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Bowyer, Theodore W.

Publications and source records attributed to Bowyer, Theodore W..

Quantifying the Potential of Argon Detection Capabilities for Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

Abstract Current noble gas detection systems for nuclear explosion monitoring are based on the detection of four radioxenon isotopes—Xe-131m, -133, -133m and -135. The data provided by radioxenon detection could be enhanced by other radionuclide signatures such as Ar-37. Activation of Ca-40 in rock by neutrons produces Ar-37, and monitoring for this additional nuclide could help distinguish detections of nuclear explosions from background sources, such as medical isotope production. This work studies the capabilities of a hypothetical argon detection network. A 10 kt explosion was modeled using MCNP and SCALE to determine the inventory of Ar-37 created in a representative granite rock layer, assuming either 0.1, 1 or 10% of the total inventory was released. The Ar-37 inventory was combined with atmospheric transport data from HYSPLIT compiled in a previous study, along with the detection limits of standard Ar-37 detection systems, to determine how many hypothetical monitoring stations would detect Ar-37 from an explosion. This method was repeated for 365 HYSPLIT data sets to create a year’s worth of hypothetical explosions, releases, and detections. The study quantified the average number of detections per release, the number of stations detecting Ar-37, and the possibility of detecting Ar-37 in coincidence with xenon.

37Ar↗

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

First STAX detector installation at the National Institute for Radioelements (IRE)

The Source Term Analysis of Xenon (STAX) project has been installing stack detectors at medical isotope production facilities to measure radioxenon emissions to investigate the effect of radioxenon releases on nuclear explosion monitoring. This paper outlines the installation of the first STAX detection system at the National Institute for Radioelements (IRE) in Fleurus, Belgium which has been operating for over three years and transferring collected data to the STAX repository. Information about the equipment installed, the data flow established, and calculations for determination of radioxenon releases from the facility are presented. Further. data quality was investigated to confirm values reported by STAX automated data processing and in a comparison of collected STAX data with data collected by IRE for regulatory reporting.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Using STAX data to predict IMS radioxenon concentrations

The noble gas collection and measurement stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS) are heavily influenced by releases from medical isotope production facilities. The ability to reliably model the movement of radioxenon from the points of release to these IMS samplers has improved enough that a routine aspect of the analysis of IMS radioxenon data should be the prediction of the effect of releases from civilian nuclear facilities on the sample concentrations. In this work, predicted concentrations at IMS noble gas systems in Germany and Sweden based on measured releases from Institute for Radioelements (IRE) in Belgium and atmospheric transport modeling for a four-month period are presented and discussed.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Comparison of near-background concentrations of Argon-37 and Xenon-133 in the Atmosphere

Radioisotopes of noble gases xenon and argon can be important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes 133Xe, 135Xe, 131mXe and 133mXe. However, it is predicted that within 100 days of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) 37Ar would be released to the atmosphere at higher concentrations than xenon isotopes (Haas et al. 2010) and with a higher signal to background ratio, depending on the radioxenon background levels. Therefore, inclusion of 37Ar measurement capabilities at atmospheric International Monitoring System (IMS) stations may represent an improvement in the capability to detect a nuclear explosion. At an IMS station, it could be difficult to determine what constitutes an elevated concentration as a result of an UNE without first understanding the expected range of background concentrations. This work describes our analysis of atmospheric samples for 37Ar to evaluate the range of background concentrations. Samples were collected at multiple locations, with approximately half coming from a sampler co-located with an IMS xenon monitoring station (RN75). The range of 37Ar concentrations measured in atmospheric air samples was relatively narrow; for samples considered detectable, the minimum and maximum measured concentrations were 0.56 and 2.3 mBq/m3, respectively. Comparison of 37Ar and 133Xe concentrations measured at the IMS station indicated some correlation between the measured concentrations. The results presented here demonstrate the capability to detect background concentrations of 37Ar in atmospheric air and provide a basis for potential implementation of 37Ar monitoring at IMS stations.

Fritz, Brad G.↗

Migration of noble gas tracers at the site of an underground nuclear explosion at the Nevada National Security Site

As part of an underground gas migration study, two radioactive noble gases and two stable tracer gases were injected into a nuclear explosion test chimney and allowed to migrate naturally. Soil gas samples were collected from a series of boreholes and a range of depths from the shallow subsurface (3 meters) to deeper levels (~160 meters) over a period of eleven months. These samples have provided insights into the development and evolution of the subsurface plume and constrained the relative migration rates of the radioactive and stable gas species. Analysis of the samples concluded that the stable tracer SF6 was consistently enriched in the subsurface samples relative to the radiotracer 127Xe, but the ratios of SF6 and 37Ar remained similar throughout the samples.

Johnson, Christine M.↗

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed—particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection—have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. Here this study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International challenge to model the long-range transport of radioxenon released from medical isotope production to six Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations

After performing a first multi-model exercise in 2015 a comprehensive and technically more demanding atmospheric transport modelling challenge was organized in 2016. Release data were provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization radiopharmaceutical facility in Sydney (Australia) for a one month period. Measured samples for the same time frame were gathered from six International Monitoring System stations in the Southern Hemisphere with distances to the source ranging between 680 (Melbourne) and about 17,000 km (Tristan da Cunha). Participants were prompted to work with unit emissions in pre-defined emission intervals (daily, half-daily, 3-hourly and hourly emission segment lengths) and in order to perform a blind test actual emission values were not provided to them. Despite the quite different settings of the two atmospheric transport modelling challenges there is common evidence that for long-range atmospheric transport using temporally highly resolved emissions and highly space-resolved meteorological input fields has no significant advantage compared to using lower resolved ones. As well an uncertainty of up to 20% in the daily stack emission data turns out to be acceptable for the purpose of a study like this. Model performance at individual stations is quite diverse depending largely on successfully capturing boundary layer processes. No single model-meteorology combination performs best for all stations. Moreover, the stations statistics do not depend on the distance between the source and the individual stations. Finally, it became more evident how future exercises need to be designed. Set-up parameters like the meteorological driver or the output grid resolution should be pre-scribed in order to enhance diversity as well as comparability among model runs.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Improved performance comparisons of radioxenon systems for low level releases in nuclear explosion monitoring

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes. Radioxenon systems with lower detection limits are currently in development. Historically, the sensitivity of radioxenon systems was measured by the minimum detectable concentration for each isotope. In this paper we analyze the response of radioxenon systems using rigorous metrics in conjunction with hypothetical representative releases indicative of an underground nuclear explosion instead of using only minimum detectable concentrations. Our analyses incorporate the impact of potential spectral interferences on detection limits and the importance of measuring isotopic ratios of the relevant radioxenon isotopes in order to improve discrimination from background sources particularly for low-level releases. To provide a sufficient data set for analysis, hypothetical representative releases are simulated every day from the same location for an entire year. The performance of three types of samplers are evaluated assuming they are located at 15 IMS radionuclide stations in the region of the release point. The performance of two IMS-deployed samplers and a next-generation system is compared with proposed metrics for detection and discrimination using representative releases from the nuclear test site used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Haas, Derek A.↗

A review of the developments of radioxenon detectors for nuclear explosion monitoring

Developments in radioxenon monitoring since the implementation of the International Monitoring System are reviewed with emphasis on the most current technologies to improve detector sensitivity and resolution. The nuclear detectors reviewed include combinations of plastic and NaI(Tl) detectors, high purity germanium detectors, silicon detectors, and phoswich detectors. The minimum detectable activity and calibration methods for the various detectors are also discussed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radiological Source Term Estimates of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident

In the aftermath of a radiological disaster, it is desirable to predict and estimate the amount of radionuclides released into the atmosphere and environment. We obtained an estimate for radioxenon activity released into the atmosphere during the Fukushima accident by minimizing the discrepancy between the measured activity at several International Monitoring System (IMS) detectors and that obtained with the FLEXPART atmospheric transport modeling (ATM) code.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Estimation of Plutonium-240 Mass in Waste Tanks Using Ultra-Sensitive Detection of Radioactive Xenon Isotopes from Spontaneous Fission

This report details efforts to develop a technique which is able to detect and quantify the mass of 240 Pu in waste storage tanks and other enclosed spaces. If the isotopic ratios of the plutonium contained in the enclosed space is also known, then this technique is capable of estimating the total mass of the plutonium without physical sample retrieval and radiochemical analysis of hazardous material. Results utilizing this technique are reported for a Hanford Site waste tank (TX-118) and a well-characterized plutonium sample in a laboratory environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Consideration of impact of atmospheric intrusion in subsurface sampling for investigation of suspected underground nuclear explosions

Radioactive noble gases radioxenon and radioargon constitute the primary smoking gun of an underground nuclear explosion. The aim of subsurface sampling of soil gas as part of an on-site inspection (OSI) is to search for evidence of a suspected underground nuclear event. It has been hypothesized that atmospheric gas can disturb soil gas concentrations and therefore potentially add to problems in civilian source discrimination verifying treaty compliance under the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Furthermore, this work describes a study of intrusion of atmospheric air into the subsurface and its potential impact on an OSI using results of simulations from the underground transport of environmental xenon (UTEX) model.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Xenon monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

How do you monitor (verify) a CTBT? It is a difficult challenge to monitor the entire world for nuclear tests, regardless of size. Nuclear tests 'normally' occur underground, above ground or underwater. Setting aside very small tests (let's limit our thinking to 1 kiloton or more), nuclear tests shake the ground, emit large amounts of radioactivity, and make loud noises if in the atmosphere (or hydroacoustic waves if underwater)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗