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Asmar Awad, Rima

Publications and source records attributed to Asmar Awad, Rima.

Beyond Binary: Automated PLC Memory Forensics through RGB Image Analysis and Deep Learning

The introduction of Industry 4.0 and the evolution of industrial control systems (ICS) to adopt Internet-based technologies enhanced productivity, but have inadvertently increased their vulnerability to cyber-based malicious attacks. When an ICS system is compromised, security analysts need to identify the root cause quickly to start the recovery process and develop mitigation strategies to safeguard against future instances. Memory forensics is critical in the analysis process to ascertain what occurred. To date, approaches to analyze the persistent memory in ICS devices are limited, and almost nonexistent for volatile memory. This paper proposes an automated methodology, COMA, for PLC memory dump analysis using computer vision and deep learning techniques. Specifically, COMA converts the sequences of bytes in a PLC memory dump to RGB pixels and creates a deep learning model that learns the underlying patterns and features of pre-labeled forensic artifacts in images and segments them into distinct regions. COMA then uses the trained model to automatically segment new memory images and extract forensic artifacts. We evaluate COMA on a Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC involving two cyber-based attack scenarios: (i) code injection and (ii) code modification. The empirical results show that COMA can successfully detect attack artifacts in memory dumps in both scenarios.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗

Towards generic memory forensic framework for programmable logic controllers

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a microprocessor-based controller that is used to automate physical processes in critical infrastructure and various other industries and manufacturing sectors. Initially, PLCs were completely isolated from the Internet, and cyber security was not incorporated at the time of development. The introduction of industry 4.0 and the evolution of ICS systems to communicate over public IP addresses from the Internet enhanced productivity and efficiency, but Internet connectivity exposed the systems and their vulnerabilities, which led to an increase in cyber attacks. When a system is sabotaged/compromised, security analysts need to get to the root cause of the attack as quickly as possible to recover the system. To do so, memory forensic analysis is critical to provide a unique insight into the run-time memory activities and extract a reliable source of evidence. In this paper, we analyze the memory structure of the Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC. To build a memory profile, we reverse engineer the communication protocol and conduct differential analysis to gain knowledge about the structure of the memory and the low-level representation of control logic instructions. We then identify dynamic and static memory regions by modifying different project fields and conducting differential analysis, which allows us to identify boundaries of critical memory structures and extract important forensic artifacts that can be found in the memory. The Python implementation of the memory profile can help reduce the time and effort required for manual analysis in case of cyber incident or system failure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Memory forensic analysis of a programmable logic controller in industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are used to automate physical processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations, and are often subject to cyber attacks. As in conventional IT domain, the memory analysis of the PLCs can help answer important forensic questions about the attack, such as the presence of malicious firmware, injection of modified control logic (the program running on the PLC), and manipulation of I/O devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). Unlike conventional IT domain, PLCs have heterogeneous hardware architecture, proprietary firmware and control software, making it challenging to employ a unified framework for their memory forensics. For merely extracting artifacts of forensic importance, reverse-engineering the firmware is a tedious task, and the effort needs to be repeated for every PLC model. As a community, a step-wise approach to tackle this challenge is to analyze the memory of specific PLCs, and subsequently find a generic framework applicable to all PLCs. Our work is a step forward in this direction. By following a methodology that focuses on the functional layer of PLCs instead of reverse engineering the firmware, we analyze the digital forensic artifacts available in a common PLC, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61. Before diving into the memory dump, we analyze the PLC control software to create a list of important artifacts that are sure to exist in the PLC memory dump. The approach employs a setup where PLC control software RSLogix-5000 is connected to the PLC, and the memory dump can be obtained as and when needed. We create test cases that sequentially highlight each category of artifacts, followed by an examination of the resultant impact on memory. After attaining the listed artifacts, we employ conventional string and known data searches to extract interesting information present in this PLC's memory. The memory analysis profile, presented as a Python library and shared with the community, can help a forensic investigator to readily extract forensic artifacts from the same model's controller. The adopted approach may help researchers in creating memory profile of other PLCs, and ultimately formulating a generic PLC memory analysis framework.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗

JTAG-based PLC memory acquisition framework for industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLC) are the embedded devices that directly control and monitor critical industrial infrastructure processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations. Cyberattacks often target PLCs to sabotage a physical process. A memory forensic analysis of a suspect PLC can answer questions about an attack, including compromised firmware and manipulation of PLC control logic code and I/O devices. Given physical access to a PLC, collecting forensic information from the PLC memory at the hardware-level is risky and challenging. It may cause the PLC to crash or hang since PLCs have proprietary, legacy hardware with heterogeneous architecture. This paper addresses this research problem and proposes a novel JTAG (Joint Test Action Group)-based framework, Kyros, for reliable PLC memory acquisition. Kyros systematically creates a JTAG profile of a PLC through hardware assessment, JTAG pins identification, memory map creation, and optimizing acquisition parameters. It also facilitates the community of interest (such as ICS owners, operators, and vendors) to develop the JTAG profiles of PLCs. Further, we present a case study of Kyros implementation over Allen-Bradley 1756-A10/B to help understand the framework's application on a real-world PLC used in industry settings. The sample PLC memory dumps are shared with the research community to facilitate further research.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗

Feature Classification for Control System Devices

Control systems are used to automate industrial processes, smart grids, and smart cities. Unfortunately, cyber attacks on control systems are on the rise. Additionally, control systems lack the plethora of tools available for commodity systems for forensic investigation. An important step towards the proper forensic investigation is to analyze device memory. To assist in identifying features of device memory, we present a machine learning-based technique that integrates ontology information for feature classification in a control system device’s memory.

ahmed mithu, M Rayhan↗

Volatile Memory Extraction- Based Approach for Level 0-1 CPS Forensics

Most security analyzers operate on system state that is far removed from end-point components in cyber-physical systems (CPS) identified as level 0-1 in the Purdue Architecture Reference Architecture (PERA) [1]. For example, many operate on system logs and other data dumps to disks. Tremendous value that can be gained in cyber security forensics if low level details such as dynamic changes to volatile memory can be extracted and provided to more sophisticated analysis tools. However, obtaining detailed and dynamic system state at the level of volatile memory is extremely challenging [2]. Here, we attempt to apply IT memory forensic mechanisms to CPS end-point devices and statistically evaluate them. Our focus is to extract volatile and dynamically changing internal information form CPS 0-1 level devices, and design preliminary schemes to exploit that extracted information. This new capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. As a case study for our ongoing research, we apply the proposed methodology to Modicon PLC using Modbus protocol. We extract the memory layout and subject the device to read operations at the most critical regions of memory. Similarly, write operations are initiated to carefully determine memory locations (for example, bytes that hold the firmware version number). This capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. Also, the ability to dynamically make controlled modifications to specific memory locations opens the potential for new mechanisms such as taint analysis and watermarking.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗

Tools, Techniques, and Methodologies: A Survey of Digital Forensics for SCADA Systems

Security aspects of SCADA environments and the systems within are increasingly a center of interest to researchers and security professionals. As the rise of sophisticated and nation-state malware targeting such systems flourishes, traditional digital forensics tools struggle to transfer the same capabilities to systems lacking typical volatile memory primitives, monitoring software, and the compatible operating-system primitives necessary for conducting forensic investigations. Even worse, SCADA systems are typically not designed and implemented with security in mind, nor were they purpose-built to monitor and record system data at the granularity associated with traditional IT systems. Rather, these systems are often built to control field devices and drive industrial processes. More succinctly, SCADA systems were not designed with a primary goal of interacting with the digital world. Consequently, forensics investigators well-versed in the world of digital forensics and incident response face an array of challenges that prevent them from conducting effective forensic investigation in environments with vast amounts of critical infrastructure. In order to bring SCADA systems within the reach of the armies of digital forensics professionals and tooling already available, both researchers and practitioners need a guide to the current state-of-the-art techniques, a road-map to the challenges lying on the path forward, and insight into the future directions R&D must move towards. To that end, this paper presents a survey into the literature on digital forensics applied to SCADA systems. We cover not only the challenges to applying digital forensics to SCADA like most other reviews, but also the range of proposed frameworks, methodologies, and actual implementations in literature.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗