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Hou, Yunhe

Publications and source records attributed to Hou, Yunhe.

A Distributionally Robust Resilience Enhancement Strategy for Distribution Networks Considering Decision-Dependent Contingencies

When performing the resilience enhancement for distribution networks, there are two obstacles to reliably model the uncertain contingencies: 1) decision-dependent uncertainty (DDU) due to various line hardening decisions, and 2) distributional ambiguity due to limited outage information during extreme weather events (EWEs). Here, to address these two challenges, this paper develops scenario-wise decision-dependent ambiguity sets (SWDD-ASs), where the DDU and distributional ambiguity inherent in EWE-induced contingencies are simultaneously captured for each possible EWE scenario. Then, a two-stage tri-level decision-dependent distributionally robust resilient enhancement (DD-DRRE) model is formulated, whose outputs include the optimal line hardening, distributed generation (DG) allocation, and proactive network reconfiguration strategy under the worst-case distributions in SWDD-ASs. Subsequently, the DD-DRRE model is equivalently recast to a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)-based master problem and multiple scenario-wise subproblems, facilitating the adoption of a customized column-and-constraint generation (C&CG) algorithm. Finally, case studies demonstrate a remarkable improvement in the out-of-sample performance of our model, compared to its prevailing stochastic and robust counterparts. Moreover, the potential values of incorporating the ambiguity and distributional information are quantitatively estimated, providing a useful reference for planners with different budgets and risk-aversion levels.

decision-dependent uncertainty↗

Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems

The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. Here, to provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes.

Benders decomposition↗