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Grow, David Isaac

Publications and source records attributed to Grow, David Isaac.

Packaging Capacity Calculation: Pu Oxide Packaging Options with the 2 Quart SAVY Container

This calculation supports programmatic efforts to Dilute and Dispose Pu. Metal is to be oxidized at LANL, then transported to SRS for dilution at SRS. Ultimately, the diluted oxide will be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Currently 3013 containers are used to package the oxide, which are placed in to 9975 Type B shipping containers. The Oxide Packaging Technology Maturation Plan determined that a transition to the used of 2-qt SAVY containers placed in 9977 would increase efficiency in shipping and handling and increase programmatic flexibility. The 2-quart SAVY container meets DOE M 441.1 and TA-55 Documented Safety Analysis requirements for handling and storage of Pu oxide at LANL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Advancing Vision-based Feedback and Convolutional Neural Networks for Visual Outlier Detection

Machine learning has matured into a technology that has immediate applicability to the surveillance needs of nuclear material storage containers. These containers at LANL are the barrier preventing release of radioactive material to the workers, public, and environment during the storage period of the material. Annual surveillance activities can only provide coverage on a handful of containers. There is a significant need for surveillance tools to identify potential issues and precursors to containment failure that can be used during opportunistic inspections and, more generally, outside of annual surveillance activities. In this report we provide details on the advancement of our proposed embodiment that combines an automation system for taking pictures and a high-accuracy machine learning-driven object detection software. We further showcase the improvements on the software side with progress on extracting unique identification features and advances in detecting damage. The current state of the system captures subject matter expert training and a space-conscious design whose implementation is envisioned in the near future.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Improving Non-Destructive Detection Technology Through SAVY Feature Detection

Surveillance of special nuclear material (SNM) storage containers is required by the DOE to assess their integrity across the Complex. This work aims to improve the task of container inspections by leveraging automation through machine learning (ML) tools to reduce the human-intensive effort and expert-level knowledge needed to assess container status. A field-deployable, non-destructive technology was designed using off-the-shelf components to collect multiple images from different perspectives of containers in storage to detect both spatial features of interest and anomalies of concern. Nine ML models were generated using unique training datasets and parameters. Learned features include SAVY surface regions including the body side wall, collar, lid, filter, and printed/etched information. Average Precision (AP) is used to calculate detection performance when both viewing previously seen environments and previously unseen environments. The application of image transformations and resolution scaling while training greatly improved the detection performance in unseen environments, and significantly increasing the number of computation iterations improved detection performance on previously seen environments. Additional capabilities were developed including the novel detection of procedural non-compliance and the ability to localize anomalies relative to SAVY surface features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Demonstration of Intelligent Container Surveillance Using Stationary and Mobile Camera Platforms

Surveillance of nuclear material storage containers is required to ensure that the container safety boundary is maintained during the service life of the container. As many of these container types are the first and only containment barrier to release protecting the worker, public, and environment, it is imperative to develop robust surveillance tools to characterize container degradation. Machine learning (ML) techniques have matured quickly in the past decade and are slowly becoming a routine application in data analysis. While more popular architectures have been developed with different applications in mind, these can be easily translated to container surveillance requirements. In this study, we developed a ML model based on the Detectron2 framework to identify slip lid containers and common exterior container defects, primarily dents. Commercial-off-the-shelf cameras are combined into a stationary camera array or are mounted to a robotic arm to provide more mobility for positioning needs. Results from the model evaluations on the images indicate that the stationary camera arrays outperform the accuracy of the mobile camera systems for both individual camera and composite image detections. Overall, however, the detection accuracies of the systems fell short of 50% and were less than satisfactory. Future efforts to improve the system involve focusing on a single camera deployable solution that combines a controllable light source that eliminates one of the biggest environmental factors that influence ML model detection performance. Additional training set collection is planned to build a more robust model that enables accurate detection from a wider range of imaging conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Rules of Use Report Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2021 Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

Prior to 2021, Hagan containers were examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors identified the need for Hagan-specific surveillance (Kelly, et al., 2020) and have developed this surveillance plan to meet that need.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Investigation of Luminescent Ceria as a Plutonium Oxide Simulant. Final Report

Plutonium oxide powders from various production lines at Los Alamos National Laboratory are stored and transported in specially designed “SAVY-4000”, “Hagan”, or other containment systems. Cerium oxide powder has been used as a less-hazardous simulant powder for testing accidental release from these containers under various operational scenarios. This work investigates the development and use of fluorescent cerium oxide powders as a more easily detectable, and potentially quantifiable, simulant powder for plutonium oxide container systems

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Liquid Metal Intrusion Testing Final Report

Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) is concerned about potential interactions between a tin-antimony pewter material used for localized radiation shielding and stainless-steel containers used for storage and movement of radioactive materials when containers are subjected to elevated temperatures. The specific concern is whether pewter constituents can diffuse into grain boundaries and lead to embrittlement of the stainless steel, potentially compromising the ability of stainless steel components to maintain containment. This work will provide a qualitative and quantitative understanding of the depth of penetration of the pewter coating constituents into stainless steel when the test coupons are subjected to a range of thermal environments. The results of the present work will allow LANL to determine conditions for safely using the pewter lined containers.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

An Investigation of Critical Pit Size in Savy 4000 Wall

The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, in March 2008 to protect workers who handle nuclear material from exposure due to loss of containment of stored materials. The Manual specifies a detailed approach to achieve high confidence in containers and includes requirements for container design and performance, design-life determinations, material contents, and surveillance and maintenance to ensure container integrity over time.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Guide for Joint Participation in a DOE Complex Wide SAVY-4000 Surveillance Program

This document describes LANL Storage Program best practices when working with other User Sites to implement DOE M441.1-1 Manual requirements through the use of the SAVY nuclear material packaging system. It is a Manual directive for Field Element Managers to review and approve the SAVY-4000 container series design (with supporting technical basis) as a packaging system for use at their respective sites. This review and approval incorporates an evaluation of the User Site methodology for SAVY surveillance and the process for documenting its nuclear materials storage program. This document aims to assist the Field Element Mangers and User Sites in the processes necessary to credit LANL SAVY surveillance for key elements of the User Site surveillance plan.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Comparative Approach for Evaluating the Containment Performance of Legacy NM Storage Containers

Many different types of nuclear material storage containers are used throughout TA-55 and specifically PF-4, in some instances these containers are used outside of engineering control barriers in most cases these barriers are gloveboxes. When a container is used outside of a glovebox or open front hood the container itself is relied upon as the primary engineering control barrier for the user. For this reason a process must be established in order to evaluate Non- Manual Compliant or NMC containers used outside of a glovebox in a comparative approach against Manual compliant containers. Legacy containers are typically understood to be non-standards packaged prior to 1998. For the purposes of this document “legacy” refers to any non-Manual compliant containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical Basis: SAVY-4000 Series, 2 qt Container

The 2 qt SAVY nuclear material storage container is the latest in the SAVY-4000 series. The 2 qt design is identical to the 1 qt container, with the exception of an extended, deep-drawn body. Here, a technical basis using engineering equivalency analysis, calculation, and test data is presented to establish that the 2 qt SAVY-4000 Container is a DOE Manual 441.1-1 compliant container and that a fifteen-year design life (as with the currently approved SAVY series) is justified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Test Report: Glovebox Test Fire for Evaluation of Effects on Containers and Windows

This test report describes a designed Glovebox (GB) fire to identify target environmental conditions that GB containers and windows are subject to such fires. The fire was designed by representatives from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to replicate a realistic worst-case fire scenario at LANL. Key results of these experiments include: • The GB fire was active for more than 30 minutes. • Thermocouples were placed at multiple points in the GB were measured, including one on top of the container. Temperatures at varied widely as a function of location during the fires, as might be expected and as a function of proximity to fire, elevation in the GB, and in relation airflow present during the test, which constantly introduces room-temperature air into the GB. The maximum temperature recorded by a thermocouple was slightly less than 500°F at the elevation of the highest gloveports and near, but not in contact with the GB wall. • A thermographic camera imaged the region of the GB container during the fire. These data report container temperatures of up to approximately 900°F (482°C) over a period of several minutes. • Four kilograms of lead shot were held in the container. The majority of the shot melted during the course of the fire (lead melting point: 621°F/327°C). • Multiple windows fractured during the test. In some cases, the polymer interlayer of the laminated GB window glass appears to have sustained damage due to thermal breakdown of the polymer, though the interlayer of the laminated GB window glass appears to have remained intact in all cases. • The one window with an attached thermocouple was less affected by the fire. The attached thermocouple measured up to approximately 150°F. • Other thermocouples along (but not in contact with) the GB wall and closer to the fire (and cracked windows) reported up to approximately 200°C (392° F). These finding suggest that subjecting containers to 500°C for 45 minutes is bounding and representative for fires of this type. It should also be noted that 500°C (932°F) has been previously used as a test criterion for related work. Similarly, 200°C may be a reasonable target temperature for GB windows subjected to fires of this type.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Characterization of Mechanical and Thermal Factors Related to Glovebox Container Water Ingress (Final Report)

This report summarizes tests conducted to quantify water ingress into nuclear material containers when damaged. The damage inflicted is meant to replicate realistic worst-case seismic/fire scenario at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Four types (SAVY, Hagan, K-flange, and ROCK) of three-quart containers were subject to drop and then furnace testing. At each stage (as-delivered, post-drop, and post-furnace), water ingress potential was tested by subjecting the containers to a static water column. Key results of these experiments include: • LANL provided two water ingress testing criteria. The first, and most stringent, was a 24 inAq column for a period of one week. These parameters were used for baseline testing on as-delivered containers. The second was a 6 inAq column for a period of two hours. These parameters were used to test containers after impact and furnace testing. • Under the more severe criteria for as-delivered containers, the measured water ingress was: SAVY 7–14 g; Hagan 168–493 g; K-flange 4–5 g; and ROCK 24–280 g of water ingress. • Under the less severe criteria and after drop testing, all containers permitted less than 50 g of water ingress with one exception a ROCK container that had one of three latches release during impact. • Finally, after furnace testing (500°C, 45 minutes), which destroyed the o-ring/gasket materials, and under the same 6 inAq, 2 hr column test, the measured water ingress exceeded 50 g for all but one K-flange and one ROCK container.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Evaluation of Glovebox Glove Material Integrity Under Thermal Insult (Final Report)

The results of the experiments presented above are summarized in Table 1. Timing of critical events, such as appearance of bubbles on the specimen surface and rupture are noted. Relevant temperature and pressure data are also summarized. These results indicate a few critical aspects of the response of Hypalon glove material when exposed to a high temperature environment. Glove specimens began to show changes in surface appearance (appearance of bubbles on surface) when the temperature at the specimen surface was 530 ± 32 °F, regardless of specimen thickness. The bubbles are likely the result of the glove material decomposing and off-gassing. In the case of the 15 mil thickness gloves, specimens ruptured shortly after bubbling was observed. The ruptures are likely the result the bubbles growing in size, eventually forming pinholes through the thickness of the specimen. It should be noted that the specimens did not need to ignite in order to cause a perforation of the specimen. Specimens located 10, 11 and 12 inches from the burner ruptured, while the specimen located 14 inches from the burner did not rupture; in fact no change in surface appearance was observed. The 30 mil thickness specimens exhibited a different post-bubble response with only the specimen located 10 inches from the burner (i.e. highest surface temperature) resulting in rupture. There was a longer delay between surface bubbling and rupture than was observed in the 15 mil thickness specimens. This specimen also ignited before the specimen ruptured. While the 30 mil thickness specimens located 11 and 12 inches from the burner did show surface bubbling corresponding to thermal breakdown, neither specimen ruptured. Examination of the specimens after testing revealed that a slightly hard layer of melted material had formed on the rear of the specimen. This layer may have acted to seal the rear surface of the specimen by forming a barrier that bubbles could not penetrate. The specimen located 14 inches from the burner did not rupture, and did not exhibit any change in surface characteristics. In general the 30 mil thickness glove materials proved more resistant to thermal-induced rupturing as compared with the 15 mil thickness glove material. It was shown to be possible to rupture a 15 mil thick glove without igniting the glove, while the only test case that resulted in a rupture of a 30 mil thickness specimen also showed the specimen igniting several seconds before eventual rupture. Furthermore, it was observed that 30 mil thickness specimens could be exposed to temperatures high enough to cause decomposition (bubbling), yet not rupture. Thus, it is possible that the 30 mil gloves rupture by burning through the specimen material, while the 15 mil thickness specimens could be ruptured by small bubbles formed by thermal off-gassing expanding and causing pinholes through the specimen thickness. We also note that thermal decomposition and the appearance of surface bubbles was observed in all experiments with a maximum temperature exceeding ∼500 °F. Lastly, we can state that specimens subjected to temperatures below 400 °F experienced no thermal damage, staying below this threshold should prevent damage and potential rupture of either thickness glove materials.

42 ENGINEERING↗