Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Biegalski, Steven.
This presentation is on the overview and status update of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Training and Pipeline Program. This lecture includes an introduction to the program, a program overview, and a status update at the end. Steps to complete moving forward are also provided.
Additive manufacturing (AM) is a rapidly developing technology that allows industries to automate and simplify the production of highly complicated items. Recently, there are concerns that AM techniques have the potential to be utilized in the fields of nuclear weapons and nuclear enrichment technology. Presently, there are very few international or domestic export controls that apply to AM's role in the nuclear industry, constituting an unmanaged proliferation pathway. Pre-existing export controls focus on general concepts and processes and do not consider specific nuances of various techniques that are categorized as additive manufacturing. To introduce legislation and controls that will be effective in monitoring proliferation pathways, one must investigate and characterize AM techniques and their nuclear applications. This paper categorizes and ranks 33 AM techniques based on their potential impact on the nuclear fuel cycle and the development of nuclear weapons. Through this method of characterization and categorization, export controls would address specific AM nuclear proliferation risks without disrupting the entire industry and fuel cycle. Additionally, legislation employing this method would identify loopholes in export controls using a holistic approach to managing and monitoring proliferation pathways.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.
The International Monitoring System arm of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization utilizes sampling of atmospheric radioxenon to scan the world for nuclear testing events. Current designs utilized in the field involve plastic scintillator cells run in coincidence with Sodium Iodide (NaI) or High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors. The use of plastic scintillators as electron detectors exhibit some issues in comparison to other materials. Silicon detectors are analyzed as an alternative to plastic scintillators for beta detection based on their higher energy resolution and lowered memory effect. A radioxenon detection setup was created with the intent of measuring radioxenon samples using coincidence counting between silicon and NaI detectors as well as silicon and HPGe. Finally, the absolute efficiency of both setups is calculated and compared.