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Edmond Wong

Publications and source records attributed to Edmond Wong.

Analytical Redundancy Using Kalman Filters for Rocket Engine Sensor Validation

The use of sensor redundancy is crucial in aerospace systems to maintain safe, reliable operation. While hardware redundancy is more common in application, analytical redundancy can provide a viable alternative in systems where the installation of multiple redundant sensors is not viable. To this end, the use of Kalman filters to analytically validate sensor measurements within rocket engines was explored. First, a dynamic model of the RS 25 engine, a derivative of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), was reduced to a subset of relations, focused around the main combustion chamber pressure. These relations were used within the Kalman filter algorithm to generate an estimate of sensor measurements to be compared with true measurements for data validation purposes. By using a bank of Kalman filters, the residuals between the estimated and true measurements were used to detect and isolate sensor faults. Through fault simulations, the sensor validation performance of this Kalman filter bank design was compared to a hardware redundancy check. Sensor bias and drift faults of various magnitudes were injected into nominal RS 25 engine test data. Results for both approaches show comparable fault detection with most bias faults found nearly instantaneously by both algorithms. Drift fault detection results show certain cases where one algorithm is faster than the other. The key advantage of the Kalman filter algorithm is shown in fault isolation performance where it can isolate faults between two redundant sensors while the hardware redundancy comparisons cannot.

sensors↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗