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Bhattacharjee, Shameek [Western Michigan University]

Publications and source records attributed to Bhattacharjee, Shameek [Western Michigan University].

Real-Time Testbed for Studying Cyberattacks and Defense in DER-integrated Smart Inverter Systems

In this paper, we propose a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulation testbed suitable for the implementation and testing of realistic cyberattacks on grid-tied smart inverter systems integrated with Distributed Energy Resources (DER) that use the Distributed Network Protocol-3 (DNP3) protocol for communications between grid components. Specifically, our testbed combines a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) NovaCor device, outfitted with GNETx2 network interface cards, a gridtied DER topology implemented via the RTDS software package RSCAD, and a custom virtual network that emulates a man in the middle attacker. The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker captures DNP3 traffic and falsifies telemetry data in DNP3 packets to trigger unwarranted commands from a DNP3 controller that exploit smart inverter grid support functions. We choose DNP3 and implement grid support functions according to the IEEE Std. 1547-2018 mandated for the interconnection and interoperability of DER power systems with associated power components. Furthermore, we develop a protocol payload agnostic attack detection framework that leverages the round-trip time (RTT) anomalies between DNP3 requests and responses and can detect the presence of attacks without having to analyze the payload’s contents, while balancing trade-offs between false alarm counts, missed detections, and time to detection. To facilitate further research, we publicly release benign and attack network traffic exchanged between various sensors, controllers, and actuators in our grid-tied inverter testbed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Coordinated Thermal Safety Attack and Defense on EV Battery Management Systems

Battery temperature sensor and battery current sensor data which are key sensing inputs to the Battery Management Controllers in electric vehicles, are vulnerable to possible cyber/ physical manipulation due to known vulnerabilities inherited from CAN bus technology that is used for in-vehicle communications between electronic control units that transfer sensing and control data. In this paper, we first create a simulation that enables us to evaluate impact of cyber physical attacks on electric vehicle battery management system in a controlled environment that violates thermal safety. Specifically, we emulate a Level 3 - DC fast charging system with SAE J1772/CCS, integrated with standard charging controls and thermal safety controls on EVs, and various sensing data flows. Second, we propose a coordinated current and battery temperature attack that has crippling economic, and safety impacts. Third, we quantify the usability, economic and safety impacts of such attacks as a function of the extent of data manipulation. Finally, we propose a physics model driven detection technique to detect presence of such attacks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗