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Berg, Peter

Publications and source records attributed to Berg, Peter.

8 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Compound Flooding in Halmstad: Common Causes, Interannual Variability and the Effects of Climate Change

Compound flooding was investigated in Halmstad on the Swedish west coast. The highest sea level ever recorded in Sweden was recorded by the Halmstad tide gauge. Moreover, through the city runs Nissan, one of the largest hydropower-producing rivers in southern Sweden. Together these features make the city an interesting location to study compound flooding. Co-variability between different hazards are studied using a unique set of downscaled climate scenario projections produced using state-of-the-art regional atmosphere, ocean and hydrological models. River discharge and sea level annual maxima are found to be correlated with peak strength on interannual time scales. This co-variability is found to derive from a mutual dependence that these hazards have on the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO). Precipitation also shares this dependence in winter months and acts as a driver, building up the fluvial river hazard, while potentially adding additional pluvial hazard. Trends are also assessed, and it was found that future changes in compound flooding will most likely be driven primarily by mean sea level rise and secondarily by increases in mean river discharge.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2016

Modeling in the State Flow Environment to Support Launch Vehicle Verification Testing for Mission and Fault Management Algorithms in the NASA Space Launch System

Analysis methods and testing processes are essential activities in the engineering development and verification of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS). Central to mission success is reliable verification of the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the SLS launch vehicle (LV) flight software. This is particularly difficult because M&FM algorithms integrate and operate LV subsystems, which consist of diverse forms of hardware and software themselves, with equally diverse integration from the engineering disciplines of LV subsystems. M&FM operation of SLS requires a changing mix of LV automation. During pre-launch the LV is primarily operated by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) organization with some LV automation of time-critical functions, and much more autonomous LV operations during ascent that have crucial interactions with the Orion crew capsule, its astronauts, and with mission controllers at the Johnson Space Center. M&FM algorithms must perform all nominal mission commanding via the flight computer to control LV states from pre-launch through disposal and also address failure conditions by initiating autonomous or commanded aborts (crew capsule escape from the failing LV), redundancy management of failing subsystems and components, and safing actions to reduce or prevent threats to ground systems and crew. To address the criticality of the verification testing of these algorithms, the NASA M&FM team has utilized the State Flow environment6 (SFE) with its existing Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) platform which also hosts vendor-supplied physics-based LV subsystem models. The human-derived M&FM algorithms are designed and vetted in Integrated Development Teams composed of design and development disciplines such as Systems Engineering, Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), liquid engines, and the astronaut crew office. Since the algorithms are realized using model-based engineering (MBE) methods from a hybrid of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), SFE methods are a natural fit to provide an in depth analysis of the interactive behavior of these algorithms with the SLS LV subsystem models. For this, the M&FM algorithms and the SLS LV subsystem models are modeled using constructs provided by Matlab which also enables modeling of the accompanying interfaces providing greater flexibility for integrated testing and analysis, which helps forecast expected behavior in forward VMET integrated testing activities. In VMET, the M&FM algorithms are prototyped and implemented using the same C++ programming language and similar state machine architectural concepts used by the FSW group. Due to the interactive complexity of the algorithms, VMET testing thus far has verified all the individual M&FM subsystem algorithms with select subsystem vendor models but is steadily progressing to assessing the interactive behavior of these algorithms with LV subsystems, as represented by subsystem models. The novel SFE applications has proven to be useful for quick look analysis into early integrated system behavior and assessment of the M&FM algorithms with the modeled LV subsystems. This early MBE analysis generates vital insight into the integrated system behaviors, algorithm sensitivities, design issues, and has aided in the debugging of the M&FM algorithms well before full testing can begin in more expensive, higher fidelity but more arduous environments such as VMET, FSW testing, and the Systems Integration Lab7 (SIL). SFE has exhibited both expected and unexpected behaviors in nominal and off nominal test cases prior to full VMET testing. In many findings, these behavioral characteristics were used to correct the M&FM algorithms, enable better test coverage, and develop more effective test cases for each of the LV subsystems. This has improved the fidelity of testing and planning for the next generation of M&FM algorithms as the SLS program evolves from non-crewed to crewed flight, impacting subsystem configurations and the M&FM algorithms that control them. SFE analysis has improved robustness and reliability of the M&FM algorithms by revealing implementation errors and documentation inconsistencies. It is also improving planning efficiency for future VMET testing of the M&FM algorithms hosted in the LV flight computers, further reducing risk for the SLS launch infrastructure, the SLS LV, and most importantly the crew.

Trevino, Luis↗
NASA NTRS2015

LADEE Preparations for Contingency Operations for the Lunar Orbit Insertion Maneuver

The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) spacecraft was launched on September 7, 2013 UTC, and completed its mission on April 17, 2014 UTC with a directed impact to the Lunar Surface. Its primary goals were to examine the lunar atmosphere, measure lunar dust, and to demonstrate high rate laser communications. The mission objectives, much of which can be attributed to careful LADEE mission was a resounding success, achieving all planning and preparation. This paper discusses the specific preparations for fault conditions that could occur during a highly-critical phase of the mission, the Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI). highly critical phase of the mission.

failure analysis↗
NASA NTRS2015

LADEE Preparations for Contingency Operations for the Lunar Orbit Insertion Maneuver

The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) spacecraft was launched on September 6, 2013, and completed its mission on April 17, 2014 with a directed impact to the Lunar Surface. Its primary goals were to examine the lunar atmosphere, measure lunar dust, and to demonstrate high rate laser communications. The LADEE mission was a resounding success, achieving all mission objectives, much of which can be attributed to careful planning and preparation. This paper discusses the specific preparations for fault conditions that could occur during a highly-critical phase of the mission. To get to the Moon, the spacecraft traversed multiple phasing loops around the Earth, and then executed a breaking maneuver to achieve lunar orbit. This Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) maneuver was perhaps the most time-critical phase of the entire mission. The LOI maneuver had to occur within a twenty minute window in order to achieve lunar orbit with an acceptable amount of propellant remaining. Missing this window would have likely resulted in a loss of the entire mission. An additional challenge of the maneuver was that spacecraft was out of view for approximately one hour prior to the main thruster burn, with the burn needing to occur within five minutes after coming into view. These conditions resulted in unique challenges for ground operations and the fault management system. Early in the planning stages of the mission, the criticality and challenges of this maneuver were evident to the system designers. The major concern was that any triggering of the on-board fault management system, whether it is in response to a true fault or a false positive, would result in an unacceptable delay to the burn. Therefore the flight software was designed with a flexible fault management system, such that any or all of the fault management responses could be disabled for the lead up and execution of the maneuver. Later, a triage was conducted to develop a list of fault responses, mapped to various parts of the timeline of the maneuver. Some of these contingency responses were solely ground-based if the time to detect, diagnose, and respond were adequate. Other responses were automated on-board if the response time from the ground would have been inadequate. For instance, in order to recover from a system reboot, on-board automation would have automatically reconfigured the spacecraft for the burn and reoriented the spacecraft to the burn attitude.These contingency responses were practiced, over and over, during numerous rehearsals. Although the LOI maneuver was executed without having to use any of these contingencies, the LADEE team was adequately prepared for this highly critical phase of the mission.

Cannon, Howard↗
NASA NTRS2011

Parametric Testing of Launch Vehicle FDDR Models

For the safe operation of a complex system like a (manned) launch vehicle, real-time information about the state of the system and potential faults is extremely important. The on-board FDDR (Failure Detection, Diagnostics, and Response) system is a software system to detect and identify failures, provide real-time diagnostics, and to initiate fault recovery and mitigation. The ERIS (Evaluation of Rocket Integrated Subsystems) failure simulation is a unified Matlab/Simulink model of the Ares I Launch Vehicle with modular, hierarchical subsystems and components. With this model, the nominal flight performance characteristics can be studied. Additionally, failures can be injected to see their effects on vehicle state and on vehicle behavior. A comprehensive test and analysis of such a complicated model is virtually impossible. In this paper, we will describe, how parametric testing (PT) can be used to support testing and analysis of the ERIS failure simulation. PT uses a combination of Monte Carlo techniques with n-factor combinatorial exploration to generate a small, yet comprehensive set of parameters for the test runs. For the analysis of the high-dimensional simulation data, we are using multivariate clustering to automatically find structure in this high-dimensional data space. Our tools can generate detailed HTML reports that facilitate the analysis.

Schumann, Johann↗
NASA NTRS2010

Inversion Method for Early Detection of ARES-1 Case Breach Failure

A document describes research into the problem of detecting a case breach formation at an early stage of a rocket flight. An inversion algorithm for case breach allocation is proposed and analyzed. It is shown how the case breach can be allocated at an early stage of its development by using the rocket sensor data and the output data from the control block of the rocket navigation system. The results are simulated with MATLAB/Simulink software. The efficiency of an inversion algorithm for a case breach location is discussed. The research was devoted to the analysis of the ARES-l flight during the first 120 seconds after the launch and early prediction of case breach failure. During this time, the rocket is propelled by its first-stage Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). If a breach appears in SRB case, the gases escaping through it will produce the (side) thrust directed perpendicular to the rocket axis. The side thrust creates torque influencing the rocket attitude. The ARES-l control system will compensate for the side thrust until it reaches some critical value, after which the flight will be uncontrollable. The objective of this work was to obtain the start time of case breach development and its location using the rocket inertial navigation sensors and GNC data. The algorithm was effective for the detection and location of a breach in an SRB field joint at an early stage of its development.

Mackey, Ryan M.↗