2011 Wind Technologies Market Report
An annual report on the wind energy industry including key statistics, economic data, installation, capacity, and generation statistics, and more.
Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Bolinger, Mark.
An annual report on the wind energy industry including key statistics, economic data, installation, capacity, and generation statistics, and more.
The U.S. wind power industry is facing uncertain times. With 2011 capacity additions having risen from 2010 levels and with a further sizable increase expected in 2012, there are – on the surface – grounds for optimism. Key factors driving growth in 2011 included continued state and federal incentives for wind energy, recent improvements in the cost and performance of wind power technology, and the need to meet an end-of-year construction start deadline in order to qualify for the Section 1603 Treasury grant program. At the same time, the currently-slated expiration of key federal tax incentives for wind energy at the end of 2012 – in concert with continued low natural gas prices and modest electricity demand growth – threatens to dramatically slow new builds in 2013.
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Taking a bottom-up approach, this report examines seven primary drivers of wind turbine prices in the United States, with the goal of estimating the degree to which each contributed to the doubling in turbine prices from 2002 through 2008, as well as the subsequent decline in prices through 2010 (our analysis does not extend into 2011 because several of these drivers are best gauged on a full-year basis due to seasonality issues). The first four of these drivers can be considered, at least to some degree, endogenous influences – i.e., those that are largely within the control of the wind industry – and include changes in: 1) Labor costs, which have historically risen during times of tight turbine supply; 2) Warranty provisions, which reflect technology performance and reliability, and are most often capitalized in turbine prices; 3) Turbine manufacturer profitability, which can impact turbine prices independently of costs; and 4) Turbine design, which for the purpose of this analysis is principally manifested through increased turbine size. The other three drivers analyzed in this study can be considered exogenous influences, in that they can impact wind turbine costs but fall mostly outside of the direct control of the wind industry. These exogenous drivers include changes in: 5) Raw materials prices, which affect the cost of inputs to the manufacturing process; 6) Energy prices, which impact the cost of manufacturing and transporting turbines; and 7) Foreign exchange rates, which can impact the dollar amount paid for turbines and components imported into the United States.
The U.S. wind power industry experienced a trying year in 2010, with a significant reduction in new builds compared to both 2008 and 2009. The delayed impact of the global financial crisis, relatively low natural gas and wholesale electricity prices, and slumping overall demand for energy countered the ongoing availability of existing federal and state incentives for wind energy deployment. The fact that these same drivers did not impact capacity additions in 2009 can be explained, in part, by the 'inertia' in capital-intensive infrastructure investments: 2009 capacity additions were largely determined by decisions made prior to the economy-wide financial crisis that was at its peak in late 2008 and early 2009, whereas decisions on 2010 capacity additions were often made at the height of the financial crisis. Cumulative wind power capacity still grew by a healthy 15% in 2010, however, and most expectations are for moderately higher wind power capacity additions in 2011 than witnessed in 2010, though those additions are also expected to remain below the 2009 high.
This report provides a comprehensive overview of trends in the U.S. wind power market in 2010. The report analyzes trends in wind power capacity, industry, manufacturing, turbines, installed project costs, project performance, and wind power prices. It also describes trends among wind power developers, project owners, and power purchasers, and discusses financing issues.
In the relatively brief history of utility-scale wind generation, the 'community wind' sector - defined here as consisting of relatively small utility-scale wind power projects that are at least partly owned by one or more members of the local community - has played a vitally important role as a 'test bed' or 'proving ground' for wind turbine manufacturers. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, Vestas and other now-established European wind turbine manufacturers relied heavily on community wind projects in Scandinavia and Germany to install - and essentially field-test - new turbine designs. The fact that orders from community wind projects seldom exceeded more than a few turbines at a time enabled the manufacturers to correct any design flaws or manufacturing defects fairly rapidly, and without the risk of extensive (and expensive) serial defects that can accompany larger orders. Community wind has been slower to take root in the United States - the first such projects were installed in the state of Minnesota around the year 2000. Just as in Europe, however, the community wind sector in the U.S. has similarly served as a proving ground - but in this case for up-and-coming wind turbine manufacturers that are trying to break into the broader U.S. wind power market. For example, community wind projects have deployed the first U.S. installations of wind turbines from Suzlon (in 2003), DeWind (2008), Americas Wind Energy (2008) and later Emergya Wind Technologies (2010),1 Goldwind (2009), AAER/Pioneer (2009), Nordic Windpower (2010), Unison (2010), and Alstom (2011). Just as it has provided a proving ground for new turbines, so too has the community wind sector in the United States served as a laboratory for experimentation with innovative new financing structures. For example, a variation of one of the most common financing arrangements in the U.S. wind market today - the 'partnership flip structure' - was first developed by community wind projects in Minnesota more than a decade ago (and is therefore sometimes referred to as the 'Minnesota flip' model) before being adapted by the broader wind market. More recently, a handful of community wind projects built in the United States over the past year have been financed via new and creative structures that push the envelope of wind project finance in the U.S. - in many cases, moving beyond the now-standard partnership flip structures. These projects include: (1) a 4.5 MW project in Maine that combines low-cost government debt with local tax equity, (2) a 25.3 MW project in Minnesota using a sale/leaseback structure, (3) a 10.5 MW project in South Dakota financed by an intrastate offering of both debt and equity, (4) a 6 MW project in Washington state that taps into 'New Markets Tax Credits' using an 'inverted' or 'pass-through' lease structure, and (5) a 9 MW project in Oregon that combines a variety of state and federal incentives and loans with unconventional equity from high-net-worth individuals. In most cases, these are first-of-their-kind financing structures that could serve as useful examples for other projects - both community and commercial wind alike. This new wave of financial innovation occurring in the community wind sector has been facilitated by policy changes, most of them recent. Most notably, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ('the Recovery Act') enables, for a limited time, wind power (and other types of) projects to elect either a 30% investment tax credit ('ITC') or a 30% cash grant (the 'Section 1603 grant') in lieu of the federal incentive that has historically been available to wind projects in the U.S. - a 10-year production tax credit ('PTC'). This flexibility, in turn, enables wind power projects to pursue lease financing for the first time - leasing is not possible under the PTC. Because they are based on a project's cost rather than energy generation, the 30% ITC and Section 1603 grant also reduce performance risk relative to the PTC - this, too, is an important enabler of lease financing. Finally, by providing a cash rather than tax incentive, the Section 1603 grant alone reduces (but does not eliminate) the need for tax appetite among project owners. All of these policy changes can be particularly useful to community wind projects, and have helped to support the different financial structures mentioned above. This special report - which is distilled from a longer Berkeley Lab report - briefly describes just two of these innovative new financing structures: the sale/leaseback structure used in Minnesota and the intrastate offering conducted in South Dakota. Readers interested in more detail on these two structures, as well as the other three projects not covered here, are encouraged to reference the full Berkeley Lab report.
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The report summarizes the major developments in the U.S. wind energy market in 2009.
This is the executive summary for the 2009 Wind Technologies Market Report, which covers the major developments in the U.S. wind energy market in 2009.
This article evaluates the first year of the Section 1603 Treasury cash grant program, which enables renewable power projects in the U.S. to elect cash grants in lieu of the federal tax credits that are otherwise available. To date, the program has been heavily subscribed, particularly by wind power projects, which had received 86% of the nearly $2.6 billion in grants that had been disbursed as of March 1, 2010. As of that date, 6.2 GW of the 10 GW of new wind capacity installed in the U.S. in 2009 had applied for grants in lieu of production tax credits. Roughly 2.4 GW of this wind capacity may not have otherwise been built in 2009 absent the grant program; this 2.4 GW may have supported approximately 51,600 short-term full-time-equivalent (FTE) gross job-years in the U.S. during the construction phase of these wind projects, and 3,860 longterm FTE gross jobs during the operational phase. The program’s popularity stems from the significant economic value that it provides to renewable power projects, relative to the otherwise available tax credits. Although grants reward investment rather than efficient performance, this evaluation finds no evidence at this time of either widespread “gold-plating” or performance problems.
Federal support for renewable energy deployment in the United States has traditionally been delivered primarily through tax benefits, including the production tax credit ('PTC') in Section 45 of the U.S. tax code, investment tax credits ('ITC') in Sections 25D and 48, and accelerated tax depreciation in Section 168. Many renewable power project developers are unable to use the majority of these tax benefits directly or immediately, however, and have therefore often relied on third-party 'tax equity' investors for the necessary investment capital in order to monetize the available tax benefits. As has been well-publicized, most of these tax equity investors were hit hard by the global financial crisis that unfolded in the last months of 2008 and, as a result, most either withdrew from the renewable power market at that time or reduced their available investment capital. This left a significant financing gap beginning in late 2008, and placed at some risk the continued near-term growth of renewable energy supply in the U.S. In recognition of these developments, the U.S. Congress passed two stimulus bills - The Energy Improvement and Extension Act ('the Extension Act') in October 2008 and The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ('the Recovery Act') in February 2009 - parts of which were intended to address the growing shortage of finance for renewable power projects. Most notably, Section 1603 of the Recovery Act enables qualifying commercial renewable energy projects to choose between the Section 45 PTC, the Section 48 ITC, or a cash grant of equal value to the Section 48 ITC (i.e., 30% of the project's eligible basis in most cases). By giving developers the option to receive a 30% cash grant (administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury) in lieu of either the ITC or the PTC, Congress hoped to 'temporarily fill the gap created by the diminished investor demand for tax credits,' and thereby achieve 'the near term goal of creating and retaining jobs - as well as the long-term benefit of expanding the use of clean and renewable energy and decreasing our dependency on non-renewable energy sources' (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2009). More than a year has now passed since the Recovery Act became law. Although the Section 1603 program has been operational for only part of that time - roughly eight months - the program faces a looming milestone in just another nine months. Specifically, in order to qualify for the Section 1603 grant, eligible projects must have commenced construction by the end of 2010. With this deadline approaching, the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives requested that Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory evaluate the effectiveness of the Section 1603 grant program to date (see Attachment 1), focusing on specific elements of the program that were subsequently agreed upon by Committee staff, the U.S. Department of Energy, and Berkeley Lab. This report responds to the Committee's request. The evaluation focuses primarily on the commercial wind power sector, for two reasons: (1) commercial wind power projects had received nearly 86% of all grant money awarded as of March 1, 2010; and (2) there is substantially more market-related information available for the commercial wind power sector than there is for other renewable power sectors, thereby facilitating analysis. Despite the focus on wind power, this initial analysis does endeavor to provide relevant information on other technologies, and in particular geothermal (the second-largest recipient of grant money), where possible.
The U.S. wind industry experienced a banner year in 2008, again surpassing even optimistic growth projections from years past. At the same time, the last year has been one of upheaval, with the global financial crisis impacting near-term growth prospects for the wind industry, and with federal policy changes enacted to push the industry towards continued aggressive expansion. This rapid pace of development has made it difficult to keep up with trends in the marketplace. Yet, the need for timely, objective information on the industry and its progress has never been greater. This report - the third of an ongoing annual series - attempts to meet this need by providing a detailed overview of developments and trends in the U.S. wind power market, with a particular focus on 2008. As with previous editions, this report begins with an overview of key wind power installation-related trends: trends in wind capacity growth in the U.S., how that growth compares to other countries and generation sources, the amount and percentage of wind in individual states and serving specific utilities, and the quantity of proposed wind capacity in various interconnection queues in the United States. Next, the report covers an array of wind industry trends, including developments in turbine manufacturer market share, manufacturing and supply-chain investments, wind turbine and wind project size, project financing developments, and trends among wind power developers, project owners, and power purchasers. The report then turns to a discussion of wind project price, cost, and performance trends. In so doing, it reviews the price of wind power in the United States, and how those prices compare to the cost of fossil-fueled generation, as represented by wholesale power prices. It also describes trends in installed wind project costs, wind turbine transaction prices, project performance, and operations and maintenance expenses. Next, the report examines other policy and market factors impacting the domestic wind power market, including federal and state policy drivers, transmission issues, and grid integration. Finally, the report concludes with a preview of possible near- to medium-term market developments. This version of the Annual Report updates data presented in the previous editions, while highlighting key trends and important new developments from 2008. New to this edition is an executive summary of the report and an expanded final section on near- to medium-term market development. The report concentrates on larger-scale wind applications, defined here as individual turbines or projects that exceed 50 kW in size. The U.S. wind power sector is multifaceted, however, and also includes smaller, customer-sited wind turbines used to power the needs of residences, farms, and businesses. Data on these applications are not the focus of this report, though a brief discussion on Distributed Wind Power is provided on page 4. Much of the data included in this report were compiled by Berkeley Lab, and come from a variety of sources, including the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), the Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Appendix provides a summary of the many data sources used in the report. Data on 2008 wind capacity additions in the United States are based on information provided by AWEA; some minor adjustments to those data may be expected. In other cases, the data shown here represent only a sample of actual wind projects installed in the United States; furthermore, the data vary in quality. As such, emphasis should be placed on overall trends, rather than on individual data points. Finally, each section of this document focuses on historical market information, with an emphasis on 2008; with the exception of the final section, the report does not seek to forecast future trends.
For the fourth year in a row, the United States led the world in adding new wind power capacity in 2008, and also surpassed Germany to take the lead in terms of cumulative installed wind capacity. The rapid growth of wind power in the U.S. over the past decade (Figure 1) has been driven by a combination of increasingly supportive policies (including the Federal production tax credit (PTC) and a growing number of state renewables portfolio standards), uncertainty over the future fuel costs and environmental liabilities of natural gas and coal-fired power plants, and wind's competitive position among generation resources. This article focuses on just the last of these drivers - i.e., trends in U.S. wind power prices - over the period of strong capacity growth since 1998.
Renewable power technologies are inherently capital-intensive, often (but not always) with relatively high construction costs and low operating costs. For this reason, renewable power technologies are typically more sensitive to the availability and cost of financing than are natural gas power plants, for example. In the United States, the bulk of renewable project finance in recent years has been provided by 'tax equity investors' (typically large investment banks and insurance companies) who partner with project developers through highly specialized financing structures (Bolinger, 2009; Cory et al., 2008; Harper et al., 2007). These structures have been designed primarily to capitalize on federal support for renewable power technologies, which has historically come in the form of tax credits and accelerated depreciation deductions. The number of tax equity investors active in the renewable power market has declined precipitously, however, as a result of the financial crisis that began unfolding across the globe in the summer of 2008. The resulting shortage and increased cost of project financing has, in turn, slowed the development of new renewable power projects, leading to layoffs throughout the entire industry supply chain. In recognition of the fact that tax-based policy incentives are not particularly effective when tax burdens are shrinking or non-existent, Congress included several provisions in 'The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009' (ARRA 2009) designed to make federal incentives for renewable power technologies more useful. Among these provisions is one that allows projects eligible to receive the production tax credit ('the PTC', see Text Box 1) to instead elect the investment tax credit ('the ITC', see Text Box 2). Another provision enables ITC-eligible projects (which now include most PTC-eligible renewable power projects) to instead receive--for a limited time only--a cash grant of equivalent value. These two provisions (among others) could have a significant impact on how renewable power projects are financed over the next few years. The purpose of this report is to both quantitatively and qualitatively analyze, from the project developer/owner perspective, the choice between the PTC and the ITC (or equivalent cash grant) for a number of different renewable power technologies.1 Because the two credits are structured differently, and apply in different ways to different technologies, the choice between the two lends itself to quantitative financial analysis of the conditions under which either the PTC or the ITC would, at least in theory, provide greater financial value. Qualitative considerations may be equally important, however, particularly in instances where quantitative differences are modest. This report proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of ARRA 2009, with some emphasis on those provisions designed to ease the liquidity crisis facing the renewable power sector. Section 3 describes the quantitative analysis methodology, as well as modeling results for wind, open-loop biomass, closed-loop biomass, geothermal, and landfill gas projects. Section 4 discusses a number of qualitative considerations that may play as important of a role as quantitative results in deciding between the PTC and the ITC (or equivalent cash grant). Section 5 concludes, and an Appendix provides supplemental tables that present quantitative analysis results conducted at different discount rates.
On December 17, 2008, the reference-case projections from Annual Energy Outlook 2009 (AEO 2009) were posted on the Energy Information Administration's (EIA) web site. We at LBNL have, in the past, compared the EIA's reference-case long-term natural gas price forecasts from the AEO series to contemporaneous natural gas prices that can be locked in through the forward market, with the goal of better understanding fuel price risk and the role that renewables can play in mitigating such risk. As such, we were curious to see how the latest AEO reference-case gas price forecast compares to the NYMEX natural gas futures strip. This brief memo presents our findings. Note that this memo pertains only to natural gas fuel price risk (i.e., the risk that natural gas prices might differ over the life of a gas-fired generation asset from what was expected when the decision to build the gas-fired unit was made). We do not take into consideration any of the other distinct attributes of gas-fired and renewable generation, such as dispatchability (or lack thereof), differences in capital costs and O&M expenses, or environmental externalities. A comprehensive comparison of different resource types--which is well beyond the scope of this memo--would need to account for differences in all such attributes, including fuel price risk. Furthermore, our analysis focuses solely on natural-gas-fired generation (as opposed to coal-fired or nuclear generation, for example), for several reasons: (1) price volatility has been more of a concern for natural gas than for other fuels used to generate power; (2) for environmental and other reasons, natural gas has, in recent years, been the fuel of choice among power plant developers; and (3) natural gas-fired generators often set the market clearing price in competitive wholesale power markets throughout the United States. That said, a more-complete analysis of how renewables mitigate fuel price risk would also need to consider coal, uranium, and other fuel prices. Finally, we caution readers about drawing inferences or conclusions based solely on this memo in isolation: to place the information contained herein within its proper context, we strongly encourage readers interested in this issue to read through our previous, more-detailed studies, available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/reports/53587.pdf or http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/54751.pdf.
Installations of grid-connected photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United States have increased dramatically in recent years, growing from less than 20 MW in 2000 to nearly 500 MW at the end of 2007, a compound average annual growth rate of 59%. Of particular note is the increasing contribution of 'non-residential' grid-connected PV systems--defined here as those systems installed on the customer (rather than utility) side of the meter at commercial, institutional, non-profit, or governmental properties--to the overall growth trend. Although there is some uncertainty in the numbers, non-residential PV capacity grew from less than half of aggregate annual capacity installations in 2000-2002 to nearly two-thirds in 2007. This relative growth trend is expected to have continued through 2008. The non-residential sector's commanding lead in terms of installed capacity in recent years primarily reflects two important differences between the non-residential and residential markets: (1) the greater federal 'Tax Benefits'--including the 30% investment tax credit (ITC) and accelerated tax depreciation--provided to commercial (relative to residential) PV systems, at least historically (this relative tax advantage has largely disappeared starting in 2009) and (2) larger non-residential project size. These two attributes have attracted to the market a number of institutional investors (referred to in this report as 'Tax Investors') seeking to invest in PV projects primarily to capture their Tax Benefits. The presence of these Tax Investors, in turn, has fostered a variety of innovative approaches to financing non-residential PV systems. This financial innovation--which is the topic of this report--has helped to overcome some of the largest barriers to the adoption of non-residential PV, and is therefore partly responsible (along with the policy changes that have driven this innovation) for the rapid growth in the market seen in recent years.ii Specifically, due to financial innovation, non-residential entities interested in PV no longer face prohibitively high up-front costs, no longer need to be able to absorb Tax Benefits in order to make the economics pencil out, no longer need to be able to operate and maintain the system, and no longer need to accept the risk that the system does not perform as expected.
On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) increased the Section 48 investment tax credit (ITC) for commercial photovoltaic (PV) systems from 10% to 30% of the project's 'tax credit basis' (i.e., the dollar amount to which the ITC applies), and also created in Section 25D of the Internal Revenue Code a new 30% ITC (capped at $2,000) for residential solar systems. Both changes went into effect on January 1, 2006, for an initial period of two years, and in late 2006 both credits were extended 'as is' for an additional year (through 2008). In early 2006, Berkeley Lab published an LBNL/CESA case study that examined the financial impact of EPAct 2005's solar tax credits on PV system owners, in light of the $2,000 cap on the residential credit, as well as the fact that most PV systems in the U.S. also receive cash incentives from state-, local-, or utility-administered PV programs, and that these cash incentives may reduce the value of federal tax credits in certain situations. That case study was subsequently revised in February 2007 to reflect new Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidance. The findings of that case study, which are briefly recapped in the next section, remained relevant up until October 2008, when the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 extended both solar credits for an unprecedented eight years, removed the $2,000 cap on the residential credit, and eliminated restrictions on the use of both credits in conjunction with the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). These significant changes, which apply to systems placed in service on or after January 1, 2009, will increase the value of the solar credits for residential system owners in particular, and are likely to spur significant growth in residential, commercial, and utility-scale PV installations in the years ahead. In light of these substantial changes to the solar ITC, this report takes a fresh look at the value of these revised credits, focusing specifically on the Section 25D residential credit. After first setting the stage by briefly reviewing our previous findings, the document proceeds to cover four specific areas in which the removal of the $2,000 cap on the residential ITC will have significant implications for PV program administrators, PV system owners, and the PV industry that go beyond the obvious market growth potential created by these more-lucrative federal incentives. These four areas include: (1) The financial implications of whether or not residential cash rebates are considered to be taxable income; (2) The role of low-interest loan programs and other forms of 'subsidized energy financing' under an uncapped ITC; (3) The degree to which taxable and nontaxable rebate levels might be reduced in response to the extra value provided by an uncapped ITC; and (4) The impact of an uncapped ITC on third-party financing and ownership models that are just beginning to emerge in the residential sector. The document concludes by highlighting a common thread that runs throughout: the need for PV program managers to understand whether or not their rebates are considered to be taxable income before they can react in an appropriate manner to the recent changes in federal solar policy and, if financing programs are offered, the need to understand whether the IRS considers these programs to be 'subsidized'. Finally, we note that this paper is based on current law; future legislative changes to the ITC could, of course, alter the conclusions reached here.