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Bartholomew, Rachel A.

Publications and source records attributed to Bartholomew, Rachel A..

Emergency Management of Tomorrow Research: Emergency Operations Center of the Future Madison, WI Tabletop Exercise

As part of the Emergency Management (EM) of Tomorrow Research (EMOTR) program, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) developed concepts for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) of the Future to provide recommendations to assist DHS S&T in future decision-making with regards to research and development (R&D) and investments toward establishing a framework for a national, coordinated approach to EM. PNNL is conducting tabletop exercises (TTXs) designed to assess the impacts and benefits of emerging technologies on EM organizations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Emergency Management of Tomorrow Research – Task 3B Research and Development Community Awareness: Eliciting Emergency Management Stakeholder Input

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is partnering with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to execute the Emergency Management (EM) of Tomorrow Research (EMOTR) program to identify current EM research, elicit capability needs from EM practitioners, and identify where technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), may benefit the future of EM and emergency operations centers. This report details the methodology, analysis, and insights of interviews and focus groups conducted as part of the task to elicit stakeholder input.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

End-User Perspectives on Using Quantitative Real-Time PCR and Genomic Sequencing in the Field

Quantitative real-time PCR and genomic sequencing have become mainstays for performing molecular detection of biological threat agents in the field. There are notional assessments of the benefits, disadvantages, and challenges that each of these technologies offers according to findings in the literature. However, direct comparison between these two technologies in the context of field-forward operations is lacking. Most market surveys, whether published in print form or provided online, are directed to product manufacturers who can address their respective specifications and operations. One method for comparing these technologies is surveying end-users who are best suited for discussing operational capabilities, as they have hands-on experience with state-of-the-art molecular detection platforms and protocols. These end-users include operators in military defense and first response, as well as various research scientists in the public sector such as government and service laboratories, private sector, and civil society such as academia and nonprofit organizations performing method development and executing these protocols in the field. Our objective was to initiate a survey specific to end-users and their feedback. We developed a questionnaire that asked respondents to (1) determine what technologies they currently use, (2) identify the settings where the technologies are used, whether lab-based or field-forward, and (3) rate the technologies according to a set list of criteria. Of particular interest are assessments of sensitivity, specificity, reproducibility, scalability, portability, and discovery power. This article summarizes the findings from the end-user perspective, highlighting technical and operational challenges.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Making sense of the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy

A tool dubbed the “spaghetti monster” helps users navigate the tangle of laws, directives, and agencies that make up the US biodefense enterprise—and reveals its formidable complexity. It has been 100 years since the end of World War I, the “war to end all wars,” which set the precedent for modern biological warfare. The 1925 Geneva Protocol subsequently banned the use of biological weapons in war but did not stop the proliferation of state-sponsored bioweapons programs. With the spread of such programs and other biologically based threats, the United States and other nations have made a variety of efforts to defend against them.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Publicly Available Landscape Analysis Tool for Biodefense Policy

Outbreaks of infectious diseases, coupled with an increasing biological threat from non-state actors, highlight the continued need to prioritize biodefense. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Biodefense has noted that the US remains ‘underprepared’ for a catastrophic biological attack or pandemic and emphasized increased coordination is essential. Consistent with this recommendation, the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act tasked the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture to “jointly develop a national biodefense strategy and associated implementation plan, which shall include a review and assessment of biodefense policies, practices, programs and initiatives.”

Omberg, Kristin M.↗

Cyber Deterrence and Stability

Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, deterrence and arms control have been cornerstones of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, the weaponization of the cyber realm by State actors and the multipolar nature of cyber conflict now undermines that stability. Strategic stability is the state in which nations believe that if they act aggressively to undermine U.S. national interests and the post-World War II liberal democratic order, the consequences will outweigh the benefits. The sense of lawlessness and lack of consequences in the cyber realm embolden States to be more aggressive in taking actions that undermine stability. Accordingly, this paper examines 1) the role of deterrence and arms control in securing cyber stability, and 2) the limitations and challenges associated with these traditional national security paradigms as applied to this emerging threat domain. This paper demonstrates that many 20th-century deterrence and arms control concepts are not particularly applicable in the cyber realm. However, they are not entirely irrelevant. The United States can distill lessons learned from this rich deterrence and arms control experience to develop and deploy a strategy to advance cyber stability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗