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DOE OSTI2013

Source Recertification, Refurbishment, and Transfer Logistics

The 2012 Gap Analysis of Department of Energy Radiological Sealed Sources, Standards, and Materials for Safeguards Technology Development report, and the subsequent Reconciliation of Source Needs and Surpluses across the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory Complex report, resulted in the identification of 33 requests for nuclear or radiological sealed sources for which there was potentially available, suitable material from within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to fill the source need. Available, suitable material was defined by DOE laboratories as material slated for excess, or that required recertification or refurbishment before being used for safeguards technology development. This report begins by outlining the logistical considerations required for the shipment of nuclear and radiological materials between DOE laboratories. Then, because of the limited need for transfer of matching sources, the report also offers considerations for an alternative approach – the shipment of safeguards equipment between DOE laboratories or technology testing centers. Finally, this report addresses repackaging needs for the two source requests for which there was available, suitable material within the DOE complex.

Logistics↗

DOE OSTI2013

Templating as a Chain of Custody Tool for Arms Control

Historically, templates have been considered for use as a treaty accountable item (TAI) authentication tool, alongside item attributes. Because of this, the use of templates has fallen by the wayside due to the perceived intrusiveness of and handling/storage of template data; especially when compared to the negotiability of unclassified attribute threshold values. However, as a chain of custody tool, templates potentially have a large and important role to play in maintaining confidence in the authenticity of the treaty accountable items as they progress through an arms control regime. In general terms, templating is the process of creating a unique, measurable, and repeatable signature which is representative of the TAI. At any point in time, the signature can be re-measured or re-inspected to verify the signature has not changed. Chain of custody is the process by which a controlled boundary is established and maintained around a TAI to both deter and detect unauthorized access to the item. Typically, this is accomplished by putting a tamper indicating device (TID) on the item or container. The TID now acts as a surrogate for the item itself, and is continually checked to ensure the unique identifier and tamper indicating mechanisms have not changed since last inspection. This in and of itself is a form of templating. A stronger template is one that utilizes a signature of the combined item and container. There are many potential signatures which may be exploited, including radiation-, electromagnetic-, and acoustic-based signatures. This paper/presentation will explore the technology and mechanisms in which templating can be applied to create a more robust chain of custody over treaty accountable items as part of a future arms control regime.

Nuclear Warhead, Chain of Custody, Templates, Non-↗