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Bertino, Elisa

Publications and source records attributed to Bertino, Elisa.

Development of Defenses against False Data Injection Attacks for Nuclear Power Plants

With the recent successful attempts against the digital control systems of critical infrastructures, there is a need to develop new defense strategies that recognize two important realities, 1) state- sponsored attackers can rely on a number of techniques including espionage, social engineering, and brute force techniques, etc. to gain access to the raw data used to control system behavior, 2) attackers can falsify operational data in manners that do not trigger conventional outlier/anomaly detection techniques in order to go undetected, which is referred to as false data injection attacks. Therefore, there is a strong need to explore another class of defense measures, referred to as physical process defense, serving as a new line of defense in the event existing defenses relying on information protection measures are breached. This physical process defenses utilize the physics and engineering models of the system to build unique signatures for genuine system behavior. If successful, the signatures would be able to detect attacks that falsify the operational data and render them harmless before they can inflict physical damage on the system. This report is focused on exploring the feasibility of physical process defenses for nuclear reactors, and their associated functional requirements to maximize their resiliency against state-sponsored, or equivalent, attackers.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Secure Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) Considerations for Smart Grid Devices

In this paper, we examine some unique challenges associated with key management in the Smart Grid and concomitant research initiatives: 1) effectively model security requirements and their implementations, and 2) manage keys and key distribution for very large scale deployments such as Smart Meters over a long period of performance. This will set the stage to: 3) develop innovative, low cost methods to protect keying material, and 4) provide high assurance authentication services. We will present our perspective on key management and will discuss some key issues within the life cycle of a cryptographic key designed to achieve the following: 1) control systems designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of critical function, and 2) widespread implementation of methods for secure communication between remote access devices and control centers that are scalable and cost-effective to deploy.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Restricted Authentication and Encryption for Cyber-physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are characterized by the close linkage of computational resources and physical devices. These systems can be deployed in a number of critical infrastructure settings. As a result, the security requirements of CPS are different than traditional computing architectures. For example, critical functions must be identified and isolated from interference by other functions. Similarly, lightweight schemes may be required, as CPS can include devices with limited computing power. One approach that offers promise for CPS security is the use of lightweight, hardware-based authentication. Specifically, we consider the use of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to bind an access request to specific hardware with device-specific keys. PUFs are implemented in hardware, such as SRAM, and can be used to uniquely identify the device. This technology could be used in CPS to ensure location-based access control and encryption, both of which would be desirable for CPS implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗