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Eric L Christiansen

Publications and source records attributed to Eric L Christiansen.

14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2023

Orion Artemis I as Flown MMOD Analysis

The Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. The comparison showed that Bumper analysis predictions were generally within one integer value of the damage found, which is considered high accuracy. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this effort extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗
NASA NTRS2023

Orion Artemis I as Flown MMOD Analysis

The Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. The comparison showed that Bumper analysis predictions were generally within one integer value of the damage found, which is considered high accuracy. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this effort extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

Kevin D Deighton↗
NASA NTRS2021

BUMPER: A Tool for Analyzing Spacecraft Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

“Bumper” is a computer program for analyzing spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk. Bumper was developed in the late-1980s and has been continuously maintained and used since. The user base has grown from a few government entities now include numerous commercial entities as well. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group is responsible for all aspects of the Bumper software. Bumper has been used to characterize MMOD risk on many spacecraft. All of the International Space Station (ISS) modules, visiting vehicles and numerous external components and systems have been analyzed. Bumper was used to analyze the Space Shuttle, Orion, and many space probes, telescopes and satellites. Bumper is also being used to analyze future spacecraft such as the Deep Space Gateway (DSG) and Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions. The Bumper Configuration Control Board (CCB) ensures that all changes to the code are approved, reviewed, and documented. The current Bumper version – “Bumper 3” – is a Fortran executable that utilizes a 64-bit architecture. Bumper has numerous features that make it a powerful tool for analyzing spacecraft MMOD risk. Bumper uses the latest orbital debris and meteoroidenvironment models. Bumper also has a large library of ballistic limit “damage” equations available that can be used for a wide variety of MMOD shielding configurations. Bumper can also handle large spacecraft finite elementmodels (FEMs) and conducts checks of the model. This paper introduces Bumper and the MMOD risk analysis process using a simplified cube-shaped spacecraft model

hypervelocity↗
NASA NTRS2003

Apparatus and Method for Deploying a Hypervelocity Shield

Provided herein are apparatuses for deployment of at least one hypervelocity shield on a structure in exoatmospheric space. The apparatuses comprise a means of attaching to the structure at least at one place on the structure and further comprise at least one of the hypervelocity shields and a means of deploying said shields. Also provided are methods of deploying the hypervelocity shields using said apparatuses.

Eric L Christiansen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon 1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

Introduction The SpaceX Dragon 1 spacecraft performed 20 resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team from the NASA John-son Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group inspected each Dragon 1 capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions. Scope A general description of the areas of the vehicle that were inspected are provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. The paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected as well as the results of analysis of intact samples collected for spectroscopic analysis to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest MMOD environments are also presented. Findings Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides de-tails of each of these variables. (1) Damage equations (2) Impact condition assumptions a. Projectile density b. Impact speed c. Impact angle (3) Analysis results a. pre-flight vs. on-orbit damage b. MMOD vs. non-MMOD Conclusions and Recommendations The ISS visiting vehicle impact database is an ongoing project. SpaceX provides crew rotations as well as resupply and cargo return with the Dragon 2 spacecraft. Sierra Space is manifested for resupply and cargo return services starting in 2023. Boeing is expected to provide crew rotations as well. All of these spacecraft will provide additional opportunities for post flight MMOD inspections of space exposed hardware. Acknowledgements Over the course of the inspection campaign various personnel at the SpaceX Texas Test Site in McGregor and at the SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne CA provided valuable support to this activity.

James L Hyde↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Office

The Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) office at the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) is dedicated to support NASA flight programs in meeting their meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) protection requirements both efficiently and effectively, with a minimum of shielding mass, volume, and cost. This paper provides an overview of HVIT capabilities in providing hypervelocity tests, analyses, MMOD risk assessments and shielding expertise. HVIT personnel work closely with NASA program and safety/mission assurance personnel to develop program-specific MMOD protection requirements which are both achievable based on initial risk assessments and will meet overall safety and mission success requirements. HVIT then proceeds with hypervelocity impact testing and hydrocode assessments to update and verify ballistic limit equations used in the MMOD risk assessment. Hypervelocity impact tests are primarily performed at the NASA WSTF Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory (RHTL). Other hypervelocity facilities that provide complementary test capabilities are called on when necessary to fill data gaps. The goal of the final pre-flight MMOD risk assessment is to show compliance with MMOD requirements prior to flight. This final assessment will also incorporate changes in the MMOD environment from meteoroid showers and orbital debris breakups. After the mission is flown, post-flight inspections are performed by HVIT to document and trend MMOD damage to returned spacecraft surfaces and hardware. HVIT accomplishments in NASA mission support are described. In addition, current HVIT activities to aid on-going NASA crewed missions and science missions are presented.

Meteoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Next Generation of Kevlar Fiber for Improved Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Protection

The next generation of Kevlar® fiber for Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection demonstrates the potential to increase orbital debris protection while optimizing the overall weight of the MMOD system and reducing damage to the rear wall of the shield. The DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology process combines numerous woven layers by infusing staple fiber to strengthen the fabric and enables lightweight and flexible protective solutions compared to traditional woven structures. DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology is a step-change in debris protection that allows for the improvement of system-level performance while removing heavier portions of the system. This paper introduces this new technology that will be available from DuPont starting in early 2024 and compares the performance of CoreMatrix™ Technology to legacy solutions. NASA’s Hypervelocity Impact Technology team has conducted hypervelocity impact tests on a subset of DuPont supplied samples that incorporate this latest Kevlar® material. The paper will describe the hypervelocity impact testing parameters, results, and path forward.

Orbital Debris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Engineering Launch Methods for Non-Spherical Hypervelocity Projectiles

The use of carbon-fiber-reinforced polymer (CFRP) in modern satellites has led to a significant amount of space debris, including fragments of CFRP and high-density metals such as steel and copper, produced during catastrophic breakup events. To address this issue, NASA's White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) has been developing the capability to launch "flake-like" and long "needle-like" projectiles. WSTF tested projectiles with different length-to-diameter ratios (L/D), impacting aluminum Whipple shields with thermal blankets on the outer surface, at velocities exceeding 6 km/s. The results of the study suggest that launching and imaging shaped projectiles at high velocities is feasible. Ongoing research is now focused on improving the techniques for launching and imaging shaped projectiles under hypervelocity conditions.

Engineering↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risks from Small Orbital Debris

This talk provides evidence that the threat to mission success from millimeter sized debris is a legitimate concern by considering (1) on-orbit impact data, (2) hypervelocity tests on spacecraft systems, (3) risk assessments for ISS and satellites.

Orbital Debris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (XEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs). An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an MMOD risk assessment of the internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds.

Micrometeoroid↗