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Glover, Austin

Publications and source records attributed to Glover, Austin.

The HyRIGHT Project: 700 bar Hydrogen Refueling Interface for Gaseous Heavy-Duty Trucks

Heavy duty truck fueling places additional constraints on the station. The HyRIGHT project was developed to evaluate a subset of key areas around precooling, communications, and safety risks that aims to:  Utilize a dynamic model that includes the relevant station components and vehicle to develop an optimized precooling strategy based on initial precooling status, real time communications that can support fueling protocol development.  Perform a techno economic cost assessment (TEA) related to effects of precooling including station storage and efficiency effects.  Develop a Cyber Vulnerability assessment and framework for refueling of HD vehicles with station communications.  Disseminate the results in support of the HD fueling protocol development to the relevant standards development organizations.

JAMES, Charles W.↗

Compressed Natural Gas Component Leak Frequency Estimation

The frequency of unintended releases in a compressed natural gas system is an important aspect of the system quantitative risk assessment. The frequencies for possible release scenarios, along with engineering models, are utilized to quantify the risks for compressed natural gas facilities. This report documents component leakage frequencies representative of compressed natural gas components that were estimated as a function of the normalized leak size. A Bayesian statistical method was used which results in leak frequency distributions for each component which represent variation and uncertainty in the leak frequency. The analysis shows that there is high uncertainty in the estimated leak frequencies due to sparsity in compressed natural gas data. These leak frequencies may still be useful in compressed natural gas system risk assessments, as long as this high uncertainty is acknowledged and considered appropriately.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Report on General Hydrogen Safety

Hydrogen is an important resource for many different industries throughout the world, including refining, manufacturing, and as a direct energy source. Hydrogen production, through methods such as steam methane reforming, has been developed over several decades. There is a large global demand for hydrogen from these industries and safe production and distribution are paramount for hydrogen systems. Codes and standards have been developed to reduce the risk associated with hydrogen accidents to the public. These codes and standards are similar to those in other industries in which there is inherent risk to the public, such as gasoline and natural gas production and distribution. Although there will always be a risk to the public in these types of fuels, the codes and standards are developed to reduce the likelihood of an accident occurring and reduce the severity of impact, should one occur. This report reviews the current state of hydrogen in the United States and outlines the codes and standards that ensure safe operation of hydrogen systems. The total hydrogen demand and use in different industries is identified. Additionally, the current landscape of hydrogen production and fueling stations in the United States is outlined. The safety of hydrogen systems is discussed through an overview of the purpose, methods, and content included in codes and standards. As outlined in this safety overview, the risk to the public in operation of hydrogen generation facilities and fueling stations is reduced through implementation of appropriate measures. Codes, such as NFPA 2, ensure that the risk associated with a hydrogen system is no greater than the risk presented by gasoline refueling stations.

08 HYDROGEN↗

BayoTech Risk and Modeling Support of NM Gas Site

The BayoTech hydrogen generation system has been evaluated in terms of safety considerations at the NM Gas site. The consequence of a leak in different components in the system was evaluated in terms of plume dispersion and overpressure. Additionally, the likelihood of a leak scenario for different hydrogen components was identified. The worst-case plume dispersion cases, full-bore leaks, resulted in relatively large plumes. However, these cases were noted to be far less likely than the partial break cases that were evaluated. The partial break cases resulted in nearly negligible plume lengths. Similarly, the overpressure analysis of the full-bore break scenarios resulted in much larger overpressures than the partial break cases (which resulted in negligible overpressure at the lot line). There were several cases evaluated in the analysis that represented leak scenarios from both hydrogen and natural gas sources. Generally, the natural gas leak scenarios resulted in a smaller horizontal impact than that of hydrogen leaks. The worst-case consequence from a hydrogen leak resulted from the compressors, storage pods, or dispensing system. To consider the safety features that may isolate the leak, the consequence was evaluated at different times after the leak event to show the reduction of pressure. After 2 seconds, the plume dispersion from this event is contained within the perimeter of the site. The worst-case consequences show that the plume may disperse to adjacent facilities and to the street. When considering both likelihood and consequence, the risk may be considered low because the maximum frequency of a full-bore leak from any component within the hydrogen compound is 8.2 E-5/yr. This means that a full-bore leak is expected to occur less than once every 10,000 years. The risk can be further reduced by implementing mitigative countermeasures, such as CMU walls along the sides of the equipment compound. This would reduce the overall consequence of the worst-case dispersion scenarios (horizontal impact of plume). In terms of siting and safety analysis, the NFPA 2 code was used to provide a high-level evaluation of the current site plan. The most limiting equipment in terms of set-back distance are the compressors/storage units because of the high-pressure hydrogen. The site layout was evaluated for an acceptable location for the compression/storage unit based on NFPA 2 set-back distances. It is important to note that the NFPA 2 set-back distances consider both likelihood and consequence. This is important because the worst-case results evaluated herein also represent the least likely leak scenario. Other site-specific considerations were evaluated, including the parking shade structure with photovoltaic cells and refueling vehicles. These issues were dispositioned and determined to not present a safety risk.

08 HYDROGEN↗