Engineering topics

Cheng, Lap

Publications and source records attributed to Cheng, Lap.

5 records

DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

MSR Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This document represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Molten Salt Reactor designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) provisional System Steering Committee (pSSC) as representatives of three broad classes of MSRs. The three classes of MSRs are: (1) Liquid-fueled with integrated salt processing, (2) Liquid-fueled without integrated salt processing, (3) Solid-fueled with salt coolant. The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP merits of the MSR Reactor Technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of MSR system designers. It updates the MSR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems and the GIF R&D activities since its publication. The document, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF MSR pSSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology to investigate the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection features of the GIF MSR representative designs. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for physical protection, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Reactor Safeguards: 2022 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2022

GIF Very High Temperature Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the VHTR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of VHTR system designers. It updates the VHTR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF VHTR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the key points of PR&PP features extracted from the reference designs of VHTRs under consideration in various countries. A major update from the 2011 report is an explicit distinction between prismatic block-type VHTRs and pebble-bed VHTRs. The white paper also provides an overview of the TRISO fuel and fuel cycle. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Safeguards Challenges for Molten Salt Reactors

There are now a wide variety of molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies being proposed or developed that are gaining international interest and momentum toward deployment. There are two sub-categories of this class of reactors - those that are liquid fueled (i.e., the molten salt is both the fuel and the coolant) and those that have solid fuel with the molten salt used as coolant only. The liquid-fueled MSRs present unique challenges to current safeguards approaches. These challenges exist because there are currently no conceptual approaches to applying safeguards to unique, tightly coupled nuclear energy systems with the reactor core, balance of plant, and fuel cycle (everything else including salt processing and material separations) combined in a single facility. The application of safeguards to liquid-fueled MSRs will have to take into consideration several technical factors including: The homogeneous mixture of fuel, coolant, fission products, and actinides (with the attendant extremely high radiation field); Continuous variation in isotopic concentrations in the fuel salt, including removal (passive or active) of fission products, rare earth elements, and noble metals; High operating temperatures of the fuel salt; Online processing where some fraction of the inventory can be removed while the reactor is operational; Unique refueling schemes, including the ability to continuously feed the core with fresh fissile or fertile material; The presence of frozen fuel, potentially requiring a different safeguards process from the liquid fuel; and The presence of fuel outside the vessel. Additionally, If the thorium fuel cycle is employed, there will be additional complications since the resulting radiation signatures will be different from those of the uranium-based fuel cycle. The existing IAEA inspection regimes are based on the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle, item counting for nuclear reactors, and bulk material accountancy for the front and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. These techniques and associated instrumentation for bulk accountancy have been developed predominantly for enrichment, fuel fabrication, and aqueous reprocessing. However, none of these bulk accountancy measures can be directly applied to liquid-fueled MSRs. This paper will explore some of the possible challenges in applying safeguards to molten salt reactors.

Kovacic, Donald N↗