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Greenhalgh, Phillip O.

Publications and source records attributed to Greenhalgh, Phillip O..

Improving Our Odds: Success through Continuous Risk Management

Launching a rocket, running a business, driving to work and even day-to-day living all involve some degree of risk. Risk is ever present yet not always recognized, adequately assessed and appropriately mitigated. Identification, assessment and mitigation of risk are elements of the risk management component of the "continuous improvement" way of life that has become a hallmark of successful and progressive enterprises. While the application of risk management techniques to provide continuous improvement may be detailed and extensive, the philosophy, ideals and tools can be beneficially applied to all situations. Experiences with the use of risk identification, assessment and mitigation techniques for complex systems and processes are described. System safety efforts and tools used to examine potential risks of the Ares I First Stage of NASA s new Constellation Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) presently being designed are noted as examples. Recommendations from lessons learned are provided for the application of risk management during the development of new systems as well as for the improvement of existing systems. Lessons learned and suggestions given are also examined for applicability to simple systems, uncomplicated processes and routine personal daily tasks. This paper informs the reader of varied uses of risk management efforts and techniques to identify, assess and mitigate risk for improvement of products, success of business, protection of people and enhancement of personal life.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.

Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating Risk of Single-Point Inspections on the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor

In the production of each Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), over 100,000 inspections are performed. ATK Thiokol Inc. reviewed these inspections to ensure a robust inspection system is maintained. The principal effort within this endeavor was the systematic identification and evaluation of inspections considered to be single-point. Single-point inspections are those accomplished on components, materials, and tooling by only one person, involving no other check. The purpose was to more accurately characterize risk and ultimately address and/or mitigate risk associated with single-point inspections. After the initial review of all inspections and identification/assessment of single-point inspections, review teams applied risk prioritization methodology similar to that used in a Process Failure Modes Effects Analysis to derive a Risk Prioritization Number for each single-point inspection. After the prioritization of risk, all single-point inspection points determined to have significant risk were provided either with risk-mitigating actions or rationale for acceptance. This effort gave confidence to the RSRM program that the correct inspections are being accomplished, that there is appropriate justification for those that remain as single-point inspections, and that risk mitigation was applied to further reduce risk of higher risk single-point inspections. This paper examines the process, results, and lessons learned in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk associated with single-point inspections accomplished in the production of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.

Multiple Changes to Reusable Solid Rocket Motors, Identifying Hidden Risks

The Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) baseline is subject to various changes. Changes are necessary due to safety and quality improvements, environmental considerations, vendor changes, obsolescence issues, etc. The RSRM program has a goal to test changes on full-scale static test motors prior to flight due to the unique RSRM operating environment. Each static test motor incorporates several significant changes and numerous minor changes. Flight motors often implement multiple changes simultaneously. While each change is individually verified and assessed, the potential for changes to interact constitutes additional hidden risk. Mitigating this risk depends upon identification of potential interactions. Therefore, the ATK Thiokol Propulsion System Safety organization initiated the use of a risk interaction matrix to identify potential interactions that compound risk. Identifying risk interactions supports flight and test motor decisions. Uncovering hidden risks of a full-scale static test motor gives a broader perspective of the changes being tested. This broader perspective compels the program to focus on solutions for implementing RSRM changes with minimal/mitigated risk. This paper discusses use of a change risk interaction matrix to identify test challenges and uncover hidden risks to the RSRM program.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.

Use of System Safety Risk Assessments for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)

This paper discusses the System Safety approach used to assess risk for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). Previous to the first RSRM flight in the fall of 1988, all systems were analyzed extensively to assure that hazards were identified, assessed and that the baseline risk was understood and appropriately communicated. Since the original RSRM baseline was established, Thiokol and NASA have implemented a number of initiatives that have further improved the RSRM. The robust design, completion of rigorous testing and flight success of the RSRM has resulted in a wise reluctance to make changes. One of the primary assessments required to accompany the documentation of each proposed change and aid in the decision making process is a risk assessment. Documentation supporting proposed changes, including the risk assessments from System Safety, are reviewed and assessed by Thiokol and NASA technical management. After thorough consideration, approved changes are implemented adding improvements to and reducing risk of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.