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Bakker, Craig KR

Publications and source records attributed to Bakker, Craig KR.

Constrained Turret Defense with Fixed Final Time

In this paper, we extend existing turret defense differential game formulations involving a turn-constrained turret and mobile agent to include specified final time and a constraint. For the purposes of this analysis, the specified final time may represent some exogenous input, perhaps representing the time at which some other event will take place. As for the constraint, it represents a no-fly zone for the mobile agent. The scenario is formulated as a two-player, zero-sum differential game and solved via the method of characteristics (i.e., back-propagation of equilibrium trajectories). Three different trajectory types make up the solution: trajectories that end with the turret aligned with the mobile agent, trajectories that end with the mobile agent on the constraint boundary, and regular trajectories.

differential game, game theory↗

Sensor and Actuator Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems with Domain-Aware Operator Theory

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) provide opportunities for cyber attacks to have physical impacts. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a subclass of cyber threats that act stealthily to avoid detection and enable long-term attacks. Here, we build on our past work in APT modelling to combine deception-based sensor bias attacks and direct actuator manipulations in attacks against a hierarchical control system. That past work used the Koopman operator to develop a data-driven, domain-aware, optimization-based attacker model. Using an expansion of this model, we compute several different attacks, including multiple simultaneous attacks, against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. One next step of interest is to construct a defender system, built on the same modelling approach, designed to detect and mitigate such attacks.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗

Deception-Based Cyber Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems using Domain-Aware Koopman Learning

Industrial control systems are subject to cyber attacks that produce physical consequences. These attacks can be both hard to detect and protracted. Here, we focus on deception-based sensor bias attacks made against a hierarchical control system where the attacker attempts to be stealthy. We develop a a data-driven, optimization-based attacker model and use the Koopman operator to represent the system dynamics in a domain-aware and computationally efficient manner. Using this model, we compute several different attacks against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. Finally, we discuss some computational considerations and identify avenues for future research.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗

Data-driven Resilience Characterization of Control Dynamical Systems

In this paper, we define and quantify resiliency of a power network and propose data-driven algorithms for computing the same for the power grid. To do this, we use the Koopman operator framework to lift the controlled dynamical system to an abstract (possibly higher) dimensional space, where the evolution is linear. The linear system representation allows us to relate small time local controllability and observability of a general nonlinear control system to the controllability and observability of the lifted linear system. Finally, we define the resiliency of the underlying power grid in terms of the controllability and observability gramians of the lifted linear system. We illustrate the proposed approach to compute the resiliency metrics on time-series data obtained from a microgrid.

koopman operator, resilience, control↗

Koopman-based Differentiable Predictive Control for the Dynamics-Aware Economic Dispatch Problem

The dynamics-aware economic dispatch (DED) problem embeds low-level generator dynamics and operational constraints to enable near real-time scheduling of generation units in a power network. DED produces a more dynamic supervisory control policy than traditional economic dispatch (T-ED) that reduces overall generation costs. However, the incorporation of differential equations that govern the system dynamics makes DED an optimization problem that is computationally prohibitive to solve. In this work, we present a new data-driven approach based on differentiable programming to efficiently obtain offline parametric solutions to the underlying DED problem. In particular, we employ the recently proposed differentiable predictive control (DPC) for offline learning of explicit neural control policies based on identified Koopman operator (KO) model of the system dynamics. We demonstrate the high solution quality and five orders of magnitude computational-time savings of the DPC method over the original optimization-based DED approach on a 9-bus test power grid network.

King, Ethan↗

Solving the Dynamics-Aware Economic Dispatch Problem with the Koopman Operator

The dynamics-aware economic dispatch (DED) problem embeds low-level generator dynamics and operational constraints to enable near real-time scheduling of generation units in a power network. DED produces a more dynamic supervisory control policy than traditional economic dispatch (T-ED) that reduces overall generation costs. However, in contrast to T-ED, DED is a nonlinear, non-convex optimization problem that is computationally prohibitive to solve. We introduce a machine learning-based operator-theoretic approach for solving the DED problem efficiently. Specifically, we develop a novel discrete-time Koopman Operator (KO) formulation that embeds domain information into the structure of the KO to learn high-fidelity approximations of the generator dynamics. Using the KO approximation, the DED problem can be reformulated as a computationally tractable linear program (abbreviated DED-KO). We demonstrate the high solution quality and computational-time savings of the DED-KO model over the original DED formulation on a 9-bus test system.

King, Ethan↗

Metagames and Hypergames for Deception-Robust Control

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) consist of computing and communication devices integrated with physical components such as sensors and actuators. Increasing connectivity to the Internet for remote monitoring and control has made CPSs more vulnerable to deliberate attacks, which are distinctly different from random perturbations in the system. This provides a way for purely cyber attacks to have physical consequences. Stuxnet is a prominent example of such an attack, one in which the malware acted over an extended period of time while deliberately remaining undetected. Such attacks can be described as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) -- long-term, stealthy attacks. Here, we extend our previous work on hypergames to develop defender strategies that are robust to deception and do not rely on attack detection. We prove that the defender can bound the attacker payoff with these strategies even when the attacker can choose between different attack modes, and we numerically demonstrate our approach on a realistic building control system. Finally, we discuss next steps in extending this approach towards an operational capability.

hypergames, cyber-physical systems, robust control↗

Solvability, Operability, and Security for Cyber-Physical Systems: New Computational Methods with Revised Assumptions

In this paper discusses the use and integration of disparate but complementary tools for dealing with solvability, operability, and security challenges in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs): the Koopman Operator (KO) for solvability, Disjunctive Programming (DP) for operability, and Multi-Level Optimisation (MLO) for security. These methods can obviate the need for some of the traditional assumptions used in modelling CPSs. This paper demonstrates the methods' capabilities and considers ways to advance each method individually. It concludes by discussing how to integrate the different methods and identify useful synergies generated by doing so.

koopman operator, disjunctive programming, multi-l↗

The Koopman Operator: Capabilities and Recent Advances

In this paper, we provide an introduction to the Koopman Operator (KO) designed to be accessible to those not already familiar with the field. Our aim is to expose domain experts and controls practitioners to the concept and the capabilities the KO provides in the interest of promoting wider KO use; as such, we deliberately focus more on the uses and computational aspects of the KO than on the wealth of analytical results in the literature. Those researchers may then be able to pose new applications-based research questions for the KO community. We begin by defining the KO and describing its key components. Secondly, we discuss computational methods used to calculate the KO in practice. Thirdly, we provide an overview of different uses for the KO and its associated capabilities. Finally, we discuss some open areas of research for future KO work.

koopman operator, dynamical systems, optimal contr↗

Power system resilience through defender-attacker-defender models with uncertainty: an overview

Protecting and fortifying a power system to make it resilient is an important and hard problem to solve. The interaction between defenders and attackers, the availability of information and the complexity of power system require carefully selecting models and presenting the underlying assumptions. Trilevel defender-attacker-defender models have been developed to investigate the resilience of power systems. In this paper, we review trilevel models in power system application, with the aim of demonstrating the accessibility and applicability of these complex optimization formulations and discussing the underlying assumptions from these models. In particular, we highlight modeling choices, algorithmic details, and how operational and information uncertainty affects resilience versus the traditional complete-knowledge-based optimal solutions. We also describe other similar relevant models which lack such uncertainty and discuss insights on how to address operational, attacker, and defender related uncertainties in future research efforts.

multi-level optimization, defender-attacker-defend↗

Learning Koopman Operators for Systems with Isolated Critical Points

The Koopman operator provides a way to transform a (potentially) nonlinear finite-dimensional dynamical system into an infinite-dimensional linear system by lifting the nonlinear state dynamics into a functional space of observables, where the dynamics are linear. Previous literature has claimed that it is not possible to represent nonlinear dynamics with multiple isolated critical points if the set of observables is finite and contains the state; more precisely, such a set cannot be invariant under the Koopman operator. In this paper, we investigate this claim in more detail and provide an analytical counterexample to disprove it. We also consider the convergence of discretetime Koopman approximation error to the continuous-time error: we show both how this convergence occurs in general and how it can fail for systems with multiple isolated critical points. In particular, discontinuities in Koopman observables at the boundaries of basins of attraction may cause the continuous-time error to diverge; the discretetime error also suffers from this as the sampling time step goes to zero.

Bakker, Craig KR↗

A Methodology for Dynamic Security Risk Quantification and Optimal Resource Allocation of Security Assets

In this presentation we overview a methodology for dynamic security risk quantification and optimal resource allocation of security assets for high profile venues. This methodology is especially applicable to venues that require security screening operations such as mass transit (e.g., train or airport terminals), critical infrastructure protection (e.g., government buildings), and largescale public events (e.g., concerts or professional sports). The method starts by decomposing the three core components of risk -- threat, vulnerability, and consequence -- into their various subcomponents. For instance, vulnerability can be decomposed into availability, accessibility, organic security, and target hardness and each of these can be evaluated against the potential threats of interest for the given venue. Once evaluated, these subcomponents are rolled back up to compute the specific value for the vulnerability core risk component. Likewise, the same is done for consequence and threat, and then risk is computed as the product of these three components. A key aspect of our methodology is dynamically quantifying risk. That is, we incorporate the ability to uniquely allow the subcomponents and core components, and in turn, risk, to be quantified as a continuous function of time throughout the day, week, month, or year as appropriate.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗