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Chakraborty, Pratyush

Publications and source records attributed to Chakraborty, Pratyush.

Practical Challenges in Real-Time Demand Response

We report on a real-time demand response experiment with 100 controllable devices. The experiment reveals several key challenges in the deployment of a real-time demand response program, including time delays, uncertainties, characterization errors, multiple timescales, and nonlinearity, which have been largely ignored in previous studies. To resolve these practical issues, we develop and implement a two-level multi-loop control structure integrating feed-forward proportional-integral controllers and optimization solvers in closed loops, which eliminates steady-state errors and improves the dynamical performance of the overall building response. Furthermore, the proposed methods are validated by Hardware-in-the-Loop (HiL) tests.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Hierarchical Power Flow Control in Smart Grids: Enhancing Rotor Angle and Frequency Stability with Demand-Side Flexibility

Large-scale integration of renewables in power systems gives rise to new challenges for keeping synchronization and frequency stability in volatile and uncertain power flow states. To ensure the safety of operation, the system must maintain adequate disturbance rejection capability at the time scales of both rotor angle and system frequency dynamics. This calls for flexibility to be exploited on both the generation and demand sides, compensating volatility and ensuring stability at the two separate time scales. This article proposes a hierarchical power flow control architecture that involves both transmission and distribution networks as well as individual buildings to enhance both small-signal rotor angle stability and frequency stability of the transmission network. The proposed architecture consists of a transmission-level optimizer enhancing system damping ratios, a distribution-level controller following transmission commands and providing frequency support, and a building-level scheduler accounting for quality of service and following the distribution-level targets. Furthermore, we validate the feasibility and performance of the whole control architecture through real-time hardware-in-loop tests involving real-world transmission and distribution network models along with real devices at the Stone Edge Farm Microgrid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Sharing Storage in a Smart Grid: A Coalitional Game Approach

Sharing economy is a transformative socio-economic phenomenon built around the idea of sharing underused resources and services, e.g., transportation and housing, thereby reducing costs and extracting value. Anticipating continued reduction in the cost of electricity storage, we look into the potential opportunity in electrical power system where consumers share storage with each other. We consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, consumers are assumed to already have individual storage devices and they explore cooperation to minimize the realized electricity consumption cost. In the second scenario, a group of consumers is interested to invest in joint storage capacity and operate it cooperatively. The resulting system problems are modeled using cooperative game theory. Finally, in both cases, the cooperative games are shown to have non-empty cores and we develop efficient cost allocations in the core with analytical expressions. Thus, sharing of storage in cooperative manner is shown to be very effective for the electric power system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Analysis of Solar Energy Aggregation Under Various Billing Mechanisms

Ongoing reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are driving increased installations by residential households. Various incentive programs such as feed-in tariff, net metering, net purchase, and sale that allow the prosumers to sell their generated electricity to the grid are also powering this trend. In this paper, we investigate sharing of PV systems among a community of households, who can also benefit further by pooling their production. Using cooperative game theory, we find conditions under which such sharing decreases their net total cost. We also develop allocation rules such that the joint net electricity consumption cost is allocated to the participants. These cost allocations are based on the cost causation principle. The allocations also satisfy the standalone cost principle and promote PV solar aggregation. Here, we also perform a comparative analytical study on the benefit of sharing under the mechanisms favorable for sharing, namely net metering, and net purchase and sale. The results are illustrated in a case study using real consumption data from a residential community in Austin, TX, USA.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗