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Holt, Katherine

Publications and source records attributed to Holt, Katherine.

Using pollen in turbidites for vegetation reconstructions

Turbidites, deposited by sub-aqueous gravity flows, are common in sedimentary archives worldwide and present a unique challenge and opportunity when reconstructing past vegetation through pollen analysis. When sampling pollen from a sediment core for palaeovegetation records, it is common practice to target background sediments (i.e. pelagic sediment) and avoid sampling turbidites, as they are presumed to portray a misleading picture of past vegetation. This assumption stems from our limited understanding of pollen abundance and distribution through turbidites, meaning that palynologists overlook deposits that could potentially be used to reconstruct past vegetation and climate. We present pollen assemblage and sedimentological data from four recent (<150 years) deep marine turbidite deposits from the Hikurangi Subduction Margin, Aotearoa-New Zealand, with the aim of understanding the abundance and distribution of pollen in fine-grained turbidites. We find that pollen is diluted in the bases of turbidites, but despite this dilution, the proportions of different pollen taxa remain consistent through each turbidite. These results confirm that pollen can be sampled from turbidites for palaeovegetation reconstructions and that sampling the fine-grained upper parts of turbidites will provide the best pollen recovery.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗