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Davis, John Taylor

Publications and source records attributed to Davis, John Taylor.

At least 19 records

Overview of SAVY-4000 Lifetime Extension Activities in Fiscal Year 2024

This report provides an overview of activities engaged in during the 2024 fiscal year in support of the SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) lifetime extension. As the final full year prior to the submittal of the technical basis, efforts were made to assess the current understanding regarding SAVY degradation in service as well as any knowledge that provided a more substantive view of the challenges that SAVYs face in storage. Close coordination with the stakeholders (i.e. LANL program office) ensured alignment with expectations regarding timelines for the remainder of the activities supporting the technical basis document for the lifetime extension request.

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Development and Implementation of a Bag Degradation Predictive Tool at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.

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Corrosion Analysis of 121103072 (SAVY-4000)

A surveillance feedlist for fiscal year (FY) 2022 was developed with the intent to target containers with contents known to generate corrosive gasses. One SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) container with a serial number 121103072 was selected due to the reasonable wattage and known molten salt extraction (MSE) material corrosive behavior. The material was measured at 3.08 W with approximately 200 g of material placed inside of the SAVY for 6.07 years. The inner packaging configuration included a ¼ Qt stainless steel slip top inner container and a sPVC bag-out bag enclosing the inner container. Visual observations of the container during retrieval revealed several concerning features on the exterior of the container, notably on the lid. Fig. 1 shows the container lid along with an inset image further magnifying the features of interest. The corroded tamper indicating device (TID) wire and the corroded radioactive material tag wire indicated that corrosive gas species for steel were produced during storage. Although the TID wire and rad tag wire are not the same composition as the SAVY body and lid, these are often used as an indicator of potential corrosion inside of the SAVY container. The oxide residing inside of the filter holes and significant buildup around one hole provided further evidence supporting the presence of corrosive species inside of the container.

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Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

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Water-Resistant Container Testing: 48 oz Bruntmor Container Design

The purpose of this report is to detail the results of water ingress testing conducted on the 48 oz Bruntmor container design and discuss these results against the water-resistant container requirements of TA55-AP 522 and PA-RD-01009. The 48 oz Bruntmor is a proposed commercially off the shelf inner container option for material storage inside of a glovebox and/or as an approved non-hermetically sealed inner of an approved packaging configuration inside of an approved outer container as listed in PA-RD-01022. The 48 oz Bruntmor is shaped like a slip lid container, made of 18-8 stainless steel, and utilizes a smooth, threaded lid with a silicone gasket for closure and containment. This container both lid and body is hot rolled out of 18-8 stainless steel with one seam weld on the body.

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L4-3 Developing DOE M441.1-1 Compliant Container Components: Filter Cup Experimental Fixture Test Data Verification

This document serves to provide technical documentation and justification for using the Filter Cup Experimental Fixture (FCEP) for filter efficiency and pressure drop testing in the Enhanced Filter Test System (EFTS). This document assumes that the reader has prior knowledge related to both of these systems, as well as the SAVY-4000® nuclear material container series filter technology.

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Tools for Water Ingress Testing

The Safety Storage and Engineering Team, as part of the Production Support Services division (PSS-2), is tasked with ensuring the safety of containers used for handling and storage of nuclear materials. As part of this work, water ingress tests are conducted to evaluate the water-tightness of containers intended for in-glovebox use. In collaboration, the statistics group of the Computer and Computational Sciences Division (CCS-6) provided support in developing a statistically defensible approach for determining appropriate sample sizes for water ingress testing. Water ingress testing involves multiple measurements on multiple containers. Our approach uses a simple random effects model to analyze a pilot data set, implementing prediction limits to evaluate the efficacy of collecting additional data. Although this study capitalizes on available data, our approach can be used with estimates of the ratio of between and within variability and average values, often available from past testing or expert knowledge. An interactive Shiny tool was developed as a final user-friendly product for future testing. The Shiny interface is an open-source package providing a framework for building web applications. Raw data exploration and prediction interval-based sample size assessments can quickly be conducted by the engineering team without needing to interact with the underlying code.

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Water-Resistant Container Testing: A426-1000 Container Design

The purpose of this report is to detail the results of water ingress testing conducted on the A426-1000 container design and discuss these results against the water-resistant container requirements of TA55-AP- 522 and PA-RD-01009. The A426-1000 is a proposed commercially off the shelf inner container option for material storage inside of a glovebox and/or as an approved non-hermetically sealed inner of an approved packaging configuration inside of an approved outer container as listed in PA-RD-01022. The A426-1000 is shaped like a slip lid container, made of 316L stainless steel, and utilizes a smooth, threaded lid with a silicone O-ring for closure and containment. This container both lid and body is machined out of one billet piece of 316L stainless steel with no welds. See Figure 1 and Table 1 for a summary of the container specifications. For more details on the container design, see Section 1.4.

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Water-Resistant Container Testing CNUT INGB Container Design (Rev. 1)

The purpose of this report is to detail the results of water ingress testing conducted on the 5Qt Castle Nut In-Glovebox (5QtCNUT INGB) container design and discuss these results against the water-resistant container requirements of TA55-AP- 522 and PA-RD-01009. The CNUT is a general-purpose container option for material storage inside of a glovebox and/or as an approved non-hermetically sealed inner of an approved packaging configuration inside of an approved outer container as listed in PA-RD-01022. The CNUT containment boundary consists of a filtered lid and deep drawn body with welded collar all made of 316L stainless steel, an aluminum bronze spin down ring to provide compression of a to Viton® O-ring to create a seal for closure and containment.

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The 65 Elevated Risk Container Status Relative Humidity Measurements RFID RH/T Sensors in Containers [Slides]

In March of 2023, a memo was issued, drafted by the Container Management, Safety, and Engineering Team, identifying 65 elevated risk legacy containers for priority disposition at TA-55. These 65 were identified separately from the “typical” prioritization decision-making method used at TA-55 to disposition legacy items. This new technique gave important feedback and revealed improvement opportunities for the selection process of legacy containers for disposition. The DOE complex and TA-55 have a long history of nuclear operations and therefore the disposition of these legacy materials is vital.

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Water ingress testing of Pressure Cooker 1006027150 REVAB-021

The requirements of this water ingress test are defined in PA-RD-01009, TA-55 Criticality Safety Requirements. “The container design should be capable of preventing the entry of more than 50 ml water when subjected to water spray at a flow of up to 2 inches water per hour for 2 hours or when immersed in water up to a depth of 6 inches above the top of the container for the same period of time.” The six allen screw fasters on the lid of the container were torqued to approximately 45 inch-pounds with a calibrated torque wrench in a crisscross pattern to ensure equal force distribution. The container management team of ORI-2 has developed a standard practice of gathering 5 data points to increase the statistical confidence in the data. This method has been demonstrated in previous LA-URs and approved official memorandums as follows: LANL Memo, SPE-2: 19-016 dated August 22, 2019; LANL Memo, SPE-2:19-020 dated September 24, 2019; and LA-UR-19-28268, Water Ingress Testing of Commercially Available Containers for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program.

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LANL PVC bag-out-bag replacement [Slides]

The US material at 8 months aging, at room temperature and exposed to gamma at 80 degrees C has been completed. The FTIR data does not show any discernible difference between the US APU-ether material and the British material. There are some differences and the curves of the FTIR, but the behavior shows that the US material is behaving comparable to the British material. The British Blue sample exposed to gamma at 70 degrees C did have an observable change in the contact angle. This was the only notable change between the two different types of polymer the TGA on both the US and the British had no observable difference. Mechanical testing samples (dog-bones) are being prepared for tensile, shear, and puncture testing. This data will be provided in later meetings. Mass spec testing is needed to measure the headspace gases that are being seen during the aging study to better health characterize the radiolytic degradation of the APU ether samples, this is also ongoing.

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Container Evaluation: Analysis of the Swagelok Knuckle with Viewport as an Approved Hermetically Sealed Inner Container

This report outlines the results from the water ingress test, helium leak test and additional atmosphere testing for the Swagelok knuckle with viewport container further referred to as the SKV. This container is constructed from a standard union vacuum fitting, 1.33” conflat to 0.5” male VCR, a 1.33” conflat fused silica lensed viewport fitting, and a 0.5 inch VCR cap. The primary intended use of this container is to store Pu metal samples in the vault for a time interval exceeding 40 years. The samples need to be contained in an air free environment to ensure that the material does not oxidize over time. The container viewport is a critical design feature that will help the operators visually inspect and evaluate the state of the metal samples prior to opening the container. These containers are advertised as leak tight, but experimental tests were performed to test the water resistant criteria and the gas leaking criteria set forth by the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program. The results of the water ingress test show that the container is water-tight, with no signs of water penetrating the container within the required guidelines outlined in TA55-AP-522. The preliminary He leak test performed demonstrate that the conflat window port and VCR cap are able to maintain a hermetic seal. Additionally, all containers will be He leak tested independently by the manufacturer prior to shipping to LANL. A third voluntary test was added to assess the container’s ability to hold atmosphere, with successful results indicating the container is able to hold inert atmosphere to prevent lanthanum metal oxidation. It is the conclusion of the authorsthat there is enough evidence through the test conducted and outlined within this document that the proposed container meets the definition of a water-tight container, and it is able to provide a hermetic seal.

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Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55 (FY22 Rules of Use Report)

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

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Evaluating Corrosion Effects on the Stainless Steel Components of the SAVY-4000/Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers: FY2022 Update

This report summarizes the work completed and underway for the Corrosion Working Group (CWG) for FY2022 in support of evaluating a greater than a 15 year design life for the SAVY4000. The CWG meets on an as needed basis to review new work, results or information regarding the corrosion of SAVY-4000 and Hagan nuclear material storage containers. The goal when analyzing corrosion is to develop a design life appropriate for the containers and to identify when a container should be removed from service. There are many parallel efforts associated with identifying and extending the service life of nuclear material storage containers. This report includes information from research and development efforts to address the lifetime. The CWG is closely related to surveillance activities and continues to play a role in identification of issues and paths forward for analysis of surveillance containers. This work summarizes the completed tasks for FY22 of the CWG while keeping in mind that some efforts continue into future years. Brief summaries of identified new avenues of work have been identified for FY23.

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