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Ehinger, Michael H

Publications and source records attributed to Ehinger, Michael H.

Nonproliferation Uncertainties, a Major Barrier to Used Nuclear Fuel Recycle in the United States

A study and comparison of the goals and understandings of nonproliferation authorities with those of used nuclear fuel (UNF) recycle advocates have uncovered (1) some of the basic reasons for the creation of uncertainties by each of the parties, (2) why these uncertainties have become a major barrier to a decision to recycle UNF components in the United States, and (3) what steps can be taken to clarify these uncertainties. Recent papers and viewpoints expressed by nonproliferation authorities and technical consultants were reviewed, summarized, and compared with results of recent fuel cycle systems analyses made at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1 Similarities and differences were identified, including both technical and policy factors. Nonproliferation authorities and a few UNF recycle advocates have recognized that the reprocessing technologies used for UNF component recycle do not offer significant nonproliferation differences; thus, the methods used can be chosen on some other basis, such as process efficiency, maturity, and/or economics. This paper reviews the safeguards implications beyond the simple assessment of UNF recycle technology selection. Differences in understanding that led to uncertainty barriers to UNF recycle include (1) the vulnerability of unseparated UNF, (2) the effects of time factors on production and accumulation of fissile plutonium isotopes and decay of the ?self-protecting radiation barrier,? (3) the chemistry of UNF components and relative ease of separation, and (4) the significant differences in commercialscale ?safeguards-by-design? UNF recycle facilities and smaller-scale covert operations. Application of safeguards-by-design and engineered safeguards can provide the defense-in-depth necessary for sufficient safeguards. Establishing these requirements for governing acceptable commercial UNF component recycle is essential.

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Inverse Solutions in Spectroscopic Analysis with Applications to Problems in Global Safeguards

This work describes a nondestructive strategy and algorithm designed to evaluate the burnup and plutonium content of light-water-reactor spent fuel and thereby confirm declared values. In contrast with previous methods that focus on only a few photopeaks (e.g., 137 Cs at 662 keV), the present approach involves the entire gamma spectrum up to 2000 keV. Spectra are used as input for the inverse code INDEPTH, which is designed to predict reactor parameters (fuel enrichment, power level, irradiation time, and cooling time) when given either a set of nuclide inventories or the gamma spectrum that they produce. This approach has the advantage of often making possible the determination of parameters other than burnup when they are unknown or in doubt. In addition, error in one photopeak evaluation is mitigated by the inclusion of the entire spectrum. The solution procedure involves multiple runs of the forward code ORIGEN/ARP, each of which produces an extensive list of nuclides formed through depletion/decay processes. The gamma spectrum of these nuclides is compared with the gamma spectrum from a detector through a bin-by-bin sum of squared error. New choices for the reactor parameters that are input to ORIGEN/ARP are determined using a gradient search technique, and the best parameter set is that which minimizes the squared error between calculated and measured gamma spectra. The method is applied to the analysis of gamma data taken from various sections of actual spent reactor fuel and is compared with declared values and other methods of evaluation. The sensitivity of the inverse solution with respect to various parameters is calculated and indicates that the algorithm is stable and robust. One example includes the presence of multiple solutions, each of which can be characterized using additional information.

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Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for coated particle fuels encased in graphitized-carbon have not progressed beyond laboratory-scale demonstrations although key equipment that has been tested in the past (such as graphite burners and electrolytic disintegration/dissolution devices) are not listed on either the 'Trigger List' or the 'Dual Use List' for mandatory export controls. Finally, if gross burn-up determined from fission product gamma ray inspection of a discharged pebble cannot be correlated acceptably with predicted plutonium content of the pebble, development and testing may be required on detector concepts for more directly measuring the plutonium content in a discharged pebble to ensure that its placement in the spent fuel storage tanks is for an acceptable 'measured discard' of diluted plutonium.

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Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

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THE INTEGRATED EQUIPMENT TEST FACILITY AT OAK RIDGE AS A NONPROLIFERATION TEST LOOP

The apparent renaissance in nuclear power has resulted in a new focus on nonproliferation measures. There is a lot of activity in development of new measurement technologies and methodologies for nonproliferation assessment. A need that is evolving in the United States is for facilities and test loops for demonstration of new technologies. In the late 1970s, the Fuel Recycle Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was engaged in advanced reprocessing technology development. As part of the program, the Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was constructed as a test bed for advanced technology. The IET was a full-scale demonstration facility, operable on depleted uranium, with a throughput capacity for 0.5 Mt/d. At the front end, the facility had a feed surge vessel, input accountability tank, and feed vessel for the single cycle of solvent extraction. The basic solvent extraction system was configured to use centrifugal contactors for extraction and scrub and a full-size pulsed column for strip. A surge tank received the solvent extraction product solution and fed a continuous operating thermo-syphon-type product evaporator. Product receiving and accountability vessels were available. Feed material could be prepared using a continuous rotary dissolve or by recycling the product with adjustment as new feed. Continuous operations 24/7 could be realized with full chemical recovery and solvent recycle systems in operation. The facility was fully instrumented for process control and operation, and a full solution monitoring application had been implemented for safeguards demonstrations, including actual diversion tests for sensitivity evaluation. A significant effort for online instrument development was a part of the program at the time. The fuel recycle program at Oak Ridge ended in the early 1990s, and the IET facility was mothballed. However, the equipment and systems remain and could be returned to service to support nonproliferation demonstrations. This paper discusses the status of the facility and operations.

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Using NDA Techniques to Improve Safeguards Metrics on Burnup Quantification and Plutonium Content in LWR SNF

Globally, there exists a long history in reprocessing in evaluation of the shipper/receiver difference (SRD) on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) received and processed. Typically, the declared shipper s values for uranium and plutonium in SNF (based on calculations involving the initial manufacturer s data and reactor operating history) are used as the input quantities to the head-end process of the facility. Problems have been encountered when comparing these values with measured results of the input accountability tank contents. A typical comparison yields a systematic bias indicated as a loss of 5 7 percent of the plutonium (Pu) and approximately 1 percent for the uranium (U). Studies suggest that such deviation can be attributed to the non-linear nature of the axial burnup values of the SNF. Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Texas A&M University are co-investigating the development of a new method, via Nondestructive Assay (NDA) techniques, to improve the accuracy in burnup and Pu content quantification. Two major components have been identified to achieve this objective. The first component calculates a measurement-based burnup profile along the axis of a fuel rod. Gamma-ray data is collected at numerous locations along the axis of the fuel rod using a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector designed for a wide range of gamma-ray energies. Using two fission products, 137Cs and 134Cs, the burnup is calculated at each measurement location and a profile created along the axis of the rod based on the individual measurement locations. The second component measures the U/Pu ratio using an HPGe detector configured for relatively low-energy gamma-rays including x-rays. Fluorescence x-rays from U and Pu are measured and compared to the U/Pu ratio determined from a destructive analysis of the sample. This will be used to establish a relationship between the measured and actual values. This relationship will be combined with the burnup analysis results to establish a relationship between fission product activity and Pu content. It is anticipated that this new method will allow receiving facilities to make a limited number of NDA, gamma-ray, measurements to confirm the shipper declared values for burnup and Pu content thereby improving the SRD.

Burnup↗

Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications for process monitoring are under conceptual development and evaluation. This paper reports on a study of process monitoring for a sample problem involving spent fuel reprocessing with aqueous reprocessing technologies. This includes modeling the processes in the context of a nuclear material diversion scenario and measuring the associated process chemistry. A systems-centric model is applied using actual and simulated plant data, advanced sensors, anomaly detection methods, statistical analysis and data authentication methods, to help illustrate the benefits of process monitoring applications.

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AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

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