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Cynthia Null

Publications and source records attributed to Cynthia Null.

8 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2025

Trade Space Analyses: Balancing Crew and Mission Design Parameters-Candidate Mars Master Task List

In 2020, the Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations and the Agency’s Federated Board requested an assessment to develop a methodology for trade space analysis comparing crew size for Mars missions against mission design parameters. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conducted an assessment to develop a methodology for systematic, repeatable trade space analysis for crew size and developed an initial set of human performance models and a list of candidate crew tasks for NASA’s first mission to Mars. This report contains list of candidate crew tasks for Mars.

Crew Duties and Tasks↗
NASA NTRS2024

Trade Space Analyses: Balancing Crew and Mission Design Parameters

In 2020, the Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations and the Agency’s Federated Board requested an assessment to develop a methodology for trade space analysis comparing crew size for Mars missions against mission design parameters. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conducted an assessment to develop a methodology for systematic, repeatable trade space analysis for crew size and developed an initial set of human performance models and a list of candidate crew tasks for NASA’s first mission to Mars. This report contains the results of the NESC assessment.

Humans to Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Error Analysis for Human-Rated Space Systems

Humans bring unique capabilities to space systems and contribute to mission success in a manner that cannot be matched by machines. Nevertheless, from time to time, human error can present a threat to system performance, and system designers must anticipate and manage this risk. NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems call for program managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) during system development but does not specify how to do this. In 2018, NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center asked the authors to develop a guidance document on HEA. The resulting position paper outlines a suggested method for HEA and makes it clear that error analysis is about identifying and mitigating problems at a system level, and not about finding fault with individuals. Error management strategies must be directed at error-producing conditions, thereby reducing the likelihood of human error, while retaining the positive contribution that humans make to system operations.

human error human-rated space↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Comparison of Anthropomorphic Test Device and human Volunteer Responses in Landing Impact Tests of U.S. Space Vehicles

United States (U.S.) crewed vehicles are being designed to support the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) human spaceflight programs. Vehicles must be designed to meet NASA’s occupant protection requirements including landing injury assessment with anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) and analytical models. However, these tools are limited in capturing all injuries that might occur during spacecraft landings. A NASA study of injuries during Soyuz vehicle landings has shown that analytical models are underpredicting occupant injury. Because of the inherent limitations with our analytical tools, human volunteer impact testing was employed to validate the safety of U.S. crewed vehicles. A total of 84 human volunteer tests in 11 different test orientations and g-levels were completed as part of this effort in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and the vehicle development companies. Human subjects were tested at various realistic landing loads and in the highest fidelity seat and suit components that were available at the time of testing for two U.S. vehicles. Matched-pair ATD tests in the same test conditions were also conducted with small female and midsized male Hybrid III ATDs. ATDs were fully instrumented. Head accelerations and subjective responses were recorded in human subjects. In some cases, chest accelerations were captured. Responses of the ATDs and humans in matched-pair tests were compared. No ATD tests showed evidence for risk of injury based on NASA occupant protection requirements. Human subjects reported 17 cases of discomfort or pain, 1 human subject was diagnosed with a minor injury that was not evident in the ATD tests. These results provide evidence that ATDs do not capture all potential injury risks, namely lower severity injuries, discomfort, pain, and fit issues. Overall, human testing is beneficial to understanding the true risk of injury to crewmembers during Earth landings.

Teresa Reiber↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Using Training Requirements Modeling to Inform Crew Size

Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to the long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for future missions. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew. The IMPRINT results will be presented in the modeling and simulation sub-tag. Here we present results of a model based on NASA’s crew qualification and responsibility matrix (CQRM), a tool used to identify the crew qualifications for each area of responsibility (operation, system, and payload) for a mission. The model outputs an optimized allocation of training assignments along with a flight-assigned CQRM that can be used to consider the expertise that can be trained within a crew of a given size. We discuss the CQRM model result implications on the trade space for Mars mission crew size.

Mars↗