Engineering topics

Glantz, Clifford S.

Publications and source records attributed to Glantz, Clifford S..

4 records

DOE OSTI2021

Technical Guide for Implementing Cybersecurity Continuous Monitoring in the Nuclear Industry

A technical guide to assist the nuclear industry in implementing cybersecurity continuous monitoring program. The guide walks through the steps to develop a cybersecurity continuous monitoring program and provides details relative to the nuclear industry. It also includes a series of examples of optional metrics to be used, and technologies that can be useful when implementing a continuous monitoring program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Electricity Subsector Transmission Resilience Maturity Model (TRMM) User Guide

The electric transmission sector is facing a range of threats to its functionality that are either new, more severe than experienced in earlier years, or more well understood. Such threats include more frequent and more severe extreme weather events, wildfires, droughts, and human-caused physical and cyberattacks. They also include geological, electromagnetic, and biological events. The novelty or increasing severity of these threats creates a significant need for transmission owners to implement programs to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from such incidents. The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the face of such threats, and the transmission networks are essential components of that infrastructure. The Electricity Subsector Transmission Resilience Maturity Model (TRMM) is a tool that a transmission organization can use to objectively evaluate and benchmark its currently established transmission resilience strategies, programs, policies, and investments, in order to target and prioritize enhancements where needed. The TRMM was developed to address the unique characteristics of the transmission system. The model can enable users to: • evaluate and benchmark their organization’s resilience capabilities, effectively and consistently • prioritize actions and investments to improve the resilience of their systems • share transmission-related knowledge, best practices, and relevant references within their organization and with business partners as a means to improve resilience capabilities • contribute to increasing the overall resilience of the Nation’s transmission systems. The TRMM provides descriptive rather than prescriptive industry-focused guidance. The model content is presented at a high level of abstraction so that it can be interpreted by transmission organizations of various types, structures, and sizes. The model is designed to an be easy-to-use, self-assessment tool.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

DOE OSTI2020

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗