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Coles, Garill A.

Publications and source records attributed to Coles, Garill A..

At least 19 records

Estimating the Contributions to Human Error Probability from the Convolution of the Distribution of Time Available and Time Required

As part of their duties, Human Reliability Analysis must often evaluate if crews in nuclear power plants (NPPs) can complete tasks associated with a human-failure event within time limits. For example, the time required in NPP scenarios is determined by systematic and structured walkthroughs, feasibility studies, recorded times from training exercises, and interviews with experienced operators and experts. Typically, a point estimate is derived for the estimate (mean, maximum, or 95th percentile of time required). Using point-estimate values can mask the risk associated with variability among crews, plant conditions and set-up, environmental conditions, and other impact factors under which these actions are executed. While point estimates for time required and time available have served the industry well, without considering the uncertainty they could lead to biased understanding about the risk. The Integrated Human Event Analysis System - General Methodology (IDHEAS-G) model (developed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC) for human error probability calculates human error probability by summing two probabilities: insufficient time and cognitive error. As such, the model takes a more holistic approach by considering the full distributions for time required and time available to calculate the human error probability because the time available to complete the task is insufficient. In this study, we expand on the work of the NRC and discuss methods for estimating these time considerations. For example, for the time required, the impact of Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) on the distribution was divided into impacts that are aleatory in nature, such as crew-to-crew variability, and those that are epistemic (i.e., the PIFs). Starting with the factors that introduce aleatory uncertainty, a first-order distribution was developed from a large set of time required (i.e., NPP task completion times) data for the range of operator actions that occur in the NPP control room under simulated accident conditions. The first-order distribution can then be adjusted to account for epistemic uncertainty using research associated with the impact of applicable PIFs on the time required. We also develop guidance for analysts to address the probability distributions for the time available. The guidance we developed on how to estimate time required and time available distributions is based on the identification of pertinent research and data, data analyses, and expert knowledge elicitation.

human error probability, human performance, time e↗

Development and Demonstration of a Risk Assessment Approach for Approval of a Transportation Package of a Transportable Nuclear Power Plant for Domestic Highway Shipment

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) has tasked PNNL to address the regulatory challenges associated with confirming the safe transport of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs) containing irradiated nuclear fuel. A previous report—Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages (PNNL-31867)—determined that the expected radioactive inventory in the irradiated fuel of a TNPP would likely require shipment in an NRC-approved Type B package (or spent nuclear fuel cask) but that a TNPP “package” is unlikely to meet the entire suite of NRC requirements set forth in Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for a Type B package. It was therefore concluded that shipment of this initial TNPP transportation package, as well as possibly others, under existing regulations would likely require NRC approval using the 10 CFR 71.12 (“Specific exemptions”) process that relies on risk-informed decision making supported by quantitative risk assessment (i.e., Probabilistic Risk Assessment).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Plan for the Development and Application of a Risk Assessment Approach for Transportation Package Approval of a Transportable Nuclear Power Plant for Maritime Shipment (Rev. 1)

This plan proposes a strategy for licensing a transportable nuclear power plant, containing its unirradiated and irradiated fuel, as a transportation package for maritime transport using a probabilistic risk assessment framework in order to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. It is anticipated that initially, the deterministic transportation package licensing approach will be challenging due to the functional requirements of the transportable nuclear power plant. As such, a partial exemption request from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission coupled with applied compensatory measures are anticipated in support of providing equivalent safety to the public, worker, and environment. A plan is outlined as to how this would be demonstrated and a pathway is primarily outlined using the accompanying low accident rates which in turn support very low probabilities of release for a maritime application. Wherever possible, the proposed plan is supported by actual accident (casualty) data. Additional supporting information regarding a highway transportation probabilistic risk assessment in support of the Project Pele demonstration reactor that is currently under development is also referenced and discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Parametric Study of Factors that Affect Calculated Dose from TRISO Fueled Microreactor Transportation Accident

Microreactors are very small nuclear reactors with a power output up to 50 megawatts electric (MWe) which also meet the standards of an “advanced nuclear reactor.” Microreactors are designed to be factory-built, modular in nature, and may be transportable. These compact small-sized reactors in some design configurations are small enough to be transported by truck which could help solve certain energy challenges. This report refers to these reactors as transportable microreactors or transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs). Transportable microreactors are being considered for a wide range of independent operation applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.

microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗

Risk-informed autonomous adaptive cyber controllers

Technology related to risk-informed autonomous adaptive cyber controllers is disclosed. In one example of the disclosed technology, a method includes generating probabilities of a cyber-attack occurring along an attack surface of a network. The probabilities can be generated using sensor and operational data of a network as inputs to an attack graph. The risk scores can be determined using a plurality of fault trees and the generated probabilities from the attack graph. The respective risk scores can correspond to respective nodes of an event tree. The event tree and the determined risk scores can be used to determine risk estimates for a plurality of configurations of the network. The risk estimates for the plurality of configurations of the network can be used to reconfigure the network to reduce a risk from the cyber-attack.

Veeramany, Arun↗

Evaluating cyber-risk in synchrophasor systems

Technology related to evaluating cyber-risk for synchrophasor systems is disclosed. In one example of the disclosed technology, a method includes generating an event tree model of a timing-attack on a synchrophasor system architecture. The event tree model can be based on locations and types of timing-attacks, an attack likelihood, vulnerabilities and detectability along a scenario path, and consequences of the timing-attack. A cyber-risk score of the synchrophasor system architecture can be determined using the event tree model. The synchrophasor system architecture can be adapted in response to the cyber-risk score.

Pal, Seemita↗

Plan for Development and Application of Risk Assessment Approach for Transportation Package Approval of an MNPP for Domestic Highway Shipment

For nuclear reactors, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been conducted since the 1970s [e.g., see WASH-1400 (NRC 1975), NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990), and NUREG-1935 (Chang et al. 2012)]. PRA has also been used to assess a dry cask storage system at a nuclear power plant [see NUREG-1864 (NRC 2007)]. PRA techniques have also been applied to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, most notably in NUREG/CR-4829 (Fischer et al. 1987), NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung et al. 2000), and NUREG-2125 (NRC 2014). Additional guidance is provided in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA-TECDOC-1346 (2003). Transportation PRA was also used in the evaluations of transportation impacts in reports such as the Repository Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2002) and the Repository Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2008).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages

Microreactors are very small nuclear reactors with a power output of about 20 megawatts electric or less that are designed to be factory-built, modular in nature, and highly portable. These compact reactors will be small enough to be transported by truck or even air and could help solve energy challenges in a number of areas, ranging from remote commercial or residential locations to military bases. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is tasked to develop and evaluate transportation licensing options for microreactors. The work is funded by the National Reactor Innovation Center a National Department of Energy program led by Idaho National Laboratory for the Office of Nuclear Energy Research and Development which support demonstration of microreactor technology. Key transportation steps include the (1) initial movement of high-assay low enriched uranium fresh fuel, (2) transportation of an intact, but never-operated microreactor, and (3) transportation of an intact, previously-operated microreactor. The deliverables on the project consists of a documentation of applicable regulations and regulatory authority for transportation. The objective of this report is to propose a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors, including the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel that is assumed to be an integral component of the microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. This report includes discussion of the (1) general microreactor design concepts including representative microreactor source terms, (2) options for regulatory approval of microreactor transportation based on current regulation and historical precedence, (3) regulatory basis for including risk information in microreactor transportation licensing activities, and (4) description of a risk-informed regulatory framework.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages

Microreactors are very small nuclear reactors with a power output of about 20 megawatts electric or less that are designed to be factory-built, modular in nature, and highly portable. These compact reactors will be small enough to be transported by truck or even air and could help solve energy challenges in a number of areas, ranging from remote commercial or residential locations to military bases. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is tasked to develop and evaluate transportation licensing options for microreactors. The work is funded by the National Reactor Innovation Center a National Department of Energy program led by Idaho National Laboratory for the Office of Nuclear Energy Research and Development which support demonstration of microreactor technology. Key transportation steps include the (1) initial movement of high-assay low enriched uranium fresh fuel, (2) transportation of an intact, but never-operated microreactor, and (3) transportation of an intact, previously-operated microreactor. The deliverables on the project consists of a documentation of applicable regulations and regulatory authority for transportation. The objective of this report is to propose a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors, including the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel that is assumed to be an integral component of the microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. This report includes discussion of the (1) general microreactor design concepts including representative microreactor source terms, (2) options for regulatory approval of microreactor transportation based on current regulation and historical precedence, (3) regulatory basis for including risk information in microreactor transportation licensing activities, and (4) description of a risk-informed regulatory framework.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

Trial Implementation of a Multihazard Risk Assessment Framework for High-Impact Low-Frequency Power Grid Events

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a risk framework for modeling high-impact, low-frequency power grid events to support risk-informed decisions. In this research article, we briefly recap the framework and demonstrate its implementation for seismic and geomagnetic hazards using a benchmark reliability test system. We describe integration of a collection of models implemented to perform hazard analysis, fragility evaluation, consequence estimation and post-event restoration. We demonstrate the value of the framework as a multi-hazard power grid risk assessment and management tool. The research will benefit transmission planners and emergency planners by improving their ability to maintain a resilient grid infrastructure against impacts from major events.

power grid, risk assessment, seismic hazard, dynam↗

Evaluation of Enhanced Risk Monitors for Use on Advanced Reactors

This study provides an overview of the methodology for integrating time-dependent failure probabilities into nuclear power reactor risk monitors. This prototypic enhanced risk monitor (ERM) methodology was evaluated using a hypothetical probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model, generated using a simplified design of a liquid-metal-cooled advanced reactor (AR). Component failure data from industry compilation of failures of components similar to those in the simplified AR model were used to initialize the PRA model. Core damage frequency (CDF) over time were computed and analyzed. In addition, a study on alternative risk metrics for ARs was conducted. Risk metrics that quantify the normalized cost of repairs, replacements, or other operations and management (O&M) actions were defined and used, along with an economic model, to compute the likely economic risk of future actions such as deferred maintenance based on the anticipated change in CDF due to current component condition and future anticipated degradation. Such integration of conventional-risk metrics with alternate-risk metrics provides a convenient mechanism for assessing the impact of O&M decisions on safety and economics of the plant. It is expected that, when integrated with supervisory control algorithms, such integrated-risk monitors will provide a mechanism for real-time control decision-making that ensure safety margins are maintained while operating the plant in an economically viable manner.

ECA↗

Framework for Modeling High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Events to Support Risk-Informed Decisions

Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in loss of grid infrastructure assets challenge the electric power grid’s security and resilience. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be problematic as there exists an insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence. Since risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact low frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model can inform where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. The present effort is focused on development of a HILF risk assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision makers across numerous stakeholder sectors. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 2014 Standard TPL-001-4 considers severe events for transmission reliability planning, but does not address events of such severity that they have the potential to fail a substantial fraction of grid assets over a region, such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), extreme seismic events, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks. These are beyond current planning guidelines. As noted, the risks associated with such events cannot be statistically estimated based on historic experience; however, there does exist a stable of risk modeling techniques for rare events that have proven of value across a wide range of engineering application domains. There is an active and growing interest in evaluating the value of risk management techniques in the State transmission planning and emergency response communities, some of this interest in the context of grid modernization activities. The availability of a grid HILF risk model, integrated across multi-hazard domains which, when interrogated, can support transparent, defensible and effective decisions, is an attractive prospect among these communities. In this report, we document an integrated HILF risk framework intended to inform the development of risk models. These models would be based on the systematic and comprehensive (to within scope) characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk, identification of the stressors associated with the hazards (i.e., the means of impacting grid and supporting infrastructure), characterization of the vulnerability of assets to these stressors and the probabilities of asset compromise, the grid’s dynamic response to the asset failures, and assessment of subsequent severities of consequence with respect to selected impact metrics, such as power outage duration and geographic reach. Specifically, the current framework is being developed to;1. Provide the conceptual and overarching technical paradigms for the development of risk models; 2. Identify the classes of models required to implement the framework - providing examples of existing models, and also identifying where modeling gaps exist; 3. Identify the types of data required, addressing circumstances under which data are sparse and the formal elicitation of informed judgment might be required; and 4. Identify means by which the resultant risk models might be interrogated to form the necessary basis for risk management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Prototypic Enhanced Risk Monitor Framework and Evaluation - Advanced Reactor Technology Milestone: M3AT-15PN2301054

This research report summaries the development and evaluation of a prototypic enhanced risk monitor (ERM) methodology (framework) that includes alternative risk metrics and uncertainty analysis. This updated ERM methodology accounts for uncertainty in the equipment condition assessment (ECA), the prognostic result, and the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. It is anticipated that the ability to characterize uncertainty in the estimated risk and update the risk estimates in real time based on equipment condition assessment (ECA) will provide a mechanism for optimizing plant performance while staying within specified safety margins. These results (based on impacting active component O&M using real-time equipment condition information) are a step towards ERMs that, if integrated with AR supervisory plant control systems, can help control O&M costs and improve affordability of advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

IMPLEMENTING THE NFPA 805 PROCESS: Observations of a Technical Reviewer

In June 2004 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its fire protection requirements to permit existing nuclear power reactor licensees to voluntarily adopt fire protection requirements contained in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805. NFPA 805 is a performance-based standard for nuclear power plant fire protection that is an alternative to the deterministic, prescriptive fire protection requirements, such as 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, that was issued in 1980. One aspect of implementing NFPA 805 is that the licensee adopts the performance goals, objectives, and criteria for nuclear safety specified in the Standard. These goals, objectives, and criteria can be met through the implementation of deterministic approaches or performance-based approaches, including engineering analyses, probabilistic risk assessment, and fire modeling. Licensees voluntarily adopting the fire protection requirements in NFPA 805 must submit a license amendment request (LAR) to the NRC. The LAR provides the new proposed fire protection licensing basis, including the methodology and results of required evaluations and analyses that show how the NFPA 805 performance criteria are met. As of August 2014, licensees have submitted LARs for 26 nuclear power plants, representing 42 nuclear reactor units. Of these, 7 nuclear power plants, representing 10 nuclear reactor units, have been issued a safety evaluation (SE) by the NRC approving transition of their fire protection licensing basis to one that complies with NFPA 805. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) supports the NRC staff’s technical review of the LARs in the areas of fundamental fire protection, safe shutdown analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). PNNL, of course, cannot speak for the nuclear industry and its choice of implementation strategies or the NRC staff’s assessment of the approaches being taken to adopt NFPA 805. However, as a reviewer of the technical details of these submittals, PNNL is in a position to observe the array of implementation tactics taken in these submittals, and observe different ways licensees are making the NFPA 805 process work. For example, we see differences in how fire areas are being transitioned, the kinds of plant modifications being implemented, the changes being made to plant procedures, the number and types of recovery actions being credited, and the kinds and extent of detailed modeling being performed in support of the Fire PRAs. As a caveat, we note that it is probably too early to comment on the overall success or limitations of the NFPA 805 process or provide lessons learned for the future. Furthermore, it is not our intention to endorse any particular approach taken in a submittal over another or to critique the industry or the regulator. Rather our goal in this paper is to summarize a set of interesting and useful differences across submittals that may provide context for further future discussions about what we (i.e., reviewers, industry, and regulators) have learned in being part of the NFPA process; and how to best use that information to inform future NFPA 805 activities or other risk-informed endeavors.

NFPA 805, PRA, PSA, probabilistic risk assessment,↗