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Doug Wells

Publications and source records attributed to Doug Wells.

Developing Approaches for Certification of Uninspectable Fracture Critical AM Components

Introduction - Human-rated spaceflight hardware is subject to the Fracture Control requirements in NASA-STD5019, which are intended to control the risk of component failure due to undetected cracks or defects. - All hardware in this mission class is classified for Fracture Control – Exempt, Non-fracture Critical, or Fracture Critical - Fracture Critical: A classification that identifies a part where failure due to the presence of a crack is a catastrophic hazard ➔ Pressure vessels, engine components, primary structure, etc. - Axiom 1: Material and manufacturing process produce structures and components with cracks or defects. - Axiom 2: The presence of a crack or defect of sufficient size reduces the strength and life of the structure. - Damage Tolerance: demonstration that a component can survive the service life (with a safety factor) in the presence of an undetected flaw or damage. - Components are manufactured from aerospace quality materials using controlled processes. - Components are inspected for damage (cracks, flaws, defects, etc.). - Components are shown by test or analysis to be tolerant to undetected flaws.

Will Tilson

Process Qualification Concepts in NASA-STD-6030

- Terminology - Definition and role of QMP in the NASA-STD-6030 framework - Qualification checklist for evaluating a candidate AM material process - Types of data needed to evaluate the metrics for a QMP - Advocacy for a singular, contained data entity that enables QMP evaluation and other aspects of the AM ecosystem - Material Engineering Equivalence Baseline - Discussion of Material Engineering Equivalence concepts - Summary

Doug Wells