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Boyer, Wayne F

Publications and source records attributed to Boyer, Wayne F.

Deception used for Cyber Defense of Control Systems

Control system cyber security defense mechanisms may employ deception to make it more difficult for attackers to plan and execute successful attacks. These deceptive defense mechanisms are organized and initially explored according to a specific deception taxonomy and the seven abstract dimensions of security previously proposed as a framework for the cyber security of control systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Study of Security Attributes of Smart Grid Systems- Current Cyber Security Issues

This document provides information for a report to congress on Smart Grid security as required by Section 1309 of Title XIII of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The security of any future Smart Grid is dependent on successfully addressing the cyber security issues associated with the nation’s current power grid. Smart Grid will utilize numerous legacy systems and technologies that are currently installed. Therefore, known vulnerabilities in these legacy systems must be remediated and associated risks mitigated in order to increase the security and success of the Smart Grid. The implementation of Smart Grid will include the deployment of many new technologies and multiple communication infrastructures. This report describes the main technologies that support Smart Grid and summarizes the status of implementation into the existing U.S. electrical infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Empirical Estimates and Observations of 0Day Vulnerabilities

We define a 0Day vulnerability to be any vulnerability, in deployed software, that has been discovered by at least one person but has not yet been publicly announced or patched. These 0Day vulnerabilities are of particular interest when assessing the risk to a system from exploit of vulnerabilities which are not generally known to the public or, most importantly, to the owners of the system. Using the 0Day definition given above, we analyzed the 0Day lifespans of 491 vulnerabilities and conservatively estimated that in the worst year there were on average 2500 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. Then using a small but intriguing set of 15 0Day vulnerability lifespans representing the time from actual discovery to public disclosure, we made a more aggressive estimate. In this case, we estimated that in the worst year there were, on average, 4500 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day.

0Day lifespan↗

Empirical Estimates of 0Day Vulnerabilities in Control Systems

We define a 0Day vulnerability to be any vulnerability, in deployed software, which has been discovered by at least one person but has not yet been publicly announced or patched. These 0Day vulnerabilities are of particular interest when assessing the risk to well managed control systems which have already effectively mitigated the publicly known vulnerabilities. In these well managed systems the risk contribution from 0Days will have proportionally increased. To aid understanding of how great a risk 0Days may pose to control systems, an estimate of how many are in existence is needed. Consequently, using the 0Day definition given above, we developed and applied a method for estimating how many 0Day vulnerabilities are in existence on any given day. The estimate is made by: empirically characterizing the distribution of the lifespans, measured in days, of 0Day vulnerabilities; determining the number of vulnerabilities publicly announced each day; and applying a novel method for estimating the number of 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day using the number of vulnerabilities publicly announced each day and the previously derived distribution of 0Day lifespans. The method was first applied to a general set of software applications by analyzing the 0Day lifespans of 491 software vulnerabilities and using the daily rate of vulnerability announcements in the National Vulnerability Database. This led to a conservative estimate that in the worst year there were, on average, 2500 0Day software related vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. Using a smaller but intriguing set of 15 0Day software vulnerability lifespans representing the actual time from discovery to public disclosure, we then made a more aggressive estimate. In this case, we estimated that in the worst year there were, on average, 4500 0Day software vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. We then proceeded to identify the subset of software applications likely to be used in some control systems, analyzed the associated subset of vulnerabilities, and characterized their lifespans. Using the previously developed method of analysis, we very conservatively estimated 250 control system related 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. While reasonable, this first order estimate for control systems is probably far more conservative than those made for general software systems since the estimate did not include vulnerabilities unique to control system specific components. These control system specific vulnerabilities were unable to be included in the estimate for a variety of reasons with the most problematic being that the public announcement of unique control system vulnerabilities is very sparse. Consequently, with the intent to improve the above 0Day estimate for control systems, we first identified the additional, unique to control systems, vulnerability estimation constraints and then investigated new mechanisms which may be useful for estimating the number of unique 0Day software vulnerabilities found in control system components. We proceeded to identify a number of new mechanisms and approaches for estimating and incorporating control system specific vulnerabilities into an improved 0Day estimation method. These new mechanisms and approaches appear promising and will be more rigorously evaluated during the course of the next year.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Primer Control System Cyber Security Framework and Technical Metrics

The Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division supported development of a control system cyber security framework and a set of technical metrics to aid owner-operators in tracking control systems security. The framework defines seven relevant cyber security dimensions and provides the foundation for thinking about control system security. Based on the developed security framework, a set of ten technical metrics are recommended that allow control systems owner-operators to track improvements or degradations in their individual control systems security posture.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗