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Harmon, Tim

Publications and source records attributed to Harmon, Tim.

2 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Rocketdyne - SE-7 and SE-8 Engines

The 70-pound SE-7 engine is very similar with its two valves, ablative material, a silicon carbide liner, a silicon carbide throat, and overall configuration. There were different wraps. One had a ninety-degree ablative material orientation. That is important because it caused problems with the SE-8, but not for this application. It was not overly stressed. It was a validation of the off-the-shelf application approach. There were two SE-7 engines located on the stage near the bottom. They had their own propellant tanks. That was the application. All it did was give a little bit of gravity by firing to push the propellants to the bottom of the tanks for start or restart. It was not a particularly complicated setup. (See Slides 6 and 7, Appendix F) What had we learned? This was a proven engine in a space environment. There weren't any development issues. Off-the-shelf seemed to work. There were no operational issues, which made the SE-7 very cost-effective. Besides NASA, the customer for this application was the Douglas Aircraft Company. Douglas decided the off-the-shelf idea was cost-effective. With the Gemini Program, the company was McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, which was part of the reason the off-the-shelf idea was applied to the Apollo. (See Slide 8, Appendix F) However, here are some differences between Apollo and Gemini vehicles. For one thing, the Apollo vehicle was really moving at high speed when it re-entered the atmosphere. Instead of a mere 17,000 miles per hour, it was going 24,000 miles per hour. That meant the heat load was four times as high on the Apollo vehicle as on the Gemini craft. Things were vibrating a little more. We had two redundant systems. Apollo was redundant where it could be as much as possible. That was really a keystone or maybe an anchor point for Apollo. We decided to pursue the off-the-shelf approach. However, the prime contractor was a different entity - the North American Space Division. They thought they ought to tune up this off-the-shelf setup. It was a similar off-the-shelf application, but at a higher speed. They wanted to improve it. What they wanted to improve was the material performance of silicon carbide. They were uncomfortable with the cracks they were seeing. They were uncomfortable with the cracks in the throat, and feeling that the environment was a little tougher, that maybe it was going to rattle, perhaps something would fall out, and they would have a problem. They wanted to eliminate the ceramic liner, and they wanted a different throat material. (See Slides 9 and 10, Appendix F) The Rocketdyne solutions were to replace silicon carbide material with a more forgiving ceramic material. Also, due to the multiple locations within the vehicle, the shape of the nozzles varied. Some nozzles were long, and some nozzles were short. We came up with a single engine design with variable nozzle extensions and configurations to fit particular vehicle locations. (See Slides 10 and 11, Appendix F)

Harmon, Tim↗
NASA NTRS2009

Rocketdyne - Lunar Ascent Engine

The ascent engine was the last one from the moon, and I want to focus on the idea of redundancy and teams in regard to the engine. By teams, I mean teamwork - not just within Rocketdyne. It was teamwork within Rocketdyne; it was teamwork within Grumman; it was teamwork within NASA. These were all important elements leading to the successful development of the lunar excursion module (LEM) engine. Communication, rapid response, and cooperation were all important. Another aspect that went into the development of the ascent engine was the integration of technology and of lessons learned. We pushed all the above, plus technology and lessons learned, into a program, and that led to a successful result. One of the things that I like to think about - again in retrospect - is how it is very "in" now to have integrated product and process teams. These are buzzwords for teamwork in all program phases. That s where you combine a lot of groups into a single organization to get a job done. The ascent engine program epitomized that kind of integration and focus, and because this was the mid- to late-1960s; this was new ground for Rocketdyne, Grumman, and NASA. Redundancy was really a major hallmark of the Apollo Program. Everything was redundant. Once you got the rocket going, you could even lose one of the big F-1 engines, and it would still make it to orbit. And once the first stage separated from the rest of the vehicle, the second stage could do without an engine and still make a mission. This redundancy was demonstrated when an early Apollo launch shut down a J-2 second-stage engine. Actually, they shut down two J-2 engines on that flight. Even the third stage, with its single J-2 engine, was backed up because the first two stages could toss it into a recoverable orbit. If the third stage didn't work, you were circling the earth, and you had time to recover the command module and crew. Remember how on the Apollo 13 flight, there was sufficient system redundancy even when we lost the service module. That was a magnificent effort. TRW Inc. really ought to be proud of their engine for that. (See Slide 2, Appendix I) We had planned for redundancy; we had landed on the moon. However, weight restrictions in the architecture said, "You can t have redundancy for ascent from the moon. You've got one engine. It s got to work. There is no second chance. If that ascent engine doesn't work, you re stuck there." It would not have looked good for NASA. It wouldn't have looked good for the country. There was a letter written that President Richard Nixon would read if the astronauts got stuck on the moon, expressing how sorry we were and so forth. It was a scary letter, really. The ascent engine was an engine that had to work. (See Slide 3, Appendix I).

Harmon, Tim↗