Engineering topics

Burkes, Klaehn W.

Publications and source records attributed to Burkes, Klaehn W..

10 records

DOE OSTI2022

DC compensation for power transformer through neutral DC injection

A power transmission system can include a transformer and compensator circuit(s), each coupled between a node of the transformer and a ground connection. The compensator circuit(s) can each be configured to counteract a DC signal component of an AC signal at the transformer. The compensator circuit(s) can include a converter circuit having an AC side and a DC side and configured to convert a DC voltage on the DC side to an AC signal at the AC side. The compensator circuit(s) can include a DC link coupled to the DC side of the converter circuit. The compensator circuit(s) can include a controller configured to measure a DC signal component between the load and the ground; to determine, based at least in part on the DC signal component, a compensating signal configured to counteract the DC signal component; and to inject, by the converter circuit, the compensating signal to counteract the DC signal component.

Burkes, Klaehn W.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Leading/lagging cable referencing platform for monitoring the health of underground cable networks

A system for detecting water trees in branching underground electrical cables includes a pulse generator configured to inject a pulse into a first underground cable that branches into a second underground cable and a third underground cable. The system includes a first sensor associated with the first cable, a second sensor associated with the second cable, and a third sensor associated with the third cable. The system includes a control device configured to obtain a first, second, and third signal associated with the first, second and third sensors, respectively. The control device determines a lead-lag relationship between the second and third signals and determines presence of a water tree within at least one of the second and third cable based on the lead-lag relationship. When presence of a water tree is determined, the control device generates a control action associated with repairing or replacing the second and/or third cable.

Burkes, Klaehn W.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Portable Industrial Control Systems Simulator (Final Report)

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are more integrated than they have ever been before, but also the division between IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) is becoming a grey area. As the integration of IT and OT occurs more often, cyber attack will also increase. Cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure can be highly detrimental to society, notably via compromised Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Virtual and physical simulation has been used in medical fields, mathematics, architecture, aeronautics, space, and many more. Virtualization & Simulation in a lab environment is ideal because there is a need for the ability to test theories and designs is a safe and cost-effective way without risking equipment damage or, more importantly, human life. Furthermore, OT and ICS are some of the most difficult systems to use for research and development. They are either committed to operations or widely expensive to set up in a life-like environment. Virtualization and simulation will allow these otherwise accessible systems to be a test bed for the training, development, and research of SRNL customers or engineers and scientists at SRNL. This will allow the testbed to fit into a small form factor and interact with a simulator with minimum hardware components for easy transports and replication effort within the environment.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Effect of GPS Manipulation to Traditional and Next Generation Relay Protection (Final Report)

This project’s objective is to test the effect of GPS timing variations on relay protection algorithms to determine vulnerabilities and the associated hazards to the electric grid. This will focus on time domain protection which utilizes traveling waves measured on the transmission lines to detect the fault within a tower span. This requires the use of GPS to sync the two substations and can be vulnerable to GPS manipulation. However, the effects of GPS manipulation are not a commonly known risk. Therefore, this LDRD will address the risks of GPS manipulation for on a new protective relay technology that has the potential to change protective relaying. For time domain protection a GPS resilient architecture was implemented and tested for time domain protective relays through a direct serial fiber connection between the two relays. This allows for one relay to be the master and provide synchronization outside of timestamp for traveling wave protection.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2021

SRNL EPC Installation Report

During the week of August 25th, 2021, three Electric Phenomenon Cluster (EPC) sensors were installed at the Savannah River Site (SRS) owned, Dominion Energy (DE) operated 504-2G substation.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Fork Union EPC Installation Observation Report

On June 22nd and 23rd, a representative from Savannah River National Lab (SRNL) traveled to the Fork Union substation in Fork Union, Virginia (owned and operated by Dominion Energy) to observe the installation, calibration, and commissioning of three Electric Phenomena Cluster (EPC) sensors. The installation in its entirety included the physical securing of the EPC sensors by Dominion Energy, fiber optic cable (furnished by SmartSenseComm) being run in conduits and cable trays from the EPC sensor to the Optical Processing Unit (OPU) located in the substation switch house. The location of the EPC sensors, OPU, and cable routing can be seen in the figures included.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Integration of Next Generation Critical Infrastructure Sensor Technologies

This project is focused on advancing current protective relaying and control through verifying next generation timing systems and sensors with current commercial off the shelf protective relays. This will further research in the field of advanced grid modernization and demonstrate interoperability between nextgeneration protective relays and voltage and current sensors. These commercial off the shelf (COTS) technologies were tested and integrated with next generation sensor technologies, with the results documented below.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2020

HEMP Transformer Defense Through Power Electronics

High altitude electromagnetic pulses and geo-magnetic disturbances have the potential to severely impact the electric power grid by damaging large power transformers and causing severe power quality issues. This impact comes as a result of a quasi-static bias induced on transmission lines by geomagnetically induced currents which saturate magnetic components in the electric power system. This paper introduces the concept of utilizing a h-bridge inverter on the neutral of a LPT to inject a DC bias equivalent voltage onto the neutral side of the transformer windings. This biasing floats the transformer windings, eliminating the effect of the DC current and keeping the transformer from saturating. Schematic diagrams will be presented, along with simulation model data using Typhoon and PLECS, and finally test results from a benchtop hardware test.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Collaboration with USACyS for Signals Manipulation

Savannah River National Laboratory has been investing into cybersecurity capabilities since 2019. Cybersecurity has been a rapidly growing area for the CSRA in general and has included the consolidation of Cyber and Electronic Warfare units at Fort Gordon. This consolidation has been driven by the convergence of cyberwarfare and electronic warfare as the technologies underpinning Army Cyber Command’s vision of Information Warfare. This convergence, investment by SRNL into cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, and the desire for collaboration between the Army and SRNL has resulted in an opportunity for SRNL to develop R&D capabilities in electronic warfare that will complement SRNL’s cybersecurity efforts. Discussions between SRNL and the U.S. Army Cyber School (USACyS) has identified a general gap in ICS training lab capability in which both entities could contribute to solve. It is proposed to design and architecture that meets this need.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Effect of GPS Manipulation to Traditional and Next Generation Relay Protection

This project’s objective is to test the effect of GPS timing variations on relay protection algorithms to determine vulnerabilities and the associated hazards to the electric grid. This will focus on differential protection which utilizes peer to peer communication between substations to determine if the current is not equivalent. This requires the use of GPS to sync the two substations and can be vulnerable to GPS manipulation. However, the effects of GPS manipulation are not a commonly known risk. Therefore, this LDRD will address the risks of GPS manipulation for such a widely implemented technology. For differential protection a GPS resilient architecture was implemented and tested for differential protective relays through a direct serial fiber connection between the two relays. This allows for one relay to be the master and provide synchronization outside of timestamp for differential protection.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗