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Jacobs, Nicholas

Publications and source records attributed to Jacobs, Nicholas.

At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessing DER Network Cybersecurity Defences in a Power-Communication Co-Simulation Environment

Increasing penetrations of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric power system are expanding the power system attack surface. Maloperation or malicious control of DER equipment can now cause substantial disturbances to grid operations. Fortunately, many options exist to defend and limit adversary impact on these newly-created DER communication networks, which typically traverse the public internet. However, implementing these security features will increase communication latency, thereby adversely impacting real-time DER grid support service effectiveness. In this work, a collection of software tools called SCEPTRE were used to create a co-simulation environment where SunSpec-compliant PV inverters were deployed as virtual machines and interconnected to simulated communication network equipment. Network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defence security features were deployed on the control network to evaluate their influence on cybersecurity metrics and power system performance. The results indicated that adding these security features did not impact DER-based grid control systems but improved the cybersecurity posture of the network when implemented appropriately.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Cryptography Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Systems

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems are rapidly being adopted and integrated within the electric power grid. Developments in smart grid devices and communication protocols are advancing the power system domain but are also introducing new cyber attack vectors. In particular, the ability to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data is of increasing concern. Cryptography is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to protect DER systems and their critical information. This paper discusses prominent methods of cryptographic authentication and encryption that can be used to secure DER communications. Specific considerations and recommendations for applying cryptography to DER systems are provided, including system design constraints and system impact. These will be demonstrated with two case studies that assess cryptography hardware requirements and communications latency in DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Analysis of System and Interoperability Impact from Securing Communications for Distributed Energy Resources

As the power grid incorporates increasing amounts of distributed energy resources (DER) that provide new generation sources, new opportunities are created for improving operation of the grid while large challenges also arise for preserving grid reliability and security. To improve grid performance, DERs can be utilized to provide important support functionality, such as supporting frequency and voltage levels, especially if they are assisted by communication schemes as part of an advanced distribution management system (ADMS). Unfortunately, such connectivity and grid support functionality also creates additional cyber security risk with the potential for degradation of grid services, especially under conditions with high amounts of distributed generation. This paper will first discuss the communications needed by DERs to support system and interoperability objectives, as well as the security requirements and impact of securing these communications. Some common security mechanisms are discussed in relation to DERs, and a simulated 15-bus model of a distribution feeder is used to demonstrate aspects of the DER communications and impact to grid performance. These results help to advance understanding of the benefits, requirements, and mechanisms for securely implementing DER communications while ensuring that grid reliability is maintained.

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DOE OSTI2019

Module OT Laboratory Test Procedure

This document will detail a test procedure, involving bench and emulation testing, for the Module OT device developed for the joint NREL-SNL DOE CEDS project titled "Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command & Control Messages on Operational Technology (OT) Networks." The aim of this document is to create the testing and evaluation protocol for the module for lab-level testing; this includes checklists and experiments for information gathering, functional testing, cryptographic implementation, public key infrastructure, key exchange/authentication, encryption, and implementation testing in the emulation environment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Cybersecurity Assessments on Emulated DER Communication Networks

An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Analysis of Design Constraints and System Impact of DER Cryptographic Module

In designing a security module for inverter communications in a DER environment, it is critical to consider the impact of the additional security on the environment as well as what types of security is required for the various messages that must pass from the inverter to and from a utility. Also, since cyber security is more than just preventing an unauthorized user from viewing data, mechanisms for proving identity and ensuring that data cannot be altered without such a modification being discovered are needed. This is where the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability come into play. For different types of communications, these different security principles may be important or not needed at all. Furthermore, the cost and constraints for applying cryptography for securing DER communications must be considered to help determine what is feasible within this environment and what will be the impact and cost of applying common cryptographic protections to inverter communications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Analysis of Design Constraints and System Impact of DER Cryptographic Module

In designing a security module for inverter communications in a DER environment, it is critical to consider the impact of the additional security on the environment as well as what types of security is required for the various messages that must pass from the inverter to and from a utility. Also, since cyber security is more than just preventing an unauthorized user from viewing data, mechanisms for proving identity and ensuring that data cannot be altered without such a modification being discovered are needed. This is where the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability come into play. For different types of communications, these different security principles may be important or not needed at all. Furthermore, the cost and constraints for applying cryptography for securing DER communications must be considered to help determine what is feasible within this environment and what will be the impact and cost of applying common cryptographic protections to inverter communications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

General Requirements for Designing and Implementing a Cryptography Module for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Systems

Penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) is rapidly increasing in the bulk power system (BPS); they are growing to be a significant portion of generation. As such, grid-support capabilities are being developed and implemented. However, as their presence increases, the impact of DERs on the BPS also increases. Therefore, if a disturbance occurs in the DER system, its effects could propagate throughout the BPS. These disturbances could range from equipment malfunctions to resource variability to cyber attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

General Requirements for Designing and Implementing a Cryptography Module for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Systems

Penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) is rapidly increasing in the bulk power system (BPS); they are growing to be a significant portion of generation. As such, grid-support capabilities are being developed and implemented; IEEE Std. 1547 mandates new interconnection and interoperability standards to achieve these capabilities and allow remote users to change behaviors to many devices. However, as their presence increases, the impact of DERs on the BPS also increases. Therefore, if a disturbance occurs in the DER system, its effects could propagate throughout the BPS. These disturbances could range from equipment malfunctions to resource variability to cyber attacks. This document will discuss general requirements needed for developing a distributed cryptography module for implementation in DER systems. First, we will examine the composition of DER systems in Section 2. Procedures to identify critical assets and the security of DERs is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 introduces cryptography concepts and Section 5 discusses implementation needs and options. Finally, practical considerations are provided in Section 6 and conclusions are provided in Section 7.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗