Engineering topics

Gillis, David

Publications and source records attributed to Gillis, David.

4 records

NASA NTRS2009

Water Vapor Permeability of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) crewmembers are expected to return to earth wearing a suit similar to the current Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES). To ensure optimum cognitive performance, suited crewmembers must maintain their core body temperature within acceptable limits. There are currently several options for thermal maintenance in the post-landing phase. These include the current baseline, which uses an ammonia boiler, purge flow using oxygen in the suit, accessing sea water for liquid cooling garment (LCG) cooling and/or relying on the evaporative cooling capacity of the suit. These options vary significantly in mass, power, engineering and safety factors, with relying on the evaporative cooling capacity of the suit being the least difficult to implement. Data from previous studies indicates that the evaporative cooling capacity of the ACES was much higher than previously expected, but subsequent tests were performed for longer duration and higher metabolic rates to better define the water vapor permeability of the ACES. In these tests five subjects completed a series of tests performing low to moderate level exercise in order to control for a target metabolic rate while wearing the ACES in an environmentally controlled thermal chamber. Four different metabolic profiles at a constant temperature of 95 F and relative humidity of 50% were evaluated. These tests showed subjects were able to reject about twice as much heat in the permeable ACES as they were in an impermeable suit that had less thermal insulation. All of the heat rejection differential is attributed to the increased evaporation capability through the Gortex bladder of the suit.

Bue, Grant↗

NASA NTRS2008

Launch-Off-Need Shuttle Hubble Rescue Mission: Medical Issues

The Space Shuttle Hubble repair mission (STS-125) is unique in that a rescue mission (STS-400) has to be ready to launch before STS-125 life support runs out should the vehicle become stranded. The shuttle uses electrical power derived from fuel cells that use cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen (CRYO) to run all subsystems including the Environmental Control System. If the STS-125 crew cannot return to Earth due to failure of a critical subsystem, they must power down all nonessential systems and wait to be rescued by STS-400. This power down will cause the cabin temperature to be 60 F or less and freeze the rest of the vehicle, preventing it from attempting a reentry. After an emergency has been declared, STS-125 must wait at least 7 days to power down since that is the earliest that STS-400 can be launched. Problem The delayed power down of STS-125 causes CYRO to be consumed at high rates and limits the survival time after STS-400 launches to 10 days or less. CRYO will run out sooner every day that the STS-400 launch is delayed (weather at launch, technical issues etc.). To preserve CRYO and lithium hydroxide (LiOH - carbon dioxide removal) the crew will perform no exercise to reduce their metabolic rates, yet each deconditioned STS-125 crewmember must perform an EVA to rescue himself. The cabin may be cold for 10 days, which may cause shivering, increasing the metabolic rate of the STS-125 crew. Solution To preserve LiOH, the STS-125 manifest includes nutrition bars with low carbohydrate content to maintain crew respiratory quotient (RQ) below 0.85 as opposed to the usual shuttle galley food which is rich in carbohydrates and keeps the RQ at approximately 0.95. To keep the crew more comfortable in the cold vehicle warm clothing also has been included. However, with no exercise and limited diet, the deconditioned STS-125 crew returning on STS-400 may not be able to egress the vehicle autonomously requiring a supplemented crash-and-rescue capability.

Hamilton, Douglas↗

NASA NTRS2008

Cooling Properties of the Shuttle Advanced Crew Escape Spacesuit: Results of an Environmental Chamber Experiment

The shuttle crew wears the Advanced Crew Escape Spacesuit (ACES) to protect themselves from cabin decompression and to support bail out during landing. ACES is cooled by a liquid-cooled garment (LCG) that interfaces to a heat exchanger that dumps heat into the cabin. The ACES outer layer is made of Gore-Tex(Registered TradeMark), permitting water vapor to escape while containing oxygen. The crew can only lose heat via insensible water losses and the LCG. Under nominal landing operations, the average cabin temperature rarely exceeds 75 F, which is adequate for the ACES to function. Problem A rescue shuttle will need to return 11 crew members if the previous mission suffers a thermal protection system failure, preventing it from returning safely to Earth. Initial analysis revealed that 11 crew members in the shuttle will increase cabin temperature at wheel stop above 80 F, which decreases the ACES ability to keep crew members cool. Air flow in the middeck of the shuttle is inhomogeneous and some ACES may experience much higher temperatures that could cause excessive thermal stress to crew members. Methods A ground study was conducted to measure the cooling efficiency of the ACES at 75 F, 85 F, and 95 F at 50% relative humidity. Test subjects representing 5, 50, and 95 percentile body habitus of the astronaut corps performed hand ergometry keeping their metabolic rate at 400, 600, and 800 BTU/hr for one hour. Core temperature was measured by rectal probe and skin, while inside and outside the suit. Environmental chamber wall and cooling unit inlet and outlet temperatures were measured using high-resolution thermistors ( 0.2 C). Conclusions Under these test conditions, the ACES was able to protect the core temperature of all test subjects, however thermal stress due to high insensible losses and skin temperature and skin heat flow may impact crew performance. Further research should be performed to understand the impact on cognitive performance.

Hamilton, Douglas↗

NASA NTRS2006

Medical Operations Console Procedure Evaluation: BME Response to Crew Call Down for an Emergency

International Space Station (ISS) Mission Operations are managed by multiple flight control disciplines located at the lead Mission Control Center (MCC) at NASA-Johnson Space Center (JSC). ISS Medical Operations are supported by the complementary roles of Flight Surgeons (Surgeon) and Biomedical Engineer (BME) flight controllers. The Surgeon, a board certified physician, oversees all medical concerns of the crew and the BME provides operational and engineering support for Medical Operations Crew Health Care System. ISS Medical Operations is currently addressing the coordinated response to a crew call down for an emergent medical event, in particular when the BME is the only Medical Operations representative in MCC. In this case, the console procedure BME Response to Crew Call Down for an Emergency will be used. The procedure instructs the BME to contact a Surgeon as soon as possible, coordinate with other flight disciplines to establish a Private Medical Conference (PMC) for the crew and Surgeon, gather information from the crew if time permits, and provide Surgeon with pertinent console resources. It is paramount that this procedure is clearly written and easily navigated to assist the BME to respond consistently and efficiently. A total of five BME flight controllers participated in the study. Each BME participant sat in a simulated MCC environment at a console configured with resources specific to the BME MCC console and was presented with two scripted emergency call downs from an ISS crew member. Each participant used the procedure while interacting with analog MCC disciplines to respond to the crew call down. Audio and video recordings of the simulations were analyzed and each BME participant's actions were compared to the procedure. Structured debriefs were conducted at the conclusion of both simulations. The procedure was evaluated for its ability to elicit consistent responses from each BME participant. Trials were examined for deviations in procedure task completion and/or navigation, in particular the execution of the Surgeon call sequence. Debrief comments were used to analyze unclear procedural steps and to discern any discrepancies between the procedure and generally accepted BME actions. The sequence followed by BME participants differed considerably from the sequence intended by the procedure. Common deviations included the call sequence used to contact Surgeon, the content of BME and crew interaction and the gathering of pertinent console resources. Differing perceptions of task priority and imprecise language seem to have caused multiple deviations from the procedure s intended sequence. The study generated 40 recommendations for the procedure, of which 34 are being implemented. These recommendations address improving the clarity of the instructions, identifying training considerations, expediting Surgeon contact, improving cues for anticipated flight control team communication and identifying missing console tools.

Johnson-Troop↗