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Davis, John Taylor

Publications and source records attributed to Davis, John Taylor.

Overview of SAVY-4000 Lifetime Extension Activities in Fiscal Year 2024

This report provides an overview of activities engaged in during the 2024 fiscal year in support of the SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) lifetime extension. As the final full year prior to the submittal of the technical basis, efforts were made to assess the current understanding regarding SAVY degradation in service as well as any knowledge that provided a more substantive view of the challenges that SAVYs face in storage. Close coordination with the stakeholders (i.e. LANL program office) ensured alignment with expectations regarding timelines for the remainder of the activities supporting the technical basis document for the lifetime extension request.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development and Implementation of a Bag Degradation Predictive Tool at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.

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Corrosion Analysis of 121103072 (SAVY-4000)

A surveillance feedlist for fiscal year (FY) 2022 was developed with the intent to target containers with contents known to generate corrosive gasses. One SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) container with a serial number 121103072 was selected due to the reasonable wattage and known molten salt extraction (MSE) material corrosive behavior. The material was measured at 3.08 W with approximately 200 g of material placed inside of the SAVY for 6.07 years. The inner packaging configuration included a ¼ Qt stainless steel slip top inner container and a sPVC bag-out bag enclosing the inner container. Visual observations of the container during retrieval revealed several concerning features on the exterior of the container, notably on the lid. Fig. 1 shows the container lid along with an inset image further magnifying the features of interest. The corroded tamper indicating device (TID) wire and the corroded radioactive material tag wire indicated that corrosive gas species for steel were produced during storage. Although the TID wire and rad tag wire are not the same composition as the SAVY body and lid, these are often used as an indicator of potential corrosion inside of the SAVY container. The oxide residing inside of the filter holes and significant buildup around one hole provided further evidence supporting the presence of corrosive species inside of the container.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

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Water-Resistant Container Testing: 48 oz Bruntmor Container Design

The purpose of this report is to detail the results of water ingress testing conducted on the 48 oz Bruntmor container design and discuss these results against the water-resistant container requirements of TA55-AP 522 and PA-RD-01009. The 48 oz Bruntmor is a proposed commercially off the shelf inner container option for material storage inside of a glovebox and/or as an approved non-hermetically sealed inner of an approved packaging configuration inside of an approved outer container as listed in PA-RD-01022. The 48 oz Bruntmor is shaped like a slip lid container, made of 18-8 stainless steel, and utilizes a smooth, threaded lid with a silicone gasket for closure and containment. This container both lid and body is hot rolled out of 18-8 stainless steel with one seam weld on the body.

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