Integration and Evaluation of the AdvoCATE, FRET, CoCoSim, and Event-B tools on the Inspection Rover Case Study
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FRET↗
Engineering topics
Irfan Sljivo
Publications and source records attributed to Irfan Sljivo.
Dynamic Assurance of Autonomous Systems through Ground Control Software
Assurance cases are being increasingly acknowledged as a way to build trust in complex systems with autonomous capabilities [1]. An assurance case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification that a system will function as intended for the specific mission and operating environment. Such justifications for systems with autonomous capabilities are often based on various probabilistic quantifications [2]. Due to the dynamic nature of the environmental conditions in which these systems operate, as well as the changing nature of the autonomous systems themselves, these probabilistic quantifications cannot be simply estimated once during design time. Rather, they need to be continually evaluated during systems operations to ensure that the assurance case justifications are valid. We refer to the assurance case that combines both the static and dynamic elements as a Dynamic Assurance Case (DAC). Such complex systems with autonomous capabilities are often deployed with a Ground Control Software (GCS) component to enable remote operation. Whether the system is composed of a single unit or a fleet of units, deployed distributed or in remote environments, GCS acts as a window into the behavior of the deployed system. It receives telemetry from the system, issues commands to the system and provides various functionalities to visualize the system performance. We propose a dynamic assurance framework where the GCS acts as a relay between the autonomous system and its DAC. GCS can be used to measure both unit-specific as well as system-wide probabilistic quantifications using the incoming telemetry. We embed these quantifications throughout the DAC as variables that can be updated by external sources. We use the GCS to periodically update these variables, which allows us to continually evaluate the formally defined assurance case justifications. We demonstrate our dynamic assurance framework in the NASA Ames project Troupe1 that aims at developing a fleet of rovers capable of au- tonomously mapping their environment. The rovers work cooperatively, each collecting data for different parts of the environment. Each rover runs an identical core Flight System (cFS) [4] application. Troupe1 uses OpenC3 Cosmos [5] as the ground system, and AdvoCATE [3] to capture the system DAC. We show how we can measure both rover-specific and system-wide quantifications in Cosmos using its Ruby scripting editor and pass them into the DAC modelled in AdvoCATE. Then, we show how these incoming variables can be embedded in different parts of the DAC and how effects of their updates can be observed
Irfan Sljivo↗
Guiding Integration of Formal Verification in Assurance Cases
Assurance cases are being increasingly acknowledged as away to build trust in complex systems with autonomous capabilities. An assurance case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification that a system will function as intended for a specific mission and operating environment. Formal verification is often reserved for the most critical components of such systems. However, formal verification tools are often complex, and their usage is subject to many constraints and contextual dependencies. This can raise challenges both for performing the verification as well as reflecting the verification results appropriately in the assurance case, especially for non-expert users of the verification tool. To address these challenges, we present a tool-supported methodology for integrating formal verification results in an assurance case by capturing key verification method information in a rigorously constructed assurance case. In particular, we capture the tool specification in terms of its inputs, outputs, and assurance constraints as assumptions over inputs and guarantees provided over its outputs. The tool specification is parametrized over the inputs and outputs to both guide the intended application of the tool, as well as to check that the tool has been applied following the stated assumptions and that the guarantees hold. We define a generic tool assurance argument pattern that enables integration of the verification results in the assurance case by allowing custom refinement and automated instantiation for each tool use. We demonstrate our methodology on two formal verification tools and their applications to the verification of neural network properties for the aircraft domain.
Assurance Cases↗
Dynamic Assurance of Autonomous Systems through Ground Control Software∗
Assurance cases are being increasingly acknowledged as a way to build trust in complex systems with autonomous capabilities [1]. An assurance case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification that a system will function as intended for the specific mission and operating environment. Such justifications for systems with autonomous capabilities are often based on various probabilistic quantifications [2]. Due to the dynamic nature of the environmental conditions in which these systems operate, as well as the changing nature of the autonomous systems themselves, these probabilistic quantifications cannot be simply estimated once during design time. Rather, they need to be continually evaluated during systems operations to ensure that the assurance case justifications are valid. We refer to the assurance case that combines both the static and dynamic elements as a Dynamic Assurance Case (DAC).
dynamic assurance case↗
Dynamic Assurance of Autonomous Systems Through Ground Control Software
Assurance cases have emerged as a way to build trust in complex autonomous systems. Many assurance case justifications for such systems need to be constantly reevaluated based on the current system context and performance. Autonomous systems, especially those deployed in remote environments, often have a ground control system that enables monitoring and remote operations. In this paper, we propose a dynamic assurance framework that aims at connecting the assurance case with the ground control system. We use the ground control system to facilitate dynamic evaluation of quantitative assurance measures that support various justifications in the assurance case. We demonstrate the proposed dynamic assurance framework on the NASA Ames Research Center project Troupe. We use a combination of in-house and external tools to identify the assurance measures, formalize the related requirements, and generate monitors that feed the data to the external ground control system.
dynamic assurance case↗
The Troupe System: an Autonomous Multi-Agent Rover Swarm
Autonomous cooperative robotic systems are the future of space exploration. The complexity of such systems makes their development, verification and assurance challenging. The Robust Software Engineering group at NASA Ames has developed the Troupe project that aims to explore the design and development of a swarm of autonomous rovers tasked to perform autonomous exploration and mapping of an unknown terrain. In this paper, we showcase the system design, and accompanying verification and validation tools integrated in the Troupe system development life-cycle.
TROUPE↗
Developing A Dependable Multi-Agent Rover Swarm Using cFS
The future of space exploration lies in cooperative autonomous systems. Ensuring their high integrity remains a challenge. The Robust Software Engineering group at NASA Ames Research Center has been developing the Troupe project to explore the challenges with developing and assuring high integrity of cooperative autonomous robotic systems. In particular, Troupe aims to develop a swarm of autonomous rovers capable of mapping unknown terrain and assure their high integrity using the advanced V&V tools developed in the group. In this paper, we present the evolution of the design of Troupe. We focus on the lessons learned in developing and assuring the rover swarm using core Flight System (cFS). In particular, we discuss the benefits and challenges in applying model-based development to develop the rover swarm.
space systems↗
Developing A Dependable Multi-Agent Rover Swarm Using cFS
The future of space exploration lies in cooperative autonomous systems. Ensuring their high integrity remains a challenge. The Robust Software Engineering group at NASA Ames Research Center has been developing the Troupe project to explore the challenges with developing and assuring high integrity of cooperative autonomous robotic systems. In particular, Troupe aims to develop a swarm of autonomous rovers capable of mapping unknown terrain and assure their high integrity using the advanced V&V tools developed in the group. In this paper, we present the evolution of the design of Troupe. We focus on the lessons learned in developing and assuring the rover swarm using core Flight System (cFS). In particular, we discuss the benefits and challenges in applying model-based development to develop the rover swarm.
space systems↗