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Huning, Alex

Publications and source records attributed to Huning, Alex.

At least 19 records

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

ORNL Peer Review Summary and Recommendations for: Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors Study

The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the peer review conducted for the "Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors" study prepared by researchers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) International Nuclear Security (INS) program team requested that ORNL perform a peer review of the study report prior to publication as a final peer check before distributing the report to a broader audience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

ASME Code Qualification Plan for LPBF 316 SS

This report describes a plan to qualify laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) 316 stainless steel for use with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 5 rules for metallic components in high temperature nuclear reactors. Accomplishing this goal would make the material and manufacturing process available to vendors for inclusion in the next generation of advanced, high temperature reactors. The general approach adopted here is to treat LPBF 316 as if it was a completely new material and to develop a plan to qualify the material according to the current ASME practices. One key goal of this work is to explore and develop accelerated qualification approaches that might reduce the time required to qualify new materials by reducing the need for long term testing. However, the qualification plan here does not employ any accelerated qualification approaches to provide a limiting, bounding description of the number, duration, and types of testing required to qualify LPBF 316 without such techniques and to describe a comprehensive dataset that could be used to explore and validate accelerated qualification approaches in the future. The report addresses the fundamental challenges to qualifying Advanced Manufacturing (AM) materials for high temperature applications and summarizes the ASME Section III qualification process as well as current efforts to qualify LBPF and DED 316 for low temperature applications. The report then discusses specific issues, both material and logistical, related to qualifying PBF 316 steel. The final chapters of the report describe a complete test plan designed to generate sufficient data to qualify the material as well as a data management plan for how to store and manage the data to eventually provide the test data packaged needed to qualify the material with ASME.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Status Report on Regulatory Criteria Applicable to the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)

Although the interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in nuclear energy is increasing rapidly, at present their implementation is limited. This rapid increase in interest is not surprising considering that implementing AI and ML technology would allow for continuous monitoring, facilitate the implementation of predictive maintenance with optimized staffing plans, enable automation and autonomy opportunities that could drastically reduce fixed operation and maintenance costs, and provide training for operations and maintenance. Other industries are using AI for construction, and in the nuclear arena AI could provide great benefit in decommissioning activities. The ability of AI and ML to operate in real time vastly increases their potential impact. Before AI can be used in design, operations, or as a regulatory tool, the specifics on the regulations applicable to the use of AI for nuclear power applications need to be established. The difficulty is that the specific use cases will dictate the applicability of regulations. For example, even within the application domain associated with operations, the regulations might vary if the AI is used to create a virtual reference for plant operations or is used for training, optimization of maintenance intervals, prioritization of maintenance activities, etc. Different still is if the AI is to be used for design or setting technical specifications, which will introduce additional requirements. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing reviews are based on an applicant’s design meeting its performance assessment based on (1) safety goals and objectives, (2) deterministic and/or probabilistic analysis of accident scenarios, and (3) quantitative assessment of design alternatives against the safety goals and objectives using accepted engineering tools, methodologies, and performance criteria. The current regulatory framework does not explicitly address AI or autonomous control. However, as implementing AI technology will require the use of a digital platform, it must meet the requirements of an instrumentation and control (I&C) system. The regulatory requirements for AI, which will be incorporated into the I&C system, will be very dependent on how it is used (i.e., its functionality, safety classification, etc.). The licensing process is primarily risk-based with the identification of components and systems as nonsafety, important to safety, or safety related. A risk-informed approach allows further gradation of components and systems based on risk metrics such as core damage frequency or large early release fractions. Thus, the use cases and the risk categorization of impacted systems and components will determine the regulatory requirements. Regardless of how AI is used it presents new opportunities for risk-informing operating, maintenance, and regulatory decisions. Trustworthiness, transparency, and the ability to validate and verify the results will be paramount in showing that the systems and plant still meet their performance requirements. This report describes the results of research to identify regulatory implications of AI technologies and their uses. Specifically, this report reviews current regulatory guidance relevant to the application of AI for design (including design changes or new designs including advanced reactors), construction, operations, training, maintenance, research, testing, and as a regulatory tool. AI can be automated at different levels from purely informative purposes to autonomous controls. The focus of this review included determination of constraints on the application of AI technology, identification of any regulatory gaps or uncertainties, and clarification of anticipated technical basis information likely to be important for regulatory acceptance of these technologies. Currently, any use of AI at nuclear power plants is focused on nonsafety-related applications. The NRC and other regulatory bodies are evaluating providing guidance to address gaps rather than create new regulations to address the use of AI and ML. This approach seems to be the best to encourage AI development without adding regulatory uncertainty.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Security by Design: A Plant Design and Component-Based Approach to Technical Solutions to Insider and Outsider Threat

Security costs for nuclear reactors have been shown to rise over the lifecycle of a nuclear facility as new threats, security weaknesses, and the generic threat profile of the plant location change over time. This paper conducts a review of the technological gaps that currently exist in Security by Design (SeBD) based on the literature available and attempts to close those gaps through proposing technological constructs and processes that can integrate safety and security in the design process of a plant, with a primary focus on SMR technology. Under the new modular and mass manufacturing regime, where plant designs attempt to reduce costs with potential economies of scale and modular construction, the current SeBD definitions focusing on state level regulators are not considered adequate since the licensing stage is often too late in the design process to integrate the true cost savings of SeBD. Thus, this paper attempts to remedy the current logic in order to allow for continuous implementation of security alongside the development of the safety concept for the plant. If adopted within the design process the establishment of this type of technology will allow for a technological ecosystem to evolve that will imbed security concepts into the physical design of the components of the plant.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cost Efficient-by-Design Microreactors: Trade-offs between cost, technical, and regulatory factors

This research evaluates a cost reduction investigation through adoption of a functional containment approach on the microreactor system and structure. Trade-offs between microreactor system designs, fuels and reactor module sizes are evaluated based on performance-based and risk-informed design procedures. Cost savings are evaluated against trade-offs in the reliability of passive heat removal systems, reactivity control, and radioactive material containment. Results can inform the Microreactor Program and reactor designs on “sweet spots” for microreactors that are cost-efficient while meeting required safety limits.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Mass Production of Microreactors: A Look at Potential Scenarios and Fabrication Facility Requirements

Microreactors may be able to be cost competitive in niche markets, but they are likely to be much more expensive than small modular reactors or large reactors in terms of levelized cost. The vision of microreactors being catered to larger markets relies heavily on their ability to be mass produced and cut costs. Since commercial nuclear reactors have not been mass produced before it is challenging to estimate what kind of manufacturing facilities will be needed, what they will cost, and how factory considerations influence the unit cost of microreactors. This summary attempts to imagine the various possible production layouts of microreactors and identify the different possible manufacturing facilities (factories) that might be required. Regulatory and economic considerations for these layouts and factories are then listed.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗