Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Farmer, M.

Publications and source records attributed to Farmer, M..

U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi- November 2020 Meeting Notes with Updated Information Requests

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This information also has important implications for the safety and operation of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This document summarizes results from the Fiscal Year 2021 (FY2021) U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Since its inception, annual reports were issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. A key aspect of prior U.S. efforts, the updated list of information requests, is included in this FY2021 report to ensure that they are transmitted to organizations within Japan. This report also continues to emphasize how information obtained from the affected reactors at Daiichi has been and will continue to be used to update severe accident management strategies and reduce uncertainties in systems analysis code models. In addition, recommendations are included that would expand the use of this information to provide insights regarding maintenance, radiation protection, design, and siting activities for existing and new reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi: 2019 Evaluations

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019) information, summarizes results from a U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Each year, annual reports are issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis. For FY2019, the areas emphasized by the expert panel include component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. In addition, the process established by this U.S. effort provides an example that Japan may wish to implement in future international efforts to support D&D. As emphasized in this FY2019 report, important insights are being gained from examinations of the affected units at Daiichi. Although many results from prior years have been moved to appendices, key areas of interest are highlighted in the main document. For example, larger intact components and fuel containing materials observed on the floor of the primary containment and retained on ex-vessel structures continue to be emphasized because of insights that may be gained with respect to vessel failure and ex-vessel interactions with structures and concrete. In addition, the main report presents insights gained by focused evaluations of plant data because of potential use of systems and components during severe accident conditions and alternate perspectives regarding accident progression that may be inferred from such data. The report also illustrates how systems analysis codes can be applied to reduce uncertainties about the progression of events at Daiichi and how practical insights obtained from Daiichi can be used to enhance radiation safety for the existing fleet. Recent and planned updates to systems analysis codes are also discussed. As in prior years, this report contains an appendix with a list of examination needs that was updated after U.S. experts reviewed recently obtained information from Daiichi. Additional details for higher priority, near-term, examination activities are also provided. This report also includes an appendix with a description of a website that was developed to assist U.S. experts by providing information in an archived retrievable location.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

RCCS Testing with the Water-based NSTF: Year-1 Single-Phase Results

Under support from the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Office of Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART), a large scale test facility has been constructed to generate validation data for passive decay heat removal systems of advanced reactors. Located at Argonne National Laboratory, the Natural convection Shutdown heat removal Test Facility (NSTF) reflects key features of a ½ scale, water-based, Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS). This report serves as a summary of the single-phase testing results obtained during the programs first year of matrix testing. An introduction to the high-level program objectives is first presented, followed by a brief summary of facility design, instrumentation, and control systems. Details of the NQA-1 driven test method are included, which govern the programs quality assurance requirements and provide a background for the testing strategy and procedures. Checkout activities, including verification of gross system mass and energy balances, heat loss quantification, and isothermal facility characterization, were performed early in the first year and results presented in this report. These tests have identified relevant facility characteristics such as K-factors, frictional pressure losses, parasitic heat loss rates, and transient heating response. Results are then presented from four accepted matrix tests where the facility established a steady-state, single-phase mode of flow operation. All matrix tests were performed with an identical top-level procedure: first initiating a heater power ramp to target levels, and then holding power levels constant until the facilities structural members and network piping reached thermal equilibrium. Upon obtaining stable thermal and hydraulic conditions, active cooling was initiated off of the bulk storage tank to maintain constant riser inlet temperatures of 30°C. This steady-state period was then held for a minimum required duration, at which point the heaters were ramped down and test concluded. The two baseline tests completed reflect conditions prototypic to the full scale plant at both normal operation, and design basis Depressurized Loss of Forced Cooling (DLOFC) conditions. These parameters are defined by full RCCS decay heat loads of 1.4 MWt and 2.1 MWt, which translate to NSTF scale thermal power levels of 34.4 kWt and 51.6 kWt, respectively. Two additional tests were also conducted, which repeated baseline cases but included modification by single parameter variations in decay heat load, or heater power, at 700 kWt, and 2.8 MWt. Finally, a scoping test was performed to demonstrate the facilities ability to operate in a two-phase mode of operation. The facility successfully operated for a 3-hour period at this mode, reaching peak inventory temperatures of 105°C and condensing approximately 50 gallons of boil-off inventory. The testing parameters for this demonstration were based off the design basis DLOFC condition, and will be the reference for new baseline cases as the program moves forward with two-phase matrix testing.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi - 2018 Evaluations

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station [Daiichi]. Clearly, the accident signatures for each of these units differed. Some of this uncertainty about debris end-state can be attributed to a lack of information related to cooling system operation and cooling water injection during the events. There is also uncertainty in our understanding of phenomena affecting: (a) in-vessel core damage progression during severe accidents in boiling water reactors (BWRs) [compared with Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs)], and (b) accident progression after vessel failure (ex-vessel progression) for BWRs and PWRs. These uncertainties arise due to limited full scale prototypic data. Similar to what occurred after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, these Daiichi units offer the international community a means to reduce such uncertainties by obtaining prototypic data from multiple full-scale BWR severe accidents.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Future Nuclear Energy Factual Status Document: Resource Document for the Workshop on Basic Research Needs for Future Nuclear Energy, July 2017

Since commercialization in the mid-1950s, nuclear power has been widely deployed and provides an important clean source of energy, primarily through the generation of electricity. There are currently 449 commercial nuclear power reactors operating in 31 countries with over 390 GWe total capacity, with 99 operating units in the United States with a total generating capacity of about 100 GWe. Nuclear power plants provide over 11% of the world’s electricity production and, as of 2016, thirteen countries rely on nuclear energy to supply at least one-quarter of their total electricity. Virtually all of that power is generated with water-cooled reactor systems. A number of advanced nuclear energy system concepts have been developed to provide improved efficiency, greater fissile fuel utilization, reduced high level waste generation, and increased margins of safety over today’s water-cooled systems. However, there are a number of technical challenges that must be addressed to enable the broad deployment of these systems from concept to the electrical grid. This Technical Document is written to provide workshop participants with an overview of the current status of a number of advanced reactor systems: Key issues for advanced nuclear energy, including coolants, materials in extremes (irradiation, coolant, and/or high temperature) and interfaces; Nuclear fuel technologies for key reactor types and limitations in testing and design; State of science and understanding for nuclear systems, including characterization, testing, and modeling and simulation tools. For each of these technical areas, this document describes the technological challenge, current state of the art for the technology, and barriers to advanced nuclear concepts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An Assessment of Fission Product Scrubbing in Sodium Pools Following a Core Damage Event in a Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has stated that mechanistic source term (MST) calculations are expected to be required as part of the advanced reactor licensing process. A recent study by Argonne National Laboratory has concluded that fission product scrubbing in sodium pools is an important aspect of an MST calculation for a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR). To model the phenomena associated with sodium pool scrubbing, a computational tool, developed as part of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program, was utilized in an MST trial calculation. This tool was developed by applying classical theories of aerosol scrubbing to the decontamination of gases produced as a result of postulated fuel pin failures during an SFR accident scenario. The model currently considers aerosol capture by Brownian diffusion, inertial deposition, and gravitational sedimentation. The effects of sodium vapour condensation on aerosol scrubbing are also treated. This paper provides details of the individual scrubbing mechanisms utilized in the IFR code as well as results from a trial mechanistic source term assessment led by Argonne National Laboratory in 2016.

Fission Product Scrubbing↗

US Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi – 2016 Evaluations

Although it is clear that the accident signatures from each unit at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) [Daiichi] differ, much is not known about the end-state of core materials within these units. Some of this uncertainty can be attributed to a lack of information related to cooling system operation and cooling water injection. There is also uncertainty in our understanding of phenomena affecting: a) in-vessel core damage progression during severe accidents in boiling water reactors (BWRs), and b) accident progression after vessel failure (ex-vessel progression) for BWRs and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). These uncertainties arise due to limited full scale prototypic data. Similar to what occurred after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, these Daiichi units offer the international community a means to reduce such uncertainties by obtaining prototypic data from multiple full-scale BWR severe accidents. Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document reports recent results from the US Forensics Effort to use information obtained by TEPCO to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This Forensics Effort, which is sponsored by the Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Light Water Reactor (LWR) Sustainability Program, consists of a group of US experts in LWR safety and plant operations that have identified examination needs and are evaluating TEPCO information from Daiichi that address these needs. Examples presented in this report demonstrate that significant safety insights are being obtained in the areas of component performance, fission product release and transport, debris end-state location, and combustible gas generation and transport. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights are being used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi will improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations and inform future D&D activities by improving the capability for characterizing potential hazards to workers involved with cleanup activities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway Technical Program Plan

In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant’s current design basis. Because of our significant domestic investment in nuclear reactor technology (99 operating reactors in the fleet of commercial LWRs with five under construction), the United States has been a major leader internationally in these activities. The U.S. nuclear industry is voluntarily pursuing a number of additional safety initiatives. The NRC continues to evaluate and, where deemed appropriate, establish new requirements for ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety in the occurrence of low probability events at nuclear plants; (e.g., mitigation strategies for beyond design basis events initiated by external events like seismic or flooding initiators). The DOE has also played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R&D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. plants. In pursuing this area of R&D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary “end user” of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The response to the Fukushima accident has been global, and there is a continuing multinational interest in collaborations to better quantify accident consequences and to incorporate lessons learned from the accident. DOE will continue to seek opportunities to facilitate collaborations that are of value to the U.S. industry, particularly where the collaboration provides access to vital data from the accident or otherwise supports or leverages other important R&D work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R&D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Sodium Fast Reactor Safety and Licensing Research Plan – Volume II

Expert panels comprised of subject matter experts identified at the U.S. National Laboratories (SNL, ANL, INL, ORNL, LBL, and BNL), universities (University of Wisconsin and Ohio State University), international agencies (IRSN, CEA, JAEA, KAERI, and JRC-IE) and private consultation companies (Radiation Effects Consulting) were assembled to perform a gap analysis for sodium fast reactor licensing. Expert-opinion elicitation was performed to qualitatively assess the current state of sodium fast reactor technologies. Five independent gap analyses were performed resulting in the following topical reports: (1) Accident Initiators and Sequences (i.e., Initiators/Sequences Technology Gap Analysis), (2) Sodium Technology Phenomena (i.e., Advanced Burner Reactor Sodium Technology Gap Analysis), (3) Fuels and Materials (i.e., Sodium Fast Reactor Fuels and Materials: Research Needs), (4) Source Term Characterization (i.e., Advanced Sodium Fast Reactor Accident Source Terms: Research Needs), and (5) Computer Codes and Models (i.e., Sodium Fast Reactor Gaps Analysis of Computer Codes and Models for Accident Analysis and Reactor Safety). Volume II of the Sodium Research Plan consolidates the five gap analysis reports produced by each expert panel, wherein the importance of the identified phenomena and necessities of further experimental research and code development were addressed. The findings from these five reports comprised the basis for the analysis in Sodium Fast Reactor Research Plan Volume I.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Burner Reactor 2000MWth Concept and Comparison to Reference ABR-1000

This report presents a preconceptual design of a 2000 MWth fast reactor (ABR-2000) used to transmute, or burn, transuranics recovered from spent LWR fuel. A previous report by ANL in FY2007 presented a preconceptual design of a 1000 MWth fast reactor (ABR-1000). These fast reactors are an essential component of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗