Engineering topics

Billman, Dorrit

Publications and source records attributed to Billman, Dorrit.

6 records

NASA NTRS2020

Monitoring for Flight Path Management: Inputs to Pilot Monitoring Training

The commercial aviation industry world-wide has identified a need for improved pilot monitoring (e.g., ICAO, 2016). More specifically, aviation safety data indicate that failures in pilots' monitoring for flight path management (FPM) have contributed to a range of undesired outcomes: accidents, major upsets, and non-compliance with ATC guidance. The FAA has further stated that these types of FPM failures are likely to worsen with the increasingly complex air traffic control systems and FPM concepts proposed for NextGen (https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/what_is_nextgen/) operations (e.g., see Hah et al., 2017). An important element of this additional complexity will be the introduction of new automation or artificial intelligence that is intended to work with the flight crew but can add additional monitoring burdens. One potential mitigation for this situation is to enhance pilot training for effective monitoring. NASA Ames Research Center was asked to identify and evaluate training approaches that have the potential to enhance pilots' ability to effectively monitor for FPM (with the result of improved awareness). The focus of this work is to identify, develop or validate training guidance to improve pilot monitoring/awareness regarding FPM and mitigate the recent trend of accidents and incidents, especially Loss of Control (LOC) events. The result of this work should be guidance for FAA training and standards organizationsâ€”such as the Air Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT ARC)â€”to aid in reducing the risk of incidents and accidents due to inadequate pilot monitoring/awareness.

Feary, Mike↗

NASA NTRS2012

Human-Automation Integration: Principle and Method for Design and Evaluation

Future space missions will increasingly depend on integration of complex engineered systems with their human operators. It is important to ensure that the systems that are designed and developed do a good job of supporting the needs of the work domain. Our research investigates methods for needs analysis. We included analysis of work products (plans for regulation of the space station) as well as work processes (tasks using current software), in a case study of Attitude Determination and Control Officers (ADCO) planning work. This allows comparing how well different designs match the structure of the work to be supported. Redesigned planning software that better matches the structure of work was developed and experimentally assessed. The new prototype enabled substantially faster and more accurate performance in plan revision tasks. This success suggests the approach to needs assessment and use in design and evaluation is promising, and merits investigatation in future research.

human-automation integration↗

NASA NTRS2011

Evidence Report, Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration

The success of future exploration missions depends, even more than today, on effective integration of humans and technology (automation and robotics). This will not emerge by chance, but by design. Both crew and ground personnel will need to do more demanding tasks in more difficult conditions, amplifying the costs of poor design and the benefits of good design. This report has looked at the importance of good design and the risks from poor design from several perspectives: 1) If the relevant functions needed for a mission are not identified, then designs of technology and its use by humans are unlikely to be effective: critical functions will be missing and irrelevant functions will mislead or drain attention. 2) If functions are not distributed effectively among the (multiple) participating humans and automation/robotic systems, later design choices can do little to repair this: additional unnecessary coordination work may be introduced, workload may be redistributed to create problems, limited human attentional resources may be wasted, and the capabilities of both humans and technology underused. 3) If the design does not promote accurate understanding of the capabilities of the technology, the operators will not use the technology effectively: the system may be switched off in conditions where it would be effective, or used for tasks or in contexts where its effectiveness may be very limited. 4) If an ineffective interaction design is implemented and put into use, a wide range of problems can ensue. Many involve lack of transparency into the system: operators may be unable or find it very difficult to determine a) the current state and changes of state of the automation or robot, b) the current state and changes in state of the system being controlled or acted on, and c) what actions by human or by system had what effects. 5) If the human interfaces for operation and control of robotic agents are not designed to accommodate the unique points of view and operating environments of both the human and the robotic agent, then effective human-robot coordination cannot be achieved.

Zumbado, Jennifer Rochlis↗

NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors Research for Space Exploration: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation

Kaiser, Mary K.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Collective Intelligence and Three Aspects of Planning in Organizations: A NASA Example

For many complex sociotechnical systems, planning seems to require explicit coordination; certainly, in executing a plan the activities of different actors must be tightly coupled. However, distributing the needed planning information can be very burdensome and error prone, because different groups need different collections of information, updated or kept current on different time cycles. Further, the information needed to form successful plans is often highly distributed, and while feedback about the success of prior plans may exist, it may not be available to those in a position of using this to improve plans or to detect and resolve other problems in the system (Weick, 1995). Tools to support various aspects of planning have been developed, and can provide a huge benefit to the individuals working on that aspect. To be tractable, most solutions address a quite bounded slice of work, isolating it from the larger context. Prospective planning takes place over multiple, nested cycles of decision making. This builds a plan that specifies activities of different granularity. "Subplans" may specify multiple parallel activities by different groups and individuals, as well as sequential, nested actions by a single actor. Planning produces valuable, sharable, external, representations: in addition to prospective use, plans support retrospective assessment and also action in the present. Viewing planning in a larger context - both temporal and organizational -- enables noticing what one does not know and generating more systemic and effective solutions. Viewing a problem as one of collective intelligence invites thinking about the larger organizational context. Many approaches to supporting collective intelligence do not support execution of highly contingent actions, distributed across many players, and hence provide incomplete support for planning. However, CI technology maybe helpful in managing the processes of gathering information for decision making in planning and of distributing plan information to various actors, needed on various time cycles.

Billman, Dorrit↗

NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors Research for Space Exploration: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation

As part of NASA's Human Research Program, the Space Human Factors Engineering Project serves as the bridge between Human Factors research and Human Spaceflight applications. Our goal is to be responsive to the operational community while addressing issues at a sufficient level of abstraction to ensure that our tools and solutions generalize beyond the point design. In this panel, representatives from four of our research domains will discuss the challenges they face in solving current problems while also enabling future capabilities. Historically, engineering-dominated organizations have tended to view good Human Factors (HF) as a desire rather than a requirement in system design and development. Our field has made significant gains in the past decade, however; the Department of Defense, for example, now recognizes Human-System Integration (HSI), of which HF is a component, as an integral part of their divisions hardware acquisition processes. And our own agency was far more accepting of HF/HSI requirements during the most recent vehicle systems definition than in any prior cycle. Nonetheless, HF subject matter experts at NASA often find themselves in catch up mode... coping with legacy systems (hardware and software) and procedures that were designed with little regard for the human element, and too often with an attitude of we can deal with any operator issues during training. Our challenge, then, is to segregate the true knowledge gaps in Space Human Factors from the prior failures to incorporate best (or even good) HF design principles. Further, we strive to extract the overarching core HF issues from the point-design-specific concerns that capture the operators (and managers) attention. Generally, our approach embraces a 3M approach to Human Factors: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation. Our first step is to measure human performance, to move from subjective anecdotes to objective, quantified data. Next we model the phenomenon, using appropriate methods in our field, modifying them to suit the unique aspects of the space environment. Finally, we develop technologies, tools, and procedures to mitigate the decrements in human performance and capabilities that occur in space environments. When successful, we decrease risks to crew safety and to mission success. When extremely successful (or lucky), we devise generalizable solutions that advance the state of our practice. Our panel is composed of researchers from diverse domains of our project... from different boxes, if you will, of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).

Kaiser, Mary K.↗