REMOTE SENSOR SECURITY THROUGH ENCODED COMPUTATION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES
Ph.D. Thesis: REMOTE SENSOR SECURITY THROUGH ENCODED COMPUTATION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES
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Engineering topics
Hutto, Kevin
Publications and source records attributed to Hutto, Kevin.
GridTrust Release
A repository for the source code for the complete implementation of GridTrust, excluding the networking/LAN aspects.
Hutto, Kevin↗
Late Breaking Results: COPPER: Computation Obfuscation by Producing Permutations for Encoding Randomly
Deployed embedded devices face security risks due to increased ease of physical access to the devices by unauthorized users. Capable adversaries can intercept a device to recover the data in memory, including results of performed sensitive computations. Device owners require data confidentiality on their physically insecure devices. To satisfy this goal we implement a novel method, COPPER (Computation Obfuscation by Producing Permutations for Encoding Randomly), to create data which never exists on the device digitally in plaintext format and which is subsequently used for computation. In this paper we utilize COPPER to calculate a moving average computation on encoded data.
embedded systems↗
RanCompute: Computational Security in Embedded Devices via Random Input and Output Encodings
An embedded device in an insecure environment is subject to additional security risk through capture and reverse-engineering by a capable adversary. If this device contains a microchip performing sensitive computations, capture of the chip may leak functionality to an adversary. In this paper we propose a novel method in which we randomly encode the input operands and the outputs of a computation, thus not revealing the arithmetic operations being performed. The operations are sequenced in a graph representing the overall application. Once the initialization values are overwritten and lost, the results of these computations are indecipherable by the device performing the calculations as well as by any adversary. The result is transmitted back to a secure server which has stored the initialization values and so can decode the results which appear random to the adversary.
Embedded computing↗
PUF-Based Two-Factor Authentication Protocol for Securing the Power Grid Against Insider Threat
Recent advances in smart grid technologies have enabled additional distributed control paradigms that allow more efficient and reliable operation. However, this creates new security concerns for the grid, such as attackers using spoofed grid control devices to generate false measurements. This paper introduces a two-factor authentication protocol leveraging standard public-key cryptography as one authentication factor and a hardware-based fingerprint, known as a Physical Unclonable Function, as a second authentication factor. This protocol incurs a small overhead and prevents cyber-attacks even when an adversary is able to compromise the cryptographic keys stored in the non-volatile memory of an intelligent control device.
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Hardware-Based Randomized Encoding for Sensor Authentication in Power Grid SCADA Systems
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are utilized extensively in critical power grid infrastructures. Modern SCADA systems have been proven to be susceptible to cyber-security attacks and require improved security primitives in order to prevent unwanted influence from an adversarial party. One section of weakness in the SCADA system is the integrity of field level sensors providing essential data for control decisions at a master station. In this paper we propose a lightweight hardware scheme providing inferred authentication for SCADA sensors by combining an analog to digital converter and a permutation generator as a single integrated circuit. Through this method we encode critical sensor data at the time of sensing, so that unencoded data is never stored in memory, increasing the difficulty of software attacks. We show through experimentation how our design stops both software and hardware false data injection attacks occurring at the field level of SCADA systems.
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