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Cragg, Clinton H.

Publications and source records attributed to Cragg, Clinton H..

Recommendations for Safe Separation Distances from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) Using a Heat-Flux-Based Analytical Approach (Abridged)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to provide computational modeling to support the establishment of a safe separation distance surrounding the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The two major objectives of the study were 1) establish a methodology based on thermal flux to determine safe separation distances from the Kennedy Space Center's (KSC's) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) with large numbers of solid propellant boosters containing hazard division 1.3 classification propellants, in case of inadvertent ignition; and 2) apply this methodology to the consideration of housing eight 5-segment solid propellant boosters in the VAB. The results of the study are contained in this report.

Cragg, Clinton H.

Explosion/Blast Dynamics for Constellation Launch Vehicles Assessment

An assessment methodology is developed to guide quantitative predictions of adverse physical environments and the subsequent effects on the Ares-1 crew launch vehicle associated with the loss of containment of cryogenic liquid propellants from the upper stage during ascent. Development of the methodology is led by a team at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with guidance and support from a number of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) personnel. The methodology is based on the current Ares-1 design and feasible accident scenarios. These scenarios address containment failure from debris impact or structural response to pressure or blast loading from an external source. Once containment is breached, the envisioned assessment methodology includes predictions for the sequence of physical processes stemming from cryogenic tank failure. The investigative techniques, analysis paths, and numerical simulations that comprise the proposed methodology are summarized and appropriate simulation software is identified in this report.

Baer, Mel

AN-Type Fittings in the International Space System (ISS) Node 2 Ammonia System Technical Assessment Report

Based on an anonymous request, an NESC Assessment Team was formed to investigate potential leakage problems from the ISS Program's Node 2 Anhydrous Ammonia System AN fittings. The Team's charter was to provide the ISS Program with a path to follow, which could include testing, to ensure the ISS Program felt confident that the AN fittings' leakage would not exceed specified limits in orbit. The findings from that assessment are contained in this document.

Cragg, Clinton H.

DAWN Mission Bus and Waveguide Venting Analysis Review

A concern was raised regarding the time after launch when the DAWN Mission Communications Subsystem, which contains a 100 Watt X-Band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA) with a high voltage ((approximately 7 Kilo Volt (KV)) Electronic Power Converter (EPC), will be powered on for the first post-launch downlink. This activation is planned to be approximately one hour after launch. Orbital Sciences (the DAWN Mission spacecraft contractor) typically requires a 24-hour wait period prior to high voltage initiation for Earth-orbiting Science and GEO spacecraft. The concern relates to the issue of corona and/or radio frequency (RF) breakdown of the TWTA ((high voltage direct current (DC) and RF)), and of the microwave components (high voltage RF) in the presence of partial atmospheric pressures or outgassing constituents. In particular, generally the diplexer and circulator are susceptible to RF breakdown in the corona region due to the presence of small physical gaps ((~ 2.5 millimeter (mm)) between conductors that carry an RF voltage. The NESC concurred the DAWN Mission communication system is safe for activation.

Cragg, Clinton H.

Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner Cracking Problem

In May of 2002, three cracks were found in the downstream flowliner at the gimbal joint in the LH2 feedline at the interface with the Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFP) of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #1 of Orbiter OV-104. Subsequent inspections of the feedline flowliners in the other orbiters revealed the existence of 8 additional cracks. No cracks were found in the LO2 feedline flowliners. A solution to the cracking problem was developed and implemented on all orbiters. The solution included weld repair of all detectable cracks and the polishing of all slot edges to remove manufacturing discrepancies that could initiate new cracks. Using the results of a fracture mechanics analysis with a scatter factor of 4 on the predicted fatigue life, the orbiters were cleared for return to flight with a one-flight rationale requiring inspections after each flight. OV-104 flew mission STS-112 and OV-105 flew mission STS-113. The post-flight inspections did not find any cracks in the repaired flowliners. At the request of the Orbiter Program, the NESC conducted an assessment of the Orbiter LH2 Feedline Flowliner cracking problem with a team of subject matter experts from throughout NASA.

Harris, Charles E.