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Hurtle, Jackie C.

Publications and source records attributed to Hurtle, Jackie C..

Los Alamos National Laboratory Input for the National TRU Program 5 Year Plan for National Nuclear Security Administration TRU Waste

On July 16, 2018, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) received a Corporate Board Data Call for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site input to the National TRU Program 5 Year Plan from the Office of the National TRU Program. This report summarizes LANL input for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) TRU waste and captures the shipping needs to support the LANL mission. Information is included for the current waste inventory and projected generation rates. The site’s location, characteristics, role and mission are described. Additional information for consideration and pictures for inclusion are provided. A separate submittal will be prepared by N3B for LANL legacy TRU waste managed by N3B under contract to EM-LA.

, LANL↗

TRU Corp Board Slides

This report presents LANL news, TRU waste certification, Plans to reduce inventory, and Lessons learned.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Decrease the Number of Glovebox Glove Breaches and Failures

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is committed to the protection of the workers, public, and environment while performing work and uses gloveboxes as engineered controls to protect workers from exposure to hazardous materials while performing plutonium operations. Glovebox gloves are a weak link in the engineered controls and are a major cause of radiation contamination events which can result in potential worker exposure and localized contamination making operational areas off-limits and putting programmatic work on hold. Each day of lost opportunity at Technical Area (TA) 55, Plutonium Facility (PF) 4 is estimated at $1.36 million. Between July 2011 and June 2013, TA-55-PF-4 had 65 glovebox glove breaches and failures with an average of 2.7 per month. The glovebox work follows the five step safety process promoted at LANL with a decision diamond interjected for whether or not a glove breach or failure event occurred in the course of performing glovebox work. In the event that no glove breach or failure is detected, there is an additional decision for whether or not contamination is detected. In the event that contamination is detected, the possibility for a glove breach or failure event is revisited.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗