Systems Analysis at Sandia National Laboratories to Support National Security and Sustainability.
Abstract not provided.
Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Heimer, Brandon Walter.
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Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
While there is consensus both in the executive branch and Congress on the need to recapitalize the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, the delivery system and W80-4 warhead proposed to comprise the LRSO have generated considerable debate. Much of the public debate has focused on its potential to affect the strategic nuclear balance and stability. This paper seeks to elucidate both Russian and Chinese perspectives on strategic stability and apply them to a systematic analysis of how the LRSO might either enhance or diminish strategic stability for the purpose of better informing the decision-making process rather than advocate a particular position on this issue.
While there is consensus both in the executive branch and Congress on the need to recapitalize the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, the delivery system and W80-4 warhead proposed to comprise the long-range stand-off (LRSO) missile have generated considerable debate. Much of the public debate has focused on its potential to affect the strategic nuclear balance and stability. This paper seeks to elucidate both Russian and Chinese perspectives on strategic stability and apply them to a systematic analysis of how the LRSO might either enhance or diminish strategic stability for the purpose of better informing the decision-making process rather than advocate a particular position on this issue.
While there is consensus both in the executive branch and Congress on the need to recapitalize the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, the delivery system and W80-4 warhead proposed to comprise the LRSO have generated considerable debate. Much of the public debate has focused on its potential to affect the strategic nuclear balance and stability. This paper seeks to elucidate both Russian and Chinese perspectives on strategic stability and apply them to a systematic analysis of how the LRSO might either enhance or diminish strategic stability for the purpose of better informing the decision-making process rather than advocate a particular position on this issue.
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Suppose Tom is working to develop a rocket. Susan is very interested in knowing what Tom is doing but cannot directly observe his testing of the rocket propulsion system. Specifically, she would like to know if Tom has the ability to launch a heavy rocket or a light rocket. She thinks she can learn about Tom’s capability by learning about what type of rocket engine Tom is using, and the number of rockets in the design. She is considering buying a special sensor that can observe flashes from the rocket firing up during the tests and indicate if the rockets fire in a sufficiently narrow window of time such that they would successfully lift a heavy rocket.