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Berg, John M.

Publications and source records attributed to Berg, John M..

At least 19 records

3013 Fire Test 2020: Post-Test Measurements and Analysis

Sandia National Laboratory conducted fire tests on ten 3013 containers with varying amounts of water. The containers with attached manifolds were sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory for post-test measurements of the plastic deformation, the amount of water remaining on the material post-test and the mass loss. The measurements of the plastic deformation were used to determine the free gas volume in each container and manifold post-test. The disassembly of each container was documented by photographs. The amount of pre-test gas constituents is also reported using data in the Sandia Final Report.

3013 fire test↗

Technical Basis for Extending Storage Life of DOE-STD-3013 Containers

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard for Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013 [USDOE 2018], provides requirements for packaging stabilized metals, alloys, and oxides containing at least 30 weight percent (wt%) plutonium (Pu) plus uranium for storage for up to 50 years. This document provides the technical basis for extending that storage duration to up to 100 years for metals and alloys, and oxides that do not present a corrosion risk to the integrity of the container.

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Potential safety impacts associated with production of gaseous PuF 6 due to reactions between 3013-compliant PuO 2 with Novec TM 1230 at temperature

A part of the NNSA/SRNS Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is a planned expansion of an existing facility with capabilities to handle, process, package, and characterize large amounts of plutonium oxide materials for permanent disposition at WIPP. The facility design for this future processing capability will include glovebox operations, HEPA filters, and exhaust/ventilation systems. An NNSA review of the facility support systems included comments on the potential residual reactivity of previously-stabilized PuO 2 , and on the possibility of chemical interactions between stabilized PuO 2 and a new fire suppressant (Novec TM 1230), a replacement for chlorinated/brominated compounds such as HALON TM , to be employed in the event of a room/glovebox fire where PuO 2 will be processed.

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MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item CAN92 (SSR147) from Rocky Flats Analytical Laboratory Operations

A plutonium/uranium oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample CAN92 represents plutonium/uranium oxides stored in 3013 containers. The material originated in the analytical laboratory at Rocky Flats. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over 5 ½ years. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 117 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 77.5 kPa was largely due to the generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide with minor amounts of hydrogen and nitrous oxide. The internal components of SSR147 were inspected 6.5 years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 1,937 days had an etched appearance and general corrosion. No pitting was observed on the inner bucket that held the sample.

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MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

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Selection of 3013 Containers for Field Surveillance (FY 2021 Update)

This Update is the ninth in a series of reports that document the binning and sample selection of 3013 containers for the Field Surveillance program as part of the Integrated Surveillance Program. The last Update was in 2016. This Update documents changes to the binning and changes to the random and engineering judgment samples since 2016. This Update also documents field surveillance activities since 2016 and describes plans to complete random sampling in 2025. In addition, this Update describes a new effort to collect surveillance data as part of down blending operations and updates assumptions about Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) 3013 containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Oxalate Precipitation/Calcination Product PBO-47-09-012-023 (Final Report)

A high-purity fuel-grade plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample PBO-47-09-012-023 originated from the Hanford continuous oxalate precipitation and calcination process and represents plutonium oxides from multiple processes currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C, the material contained 87.5% plutonium/americium with no major impurities. This study followed over time the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400 th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a three year period. The maximum observed gas pressure was 96 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure was primarily due to generation of hydrogen (5.7 kPa) and nitrogen (2 kPa) gas. Oxygen was a minor component of the initial headspace gas and was depleted. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container did not show significant signs of corrosion.

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MIS High-Purity Plutonium/Uranium Oxide Hydride Product 5501407 (SSR129): Final Report

A high-purity uranium/plutonium mixed oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample 5501579 represents process plutonium oxides from high purity mixed oxides and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation at Hanford, hydride oxide from Rocky Flats, and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation and scrap mixed oxides at Savannah River that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure of two samples of this material with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. The first experiment studied a mixture of 60% as-received material (AR) and 40% material that had been calcined at 950 °C. The mixture contained 66% weapons grade plutonium and 11% uranium, with approximately 7.3% impurities and the remainder principally oxygen. A second experiment studied material calcined at 950 °C which contained approximately 4.3% impurities and similar uranium and plutonium content. Gas compositions were measured periodically over approximately 3.5 years in the first container and 20 months for the second container, which was terminated early due to an inadvertent container pumpdown. The maximum observed gas pressures were 152 kPa and 161 kPa, respectively. The increase over the initial pressures of 82 kPa and 88 kPa, respectively, was primarily due to generation of carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases. In the container with the AR/calcined mixture, a small amount of hydrogen and oxygen was generated and was consumed. In the container with calcined material only, hydrogen partial pressure of 18.9 kPa was measured. A small amount of oxygen was generated and was consumed. At the completion of the study, the internal components of both sealed containers showed signs of corrosion

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MIS High Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product MT1490 (SSR125): Final Report

A high purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample MT1490 represents process plutonium oxides from several metal oxidation operations that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 weight percent water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500 th of the volume of a 3013 container. The sample was a mixture of as-received material, material calcined at 800°C and material calcined at 950°C. This material contained 87% plutonium with no major impurities. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a nine year period. The maximum observed gas pressure of 118 kPa was reached during the ninth year. The increase over the initial pressure of 95 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and hydrogen gas. Oxygen was a minor component of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the inner bucket showed signs of corrosion, including pitting, in the container material contact region.

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MIS High-Purity Uranium/Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product SCP711-56 (SSR135): Final Report

A high-purity uranium/plutonium mixed oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample SCP711-56 represents process plutonium oxides from mixed oxides at the Hanford Site, byproduct plutonium/uranium mixed oxides at the Rocky Flats Plant, Hanford Site mixed oxides at Savannah River, mixed oxides from alloy oxidation at Savannah River, scrap mixed oxides at Savannah River and plutonium/uranium oxide at Los Alamos National Laboratory that are currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C the material contains 17% fuel grade plutonium and 68% uranium with approximately 1.5% impurities and the remainder principally oxygen. This study followed over time the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.1 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over approximately 4 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 115 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 83 kPa was primarily due to generation of carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases. A small amount of hydrogen was generated and oxygen was consumed. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed signs of corrosion, including pitting.

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MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product BLO-39-11-14-004 (SSR132 and 132A): Final Report

A high-purity, reactor-grade plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. BLO-39-11-14-004 is a high specific power oxide that represents Hanford process plutonium oxides from oxalate process product, oxalate precipitation of impure plutonium and pure mixed uranium/plutonium nitrate solutions, PFP NDA and impure and scrap plutonium oxides 80-85% from PFP and the 300 area. It also represents plutonium oxides from oxalate precipitation at LANL and Savannah River. After calcination to 950 °C, the material contained 80% plutonium and 7% americium with no major impurities. This study followed over time the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. A leak occurred in the original reactor (SSR132) which was terminated after 3 years. The sample was reloaded (SSR132A) and an additional set of data was collected. Results from both loadings are discussed. Gas compositions were measured periodically over three (SSR132) and four and a half (SSR132A) year periods. The maximum observed gas pressures were 93 kPa and 94 kPa, respectively. The increase over the initial pressure was primarily due to generation of nitrogen gas. For SSR132, the maximum observed gas pressure for hydrogen was 1.2 kPa and oxygen was 9.3 kPa (includes oxygen from leak). For SSR132A, the maximum observed gas pressure for hydrogen was 5.5 kPa and oxygen was 0.9 kPa. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed limited signs of corrosion.

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Evaluating Corrosion Effects on the Stainless Steel Components of the SAVY-4000/Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers

Surveillance of vented, stainless-steel Hagan and SAVY-4000 storage containers with some plutonium materials has revealed evidence of corrosion inside the container. There are ~3000 items stored in Hagan containers and ~600 items currently stored in SAVY-4000 containers at TA -55. The Hagan is made of 304L steel, while the SAVY-4000 is made of 316L and should be less susceptible to corrosion. Given the relatively thin body wall of these containers (nominally 0.762 millimeters), it is essential to understand the effects of corrosion on the lifetime of the containers to ensure worker safety. Studies are being conducted on both container types to determine the relative susceptibility of the two containers to corrosion. This paper describes the potential cause of corrosion, the extent of corrosion, and types of corrosion observed, along with the results of accelerated aging experiments. The combined results of the surveillance and lifetime extension studies establish a technical basis for extending the design life of the stainless steel components of the SAVY-4000 container from 5 years to 15 years.

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Gas composition observed by destructive examination of 3013 containers

The Department of Energy’s Integrated Surveillance and Monitoring Program implements requirements to measure gas pressure and gas composition during destructive examination of 3013 containers as required by DOE’s 3013 Standard. Gas pressures and gas compositions measured by the Program during destructive examination of 3013 containers from 2007 to 2017 are reported here. The maximum gas pressure within the population of containers that have undergone destructive examination was 299 kPa (43.4 psia) and this container had 0.52 wt% moisture which is higher than the Standard allows. The majority of containers have essentially no gas pressurization. Hydrogen was quantifiable above the measurement uncertainty in less than half (47 out of 114) of the containers that have undergone destructive examination. The amount of hydrogen that is generated within the sealed 3013 containers is always less than the amount predicted by the 3013 Standard’s pressure equation with the maximum observed hydrogen fraction (observed moles of hydrogen/predicted moles of hydrogen) of 0.18. It is recommended that for the purposes of calculating a maximum hydrogen pressure using the 3013 equation, a correction to the amount of hydrogen produced from decomposition of the water be incorporated. The pressure (or moles) of H 2 should be reduced by multiplying by a hydrogen fraction as described in the text. Helium and nitrogen are the other major constituents. Oxygen which is initially present in nearly all of the containers undergoing destructive examination was consumed to low values in all cases. The highest observed oxygen concentration was 1.7%, and in this case the H 2 concentration was essentially zero. Other minor gases observed in some cases included CO 2 with maximum content of 3.5%, CO with maximum content of 0.8%, N 2 O with maximum content of 1.4%, and CH 4 with maximum content of 0.4%.

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