Engineering topics

Friese, Judah I.

Publications and source records attributed to Friese, Judah I..

11 records

DOE OSTI2024

Measurements of radioxenon activities during periods of gaseous release from an advanced gas-cooled reactor

Activities of radioxenon isotopes are reported from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) during periods of gaseous release. Xenon isotopes are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These releases may affect detections from the International Monitoring System (IMS) by influencing the radioxenon background. Time series activity plots have been produced from both in-core monitoring and direct measurement at the point of release using a stack monitor system. Ratio plots using both data sets have been produced with results compared with a commonly chosen nuclear explosion “discrimination line.” The reported results improve the understanding of radionuclide emissions from civil nuclear power plants. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, USA), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Update of the Cesium-136 Cumulative Fission Yields at Multiple Neutron Energies

Nuclear data is foundational to several fields, including nuclear forensics. Nuclear forensics investigations of fission events, relies heavily on the cumulative fission yields, however several highly useful fission products suffer from very poor nuclear data including cumulative fission yields or associated uncertainties in that value. Cesium-136 is a highly relevant example of this issue, where the cumulative fission yield may be accurate but its uncertainty high enough to preclude its usefulness. In this work we evaluate and calculate an updated cumulative fission yield for 136 Cs for 235 U, 238 U, and 239 Pu at multiple neutron energies or sources using data obtained from irradiation campaigns. In all cases these newly determined cumulative fission yields provided small changes to the actual fission yields but had dramatic improvements to the uncertainty in those yields. These improvements in uncertainty will enable nuclear forensics end users to use 136 Cs data with more confidence.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Source Term Analysis of Xenon (STAX): An effort focused on differentiating man-made isotope production from nuclear explosions via stack monitoring

An overview of the hardware and software developed for the Source Term Analysis of Xenon (STAX) project is presented which includes the data collection from two stack monitoring systems installed at medical isotope production facilities, infrastructure to transfer data to a central repository, and methods for sharing data from the repository with users. STAX is an experiment to collect radioxenon emission data from industrial nuclear facilities with the goal of developing a better understanding of the global radioxenon background and the effect industrial radioxenon releases have on nuclear explosion monitoring. The final goal of this work is to utilize collected data along with atmospheric transport modeling to calculate the contribution of a peak or set of peaks detected by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to provide desired discriminating information to the International Data Centre (IDC) and National Data Centers (NDCs). Types of data received from the STAX equipment are shown and collected data was used for a case study to predict radioxenon concentrations at two IMS stations closest to the Institute for RadioElements (IRE) in Belgium. The initial evaluation of results indicate that the data is very valuable to the nuclear explosion monitoring community.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

First STAX detector installation at the National Institute for Radioelements (IRE)

The Source Term Analysis of Xenon (STAX) project has been installing stack detectors at medical isotope production facilities to measure radioxenon emissions to investigate the effect of radioxenon releases on nuclear explosion monitoring. This paper outlines the installation of the first STAX detection system at the National Institute for Radioelements (IRE) in Fleurus, Belgium which has been operating for over three years and transferring collected data to the STAX repository. Information about the equipment installed, the data flow established, and calculations for determination of radioxenon releases from the facility are presented. Further. data quality was investigated to confirm values reported by STAX automated data processing and in a comparison of collected STAX data with data collected by IRE for regulatory reporting.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2022

R-Value Measurements Performed on Actinide Targets Irradiated using the GODIVA IV Critical Assembly in FY22

The separation and characterization of two irradiated uranium targets, a depleted uranium (DU) and a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target as well as a plutonium (Pu) target, was conducted in April of 2022. The three targets were assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and irradiated using the GODIVA critical assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Splits of the dissolved targets were received by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) after which the PNNL and LANL teams chemically separated the solutions using independent separation schemes and analyzed the separated fractions for short lived actinides and fission products. Chemical separations were traced with stable or radioactive tracers to allow for the determination of chemical yields, analyzing using either inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES), inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) or gamma emission analysis (GEA) depending on the nature of the tracer. The Pu target solution was traced with stable elements at LANL to follow elemental fractionation during a Pu removal step. Many analytical techniques were used by PNNL including kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), ICP-OES, ICP-MS, GEA, and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) depending on the analyte’s need.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

14 MeV Irradiation and Analysis of a 93% 239 Pu Target in Preparation for a F2019 FY22 Pu Campaign

In this work, we present the irradiation of a 93% 239 Pu with 14 MeV neutrons and subsequent analysis of the fission and activation products. The fully assembled target, a Pu metal bead encapsulated in Al, further encapsulated in welded stainless steel, was analyzed 22 times over more than 100 days using gamma emission analysis (GEA). Using the results from these analyses, R-values and fission yields for fission products were determined. To prepare for the FY22 Pu irradiation using the GODIVA critical assembly at NCERC, the irradiated Pu target was disassembled, dissolved, and separated using chemistry provided by LANL collaborators. This chemical separation was intended to remove the Pu from solution with little to no effect on the remaining elements. The chemistry was assessed to try to determine possible routes of fractionation of the sample and the fission products. The separation process used was successful for the bulk of the analyzed fission and activation products, as well as the added radiotracers. The final dissolved solution and separated fractions were analyzed by GEA looking at the remaining fission, activation and radiotracers and thermal ionization mass spectrometry analysis looking at the Pu isotopics.

14MeV↗

DOE OSTI2022

Using STAX data to predict IMS radioxenon concentrations

The noble gas collection and measurement stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS) are heavily influenced by releases from medical isotope production facilities. The ability to reliably model the movement of radioxenon from the points of release to these IMS samplers has improved enough that a routine aspect of the analysis of IMS radioxenon data should be the prediction of the effect of releases from civilian nuclear facilities on the sample concentrations. In this work, predicted concentrations at IMS noble gas systems in Germany and Sweden based on measured releases from Institute for Radioelements (IRE) in Belgium and atmospheric transport modeling for a four-month period are presented and discussed.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

DOE OSTI2022

R-Value Measurements Performed on Uranium Targets Irradiated with Fission Spectrum Neutrons FY 2021 for F2019 Project

The separation and characterization of two irradiated uranium targets, a depleted uranium (DU) and a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target, was conducted in April of 2021. The two targets were assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and irradiated using the critical assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Splits of the dissolved targets were received by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) after which the PNNL and LANL teams chemically separated the solutions using independent separation schemes and analyzed the separated fractions for short lived actinides and fission products. Chemical separations at PNNL were traced with stable or radioactive tracers to allow for the determination of chemical yields, analyzing using either inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES), inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) or gamma emission analysis (GEA) depending on the nature of the tracer. Several other analytical techniques were used by PNNL including kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA) and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) depending on the analyte’s need. Comparisons were made between current and historical PNNL and LANL, as well as literature values. Overall, there was agreement between the two laboratories for the bulk of analytes, with some notable exceptions such as 111 Ag, and 141,143,144 Ce. Included in these comparisons were the short-lived actinides 237 U, 239 Np, the fission products 89 Sr, 91 Y, 95/97 Zr, 99 Mo, 111 Ag, 115/115 mCd, 136/137 Cs, 140 Ba, 141/143/144 Ce, 147 Nd, 153 Sm, 156 Eu, and 161 Tb, providing both total atoms as well as the R-values. The data presented in this report represents the sixth NCERC irradiation of HEU and DU (FY13, FY14, FY15, FY17, FY18, FY21), and their subsequent separation and analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Examining Nuisance Aerosol Detections in Light of the Origin of the Screening Process (November 2021)

The evolution of philosophy and computations in the International Data Center (IDC) related to aerosol samples have had profound impacts on the number of recorded detections in the network since routine operations began in 2000. Key decisions from policymakers have been the list of triggering radionuclides, the scheme for categorizing these into interest levels 1-5, and an algorithm for determining when an anthropogenic isotope is seen so often that it is no longer interesting, known as the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). These are described in the Operations Manual of the IDC. Key parameters that are controlled by the IDC but for which the IDC receives occasional input from policymakers include the constants in EWMA and the peak significance threshold for individual gamma rays, the latter of which directly leads to determination of the presence or absence of a radionuclide in a sample. There are also changes in computations which the IDC makes and informs policy makers about, such as changes in how background is computed, which could also affect the ease of detecting a peak – real or false. Rather than focus on the quantitative changes due to computation changes, this work records some thinking on how isotopes and peak significance levels were chosen, and the resulting detections seen over 18 years during the buildup of the International Monitoring System (IMS). These detections are considered on a global scale to try to determine the relative impact on monitoring, and in some cases, the nature of their existence. Repeated detections of 131I and 133I are the most troublesome, but they are not so frequent to be a major problem for the Verification Regime. These detections could probably be handled adequately using scientific methods currently under development for xenon backgrounds. It is also somewhat problematic that top-level analysis of aerosol backgrounds has not been reported previous to this. The steep increase in the rate of detections after 2016 are a concern, either in the actual backgrounds or from changes in the calculations methods used to generate the Reviewed Radionuclide Report (RRR.) Final conclusions of the authors are that the computational stability of the RRR is very important. With computational stability, changes can be usefully analyzed as being due to changes in radioactivity in Earth’s atmosphere This report is a distillation into text of a talk given in the Radionuclide Experts Group (RNEG) in Vienna during Working Group B (WGB) in February of 2019. This report does not directly contain any IDC data, only summaries by year, or by isotope, or by location. No specific IDC detection by time, location, or isotope is included.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2021

Separation of Lanthanide Isotopes from Mixed Fission Product Samples

The measurement of radioactive fission products from nuclear events has important implications for nuclear data production, environmental monitoring, and nuclear forensics. In a previous paper, the authors reported the optimization of an intra-group lanthanide separation using LN extraction resin from Eichrom Technologies®, Inc. and a nitric acid gradient. In this work, the method was demonstrated for the separation and quantification of multiple short-lived fission product lanthanide isotopes from a fission product sample produced from the thermal irradiation of highly enriched uranium. The separations were performed in parallel in quadruplicate with reproducible results and high decontamination factors for 153 Sm, 156 Eu, and 161 Tb. Based on the results obtained here, the fission yields for 144 Ce, 153 Sm, 156 Eu, and 161 Tb are consistent with published fission yields. This work demonstrates the effectiveness of the separations for the intended application of short-lived lanthanide fission product analysis requiring high decontamination factors.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗