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Christiansen, Eric L.

Publications and source records attributed to Christiansen, Eric L..

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

An Astronaut's Risk of Experiencing a Critical Impact from Lunar Ejecta During Lunar EVA

The Moon is under constant bombardment by meteoroids. When the meteoroid is large, the impact craters the surface, launching crater ejecta far from the impact potentially threatening astronauts on the lunar surface. In the early 1960’s, the ejecta impact flux was thought no more than the sporadic meteoroid flux but with speeds one to two orders of magnitude smaller. However, the Lunar Module designers realized by 1965 that meteoroid bumpers do not perform well at the smaller ejecta impact speeds. Their estimates of the Lunar Module risk of penetration by ejecta were 25 to 50% of the total risk. This was in spite of the exposure time to ejecta being only a third of that to sporadic meteoroids. The standard committee based the 1969 NASA SP-8013 lunar ejecta environment on Zook’s 1967 flux analysis and Gault, Shoemaker and Moore’s 1963 test data for impacts into solid basalt targets. However, Zook noted in his 1967 analysis, that if the lunar surface was composed of soil, that the ejected soil particles would be smaller than ejected basalt fragments and that the ejection speeds would be smaller. Both effects contribute to reducing the risk of a critical failure due to lunar ejecta. The authors revised Zook’s analysis to incorporate soil particle size distributions developed from analysis of Apollo lunar soil samples and ejected mass as a function of ejecta speed developed from coupling parameter analyses of soil impact-test data. The authors estimated EVA risk by assuming failure occurs at a critical impact energy. At these impact speeds, this might be true for suit hard and soft goods. However, these speeds are small enough that there may be significant strength effects that require new test data to modify the hypervelocity critical energy failure criterion. With these caveats, Christiansen, Cour-Palais and Freisen list the critical energy of the ISS EMU hard upper torso as 44 J and the helmet and visor as 71 J at hypervelocity. The authors then assumed that the lunar EVA suit fails at 50 J critical energy. This results in a 1,700,000 years mean time to failure using the results of this analysis and a 3,800 years mean time to failure using NASA SP-8013.

Bjorkman, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Heat-Cleaned Nextel in MMOD Shielding

Meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shielding can include NextelTM ceramic cloth in the outer layers of the shielding to enhance MMOD breakup. The Nextel fabric can contain size (or sizing) which aids in manufacture of the fabric. Sizing is a starch, oil or waxy material that is added to the rovings and yarns to protect the fibers from being cut or broken during the fabric manufacturing process and by later handling. For spacecraft applications, sizing is removed by heat-cleaning to reduce/eliminate off-gassing during vacuum operations. After the sizing is removed, the fibers in the woven fabric are prone to breakage during handling which reduces fabric strength. Because heat-cleaned Nextel tends to shed fibers that can be irritating to workers, the usual practice for hypervelocity impact tests is to use Nextel with sizing. The reduced strength of heat-cleaned Nextel does not typically effect the performance of MMOD shields with Nextel used in outer layers of the shield, because the density and areal density of the ceramic fibers in the fabric control MMOD breakup (not fabric strength). This paper provides data demonstrating that hypervelocity impact protection performance is not adversely altered for shields containing heat-cleaned Nextel compared to Nextel with sizing.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Comparison of Risk from Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Environment Models on the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure from an impact from a meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. An extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” impact during a US extravehicular activity (EVA) is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. A risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) by the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. Need to understand the effect of updated meteoroid and orbital debris environment models to EMU risk.

Hoffman, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2019

Hypervelocity Impact of Composite Overwrap Pressure Vessels

There is a limited amount of hypervelocity impact (HVI) data on pressurized composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPV). In recent years, NASA has performed HVI tests to characterize impact conditions resulting in either leak or burst of the COPVs representative of spacecraft hardware. This paper reports on the results of 40 tests that have been conducted on several types of COPV configurations, pressurized by inert gas to near the vessels rated maximum expected operating pressure (MEOP). These tests were used to better understand COPV response under HVI conditions and develop ballistic limit equations (BLE) related to these tests.

Davis, Bruce A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Observations of MMOD Impact Damage to the ISS

This paper describes meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage observations on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred MMOD damage sites on ISS have been documented using imagery taken from ISS windows. MMOD damage sites visible from ISS windows are typically larger – approximately 5mm diameter and greater – due to the larger viewer-to-surface distance. Closer inspection of these surfaces by astronauts during spacewalks reveals many smaller features that are typically less distinct. Characterization of these features as MMOD or non- MMOD is difficult, but can be partially accomplished by matching physical characteristics of the damage against typical MMOD impact damage observed on ground-based impact tests. Numerous pieces of space-exposed ISS hardware were returned during space shuttle missions. Subsequent ground inspection of this hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORUs) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with over 1,400 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damage features is provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects is presented. MMOD impact damage to the following ISS modules/subsystems is described: (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

Risk from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration—broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA’s Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper provides an overview of the methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, Hilary J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Status of the Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign for the SpaceX Cargo Dragon

The SpaceX Cargo Dragon has been flying supply missions for NASA to the International Space Station (ISS) since 2012. At the time of this writing, SpaceX has completed 14 missions to ISS with each returning to Earth via water landing. After each mission, a team from the NASA Johnson Space Center performs an inspection of the exterior surfaces of the Cargo Dragon spacecraft for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are pro-vided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA.

Hoffman, Kevin D.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Bumper: A Tool for Analyzing Spacecraft Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

“Bumper” is NASA’s computer program for analyzing spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk. Bumper was developed in the late-1980s and has been continuously used and maintained since. The user base has grown from a few government entities to now include numerous commercial entities as well. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team is responsible for all aspects of the Bumper software. Bumper has been used to characterize MMOD risk on hundreds of spacecraft. All of the International Space Station (ISS) modules, visiting vehicles and numerous external components and systems have been analyzed. Bumper was used to analyze each of the Space Shuttle missions since STS-50. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) MMOD shielding is being developed using Bumper as well. Bumper has also been used on numerous telescopes (Hubble, James Webb, and Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescopes), scientific probes (Stardust, New Horizons, Parker Solar Probe), and Earth observation satellites (Landsat, Joint Polar Satellite System). Bumper is also being used to analyze the micrometeoroid risk and support design of the Deep Space Gateway (DSG) and Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions. The HVIT Bumper Configuration Control Board (CCB) ensures that all changes to the code are approved, reviewed, and documented. Most of the changes are made to add new MMOD damage “ballistic limit equations” (BLEs). BLEs are typically added in response to completion of a hypervelocity impact (HVI) test series and development of an associated BLE. Other less frequent changes include updates of the debris or meteoroid environment models, feature enhancements, and feature retirement. Some BLEs are commercially sensitive and/or proprietary, so the CCB also manages code user-version control and software distribution. The current version – “Bumper 3” – is a FORTRAN executable that utilizes a 64-bit architecture. Bumper 3 has numerous features that make it a powerful tool for analyzing spacecraft MMOD risk. Bumper uses the latest orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment models. Bumper also easily processes large spacecraft geometry models, recognizes hidden surfaces, permits BLE assignment by name or number, and conducts quality checks of the spacecraft geometry model. Bumper 3 can also be used to estimate the effects of particle penetration through thin, high-standoff distance hardware components such as solar arrays and radiators. This is done using a special HVIT-developed technique know as the “3-Part Analysis.” The paper introduces the Bumper 3 MMOD risk analysis code and provides an example MMOD risk assessment showing Bumper’s role in the overall MMOD protection design process.

Lear, Dana M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Low Density Sabot Catcher for Hypervelocity Impact Tests

The monolithic steel plate traditionally used to intercept sabot pieces during light-gas gun operations was replaced by low density material. The idea was to decrease the shock stress in these plastic sabot pieces to values below the vaporization threshold, thereby reducing the prominent soot-deposits that characterize typical target surfaces. The project was a collaboration between Orbital Debris and Planetary Science interests at JSC/ARES.

Horz, Friedrich↗
NASA NTRS2018

Cumulative Distribution of Ballistic Impact Failures of Common Twisted-Pair Data Cables at Orbital Speeds

Data wire cable runs are a significant presence on the exterior of the International Space Station (ISS), and continued ISS mission support requires detailed assessment of cables due to micrometeoroid and orbit debris (MMOD) impact. These data wire cables are twisted-pair cables consisting of two 22AWG stranded conductors and fillers inside a tight fitting braided copper shield. The copper shield and its contents are covered with a jacket that has a nominal outer diameter of 3.76 mm and beta-cloth tape. The ISS engineering community has identified two loss-of-function mechanisms for these cables: open circuits due to severed conductors within the cable, and short circuits due to contact between conductors or grounded components. As these data cables are low power systems, short circuits are not expected to burn away the contact, so both open and short circuits are considered permanent loss-of-function for the cable. A total of ninety-seven impact experiments have been performed into these cables to develop a statistical model for the failure of these cables to be used in reliability studies. The experimental work has yielded cumulative distribution functions for these cables for steel and aluminum components of the orbital debris environment at representative speeds and impact obliquities.

Miller, Joshua E.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

HVI Ballistic Limit Charaterization of Fused Silica Thermal Pane

The Orion spacecraft's windows are exposed to the micrometeroid and orbital debris (MMOD) space environments while in space as well as the Earth entry environment at the mission's conclusion. The need for a low-mass spacecraft window design drives the need to reduce conservatism when assessing the design for loss of crew due to MMOD impact and subsequent Earth entry. Therefore, work is underway at NASA and Lockheed Martin to improve characterization of the complete penetration ballistic limit of an outer fused silica thermal pane. Hypervelocity impact tests of the window configuration at up to 10 km/s and hydrocode modeling have been performed with a variety of projectile materials to enable refinement of the fused silica ballistic limit equation.

Bohl, William E.↗