Engineering topics

Huning, Alexander J.

Publications and source records attributed to Huning, Alexander J..

5 records

DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Microreactor Safety Analysis Challenges and Recommendations for Utilization of the Comprehensive Reactor Analysis Bundle

To enable the broad deployment of microreactors in fundamentally new application regimes (i.e., mobile and autonomous operations), their safety must be indisputable in terms of possessing inherent resistance to severe offsite dose consequences. Therefore, mechanistic beyond-design-basis event source term calculations that demonstrate a sufficiently large margin of safety will be required to accommodate these new application regimes, which have no history of commercial regulation. Even for traditional reactor operation configurations, safety analysis expertise and familiarity with accident phenomena and conditions in microreactors—specifically those with heat pipe primary cooling arrangements—are lacking compared with other advanced reactor concepts and small modular reactors. Recently, modeling and simulation tools to account for unique heat pipe design aspects have been developed by Sandia National Laboratories with MELCOR and by the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Program with BlueCRAB. However, further demonstration and assessment of potential knowledge gaps are needed to support these codes’ broad usage by the microreactor community. Through the DOE Microreactor Program, an initial assessment of these two tools and guidance on how an evaluation model could be constructed was performed and is reported herein. Moreover, a proposed approach for demonstrating an evaluation model using these two tools is outlined.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Integrating the Safety Evaluation for a Molten Salt Reactor Operation and Fuel Cycle Facility Application

Molten salt reactor (MSR) sites may include additional elements of the nuclear fuel cycle beyond those of the existing fleet. In the existing fleet, the individual elements of the fuel cycle typically have been located on different sites and licensed separately. Providing robust separation between hazards remains a useful safety practice for MSRs. Although the different elements of the fuel cycle at a nuclear site that includes MSRs may transfer material between processes more frequently than prior practices, providing adequate separation between distinct facilities avoids the potential for adverse interactions. Additionally, some elements of the MSR fuel cycle, such as fuel salt preparation or waste stabilization, may be more efficient to share among multiple nearby reactors, and nuclear sites that include MSRs may also include other reactor classes. Hence, discrete MSR fuel cycle facilities located at a common site could be physically separated with robust barriers—albeit potentially connected by piping—and licensed individually. This report describes the hazards of individual elements of representative MSR fuel cycle facilities, including their relationship to overall site level hazards. The report maps the regulatory compliance aspects of the individual MSR fuel cycle elements (e.g., fuel salt preparation, reactor, waste stabilization) to existing and developing regulations, as well as describes current and developing site-level regulations from an MSR perspective.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

The pursuit of net-positive sustainability for industrial decarbonization with hybrid energy systems

We report signatories of the Paris Agreement are set to miss their climate targets. The net-zero pledges announced to date across many countries and private industries are insufficient to achieve carbon neutrality, which requires implementation of far-reaching and significantly scaled-up climate-positive actions. All technology options that pertain to deep decarbonization and carbon removal must be part of the mitigation portfolio. Transformative action plans must be established in which every individual/organization around the globe is an actor of changes in relation to net-zero goals. Such plans must involve governmental policy support but also encourage voluntary efforts to boost innovations, investments, initiatives, and behavioral changes. Recognition of these efforts is made quantifiable with the concepts of carbon handprint and net positivity. This paper presents a carbon handprint perspective on characterizing the environmental benefits of hybrid energy systems (HESs)—a widely applicable solution to cleaner production leveraging the capabilities of a portfolio of low-carbon energy sources—that provide heat and electricity to industrial processes. First, the carbon handprint and net positivity concepts and their calculation approach are introduced. The state of the art of HES-enabled industrial cogeneration is then surveyed, and the greenhouse gas emission intensities of different energy sources that power HESs are compared. Next, drawing on a case study about a US chemical facility's voluntary initiative to explore replacing its fossil fuel–based cogeneration infrastructure with a clean energy–generated HES, several technically viable scenarios are evaluated—especially those with small modular nuclear reactors—to illustrate how the positive-thinking handprint approach helps encourage and inform the search for widespread influence pathways in pursuit of net-positive sustainability. Finally, current knowledge gaps in the case study are identified, and opportunities to scale up the proposed handprint-based analysis are outlined with consideration of an expanded role of HESs in fulfilling climate objectives.It is envisioned that like-minded decision makers in the industry sector and beyond will adopt this perspective and act synergistically to enhance their environmental stewardship through voluntary actions and make greater contributions to the planet's climate future.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2022

Mid-Year Progress Update on ORNL Support for Developing the Guidance for Microreactor Manufacturing Licenses

Factory fueling and assembly, multi-site operation, and the associated transportation of advanced nuclear systems present both new opportunities and challenges for microreactor deployment. These areas have not been demonstrated under Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules and regulations. A goal of the Systems Integration and Analysis technical area under the US Department of Energy Microreactor Program for the current fiscal year is to articulate these challenges and provide industry recommendations. This mid-year progress report describes the progress and some of the contributions to this effort by the Advanced Reactor Engineering and Development section at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The content provided here is preliminary and may change before being incorporated into a later report, which is expected to be completed in September 2022.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Molten Salt Reactor Fundamental Safety Function PIRT

The phenomenon identification and ranking table (PIRT) process was employed to evaluate the current capability to assess the ability of liquid-salt–fueled molten salt reactors to achieve their fundamental safety functions (FSFs). The PIRT process provides a structured mechanism to elicit and document expert opinions on the most important phenomena and the corresponding level of knowledge with regard to achieving the FSFs. The PIRT panel included reactor developers, accident progression evaluation tool developers, US Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory technical staff, university researchers, and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. The information-gathering process concentrated on phenomena related to accidents in which the fuel salt—including any in the cover gas—has been released from the first barrier layer. This information-gathering process included identifying all potential accidents that could result in the release of a substantial amount of radionuclides that could breach or bypass the first barrier. The PIRT did not identify any previously unrecognized systemic vulnerabilities. However, the elicitation process identified several areas with low levels of knowledge and significant potential impact on accident progression. These areas either require additional research to improve the state of knowledge or additional design conservatism to accommodate the remaining unknowns.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗