Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Hoffman, William C., III.
The Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accidents resulted in tragic loss of life and national assets, and investigations into both accidents produced important lessons to prevent future accidents
Power systems for human spacecraft have historically included fuel cells due to the superior energy density they offer over battery systems depending on mission length and power consumption. As space exploration focuses on the evolution of reusable spacecraft and also considers planetary exploration power system requirements, fuel cells continue to be a factor in the potential system solutions.
Development of a PEM fuel cell powerplant (PFCP) for use in the Space Shuttle offers multiple benefits to NASA. A PFCP with a longer design life than is delivered currently from the alkaline fuel will reduce Space Shuttle Program maintenance costs. A PFCP compatible with zero-gravity can be adapted for future NASA transportation and exploration programs. Also, the commercial PEM fuel cell industry ensures a competitive environment for select powerplant components. Conceptual designs of the Space Shuttle PFCP have resulted in identification of key technical areas requiring resolution prior to development of a flight system. Those technical areas include characterization of PEM fuel cell stack durability under operational conditions and water management both within and external to the stack. Resolution of the above issues is necessary to adequately control development, production, and maintenance costs for a PFCP.
Determining deterioration characteristics of the Space Shuttle crew escape system pyrotechnic components loaded with hexanitrostilbene would enable us to establish a hardware life-limit for these items, so we could better plan our equipment use and, possibly, extend the useful life of the hardware. We subjected components to accelerated-age environments to determine degradation characteristics and established a hardware life-limit based upon observed and calculated trends. We extracted samples using manufacturing lots currently installed in the Space Shuttle crew escape system and from other NASA programs. Hardware included in the study consisted of various forms and ages of mild detonating fuse, linear shaped charge, and flexible confined detonating cord. The hardware types were segregated into 5 groups. One was subjected to detonation velocity testing for a baseline. Two were first subjected to prolonged 155 F heat exposure, and the other two were first subjected to 255 F, before undergoing detonation velocity testing and/or chromatography analysis. Test results showed no measurable changes in performance to allow a prediction of an end of life given the storage and elevated temperature environments the hardware experiences. Given the lack of a definitive performance trend, coupled with previous tests on post-flight Space Shuttle hardware showing no significant changes in chemical purity or detonation velocity, we recommend a safe increase in the useful life of the hardware to 20 years, from the current maximum limits of 10 and 15 years, depending on the hardware.
The 2.5-inch frangible nut is used in two places to attach the Space Shuttle Orbiter to the External Tank. It must be capable of sustaining structural loads and must also separate into two pieces upon command. Structural load capability is verified by proof loading each flight nut, while ability to separate is verified on a sample of a production lot. Production lots of frangible nuts beginning in 1987 experienced an inability to reliably separate using one of two redundant explosive boosters. The problems were identified in lot acceptance tests, and the cause of failure has been attributed to differences in the response of the Inconel 718. Subsequent tests performed on the frangible nuts resulted in design modifications to the nuts along with redesign of the explosive booster to reliably separate the frangible nut. The problem history along with the design modifications to both the explosive booster and frangible nut are discussed in this paper. Implications of this failure experience impact any pyrotechnic separation system involving fracture of materials with respect to design margin control and lot acceptance testing.
The invention relates to a four-terminal electrical connector device for testing and measuring unknown resistances of initiators used for starting pyrotechnic events aboard the space shuttle. The testing device minimizes contact resistance degradation effects and so improves the reliability of resistance measurements taken with the device. Separate and independent voltage sensing and current supply circuits each include a pair of socket contacts for mating engagement with the pins of the initiator. The unknown resistance that is measured by the device is the resistance of the bridgewire of the initiator which is required to be between 0.95 and 1.15 ohms.