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Farley, David

Publications and source records attributed to Farley, David.

An Enhanced Safeguards Approach for Accelerator Driven Systems utilized to Close the Fuel Cycle

Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Secure fiber optic seals enabled by quantum optical communication concepts

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to detecting tampering of a seal based upon quantum optical communication via a communications channel comprising the seal. A plurality of pulses of light encoded with random data are transmitted on the communications channel, whereupon they are received and their data values measured. The measured data values of the pulses are then compared to the known transmitted data to determine a correlation statistic between the transmitted and received data values. Tampering with the seal can be detected based upon identifying that the correlation statistic has dropped below a threshold non-tampered level of correlation between transmitted and received values.

Sarovar, Mohan↗

Safeguards Challenges for Molten Salt Reactors

There are now a wide variety of molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies being proposed or developed that are gaining international interest and momentum toward deployment. There are two sub-categories of this class of reactors - those that are liquid fueled (i.e., the molten salt is both the fuel and the coolant) and those that have solid fuel with the molten salt used as coolant only. The liquid-fueled MSRs present unique challenges to current safeguards approaches. These challenges exist because there are currently no conceptual approaches to applying safeguards to unique, tightly coupled nuclear energy systems with the reactor core, balance of plant, and fuel cycle (everything else including salt processing and material separations) combined in a single facility. The application of safeguards to liquid-fueled MSRs will have to take into consideration several technical factors including: The homogeneous mixture of fuel, coolant, fission products, and actinides (with the attendant extremely high radiation field); Continuous variation in isotopic concentrations in the fuel salt, including removal (passive or active) of fission products, rare earth elements, and noble metals; High operating temperatures of the fuel salt; Online processing where some fraction of the inventory can be removed while the reactor is operational; Unique refueling schemes, including the ability to continuously feed the core with fresh fissile or fertile material; The presence of frozen fuel, potentially requiring a different safeguards process from the liquid fuel; and The presence of fuel outside the vessel. Additionally, If the thorium fuel cycle is employed, there will be additional complications since the resulting radiation signatures will be different from those of the uranium-based fuel cycle. The existing IAEA inspection regimes are based on the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle, item counting for nuclear reactors, and bulk material accountancy for the front and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. These techniques and associated instrumentation for bulk accountancy have been developed predominantly for enrichment, fuel fabrication, and aqueous reprocessing. However, none of these bulk accountancy measures can be directly applied to liquid-fueled MSRs. This paper will explore some of the possible challenges in applying safeguards to molten salt reactors.

Kovacic, Donald N↗