Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Gordon Vos

Publications and source records attributed to Gordon Vos.

6 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2023

NASA's Center Innovation Fund (CIF) Internal Research and Development (IRAD) Handling Qualities Study on the Mikrolar Motion Platform Test Report

In order to support the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Extravehicular Activity and Surface Mobility Program (EHP), system engineers, designers, and researchers embarked on a yearlong challenge to develop a new lunar rover-based motion table simulator to study handling qualities of lunar rovers in the lunar South Pole region, support development research for any lunar rover vendor, and provide a lunar training capability for future lunar/planetary astronauts. In 1989, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine (RAF-IAM) stated that motion platforms are the only simulation devices capable of fully stimulating the body motion sensors. They confirmed that motion platforms can impart accelerations to the whole body and therefore exercise the automatic motion feedback-loop that operators are used to. With both visual and motion cues handling the vehicle becomes more realistic. Strachan (2019) con-firms motion cueing from a well set-up motion platform has been found to be important especially in conditions such as night or reduced visibility where motion cues may be more relied upon

Motion Table↗
NASA NTRS2013

Evidence Report: Risk of Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction

Human-computer interaction (HCI) encompasses all the methods by which humans and computer-based systems communicate, share information, and accomplish tasks. When HCI is poorly designed, crews have difficulty entering, navigating, accessing, and understanding information. HCI has rarely been studied in an operational spaceflight context, and detailed performance data that would support evaluation of HCI have not been collected; thus, we draw much of our evidence from post-spaceflight crew comments, and from other safety-critical domains like ground-based power plants, and aviation. Additionally, there is a concern that any potential or real issues to date may have been masked by the fact that crews have near constant access to ground controllers, who monitor for errors, correct mistakes, and provide additional information needed to complete tasks. We do not know what types of HCI issues might arise without this "safety net". Exploration missions will test this concern, as crews may be operating autonomously due to communication delays and blackouts. Crew survival will be heavily dependent on available electronic information for just-in-time training, procedure execution, and vehicle or system maintenance; hence, the criticality of the Risk of Inadequate HCI. Future work must focus on identifying the most important contributing risk factors, evaluating their contribution to the overall risk, and developing appropriate mitigations. The Risk of Inadequate HCI includes eight core contributing factors based on the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS): (1) Requirements, policies, and design processes, (2) Information resources and support, (3) Allocation of attention, (4) Cognitive overload, (5) Environmentally induced perceptual changes, (6) Misperception and misinterpretation of displayed information, (7) Spatial disorientation, and (8) Displays and controls.

Kritina Holden↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human-in-the-Loop Evaluations: Process and Mockup Fidelity

Human-in-the-loop (HITL) evaluations are iterative events used during design and development to identify issues with the implementation of human systems integration. HITL evaluations involve human test subjects who are user-representative participants performing activities with representative hardware, software, and procedures. The paper will describe the process by which HITL evaluations can be implemented in a program or project. This will include definitions for developmental and verification HITL evaluations, levels of mockup fidelity, and certification of HITL articles. The proposed process can be tailored depending on the type of HITL evaluation being conducted. It is highly recommended that findings are timely reported and incorporated in the hardware and/or software design.

Jackelynne Silva-Martinez↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗