Engineering topics

Everett, Chris

Publications and source records attributed to Everett, Chris.

5 records

DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2015

Developing Probabilistic Safety Performance Margins for Unknown and Underappreciated Risks

Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.

Safety Performance Margin↗

NASA NTRS2014

The Evolution of System Safety at NASA

The NASA system safety framework is in the process of change, motivated by the desire to promote an objectives-driven approach to system safety that explicitly focuses system safety efforts on system-level safety performance, and serves to unify, in a purposeful manner, safety-related activities that otherwise might be done in a way that results in gaps, redundancies, or unnecessary work. An objectives-driven approach to system safety affords more flexibility to determine, on a system-specific basis, the means by which adequate safety is achieved and verified. Such flexibility and efficiency is becoming increasingly important in the face of evolving engineering modalities and acquisition models, where, for example, NASA will increasingly rely on commercial providers for transportation services to low-earth orbit. A key element of this objectives-driven approach is the use of the risk-informed safety case (RISC): a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The RISC addresses each of the objectives defined for the system, providing a rational basis for making informed risk acceptance decisions at relevant decision points in the system life cycle.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗

NASA NTRS2010

An Extreme-Value Approach to Anomaly Vulnerability Identification

The objective of this paper is to present a method for importance analysis in parametric probabilistic modeling where the result of interest is the identification of potential engineering vulnerabilities associated with postulated anomalies in system behavior. In the context of Accident Precursor Analysis (APA), under which this method has been developed, these vulnerabilities, designated as anomaly vulnerabilities, are conditions that produce high risk in the presence of anomalous system behavior. The method defines a parameter-specific Parameter Vulnerability Importance measure (PVI), which identifies anomaly risk-model parameter values that indicate the potential presence of anomaly vulnerabilities, and allows them to be prioritized for further investigation. This entails analyzing each uncertain risk-model parameter over its credible range of values to determine where it produces the maximum risk. A parameter that produces high system risk for a particular range of values suggests that the system is vulnerable to the modeled anomalous conditions, if indeed the true parameter value lies in that range. Thus, PVI analysis provides a means of identifying and prioritizing anomaly-related engineering issues that at the very least warrant improved understanding to reduce uncertainty, such that true vulnerabilities may be identified and proper corrective actions taken.

Everett, Chris↗