Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Jacqueline Charvat.
Welcome to the April 2024 issue of the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH) Newsletter. In this issue, we celebrate LSAH lead, Dr. Mary Wear’s retirement, inform you of the Apollo Records Synthesis Project (ARSP), and recap information shared at the 2024 Human Research Program (HRP) Investigators’ Workshop (IWS) by our LSAH Epidemiologists and NASA HRP team.
As spaceflight continues to advance, understanding who has been to space in the past and what occurred during those missions, can help us better create a contextual foundation for the data that has been collected. This foundation can in turn guide how data may be generalized and applied to future crew selections and mission programs.
Welcome to the April 2023 issue of the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH) Newsletter! Along with the familiar subjects in previous issues, this issue will introduce two new sections: Clinic Corner, where Dr. Tim LaVan shares a brief status of the Flight Medicine Clinic, and Formers Corner, where we share images and captions submitted by you and your fellow crewmates!
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For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.
For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. Formalization of the process for creating these causal diagrams will enable the creation of a composite risk network that is vetted by members of the NASA community and configuration managed. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document outlines the pilot process, the standardized approaches, and guidance for risk custodian teams when creating and updating DAGs as a part of the NASA Human System Risk Management process.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The designers of the next generation of lunar landers may adopt novel, crew-body orientations outside of our flight history or applied to flight durations and environments outside of our experience. Current sustained translational acceleration requirements in NASA-STD-3001 are applicable only to crewmembers in a seated posture and are thus inadequate to address human tolerance in non-seated configurations. Initial designs for the Apollo Lunar Module (LM) included seats for both commander and pilot; however, these were subsequently removed from the vehicle due to mass constraints and a willingness to accept the unknown risks for short-duration missions given the limited human physiologic data at the time. In the years since Apollo, our evidence base has grown immensely. Initial Artemis mission timelines under consideration will be longer than the longest Apollo mission, by a significant margin, with timeframes more analogous to longer Space Shuttle missions. Given the incidence of postflight orthostatic intolerance following shuttle missions, a significant risk may exist for lander design(s) pursuing a standing crew configuration similar to Apollo LM. New sustained translational acceleration limits developed to address this risk are presented herein. These limits were derived from evaluations of Apollo biomedical and flight profile data during lunar descent and ascent operations, Soyuz and Space Shuttle flight profile and post-landing biomedical data, and analogue bed rest post-exposure data on orthostatic intolerance.
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BACKGROUND As NASA’s mission programs begin to shift from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to planetary mission profiles, the importance of understanding the phenomena a human experience when returning from spaceflight is of increased importance. The purpose of this study was to assess trends across individuals in the symptoms experienced during the landing process of long duration ISS missions. METHODS Data for this study is an aggregation of mission level data from forms used by crew surgeons at R+0, electronic medical records, notes from weekly Space Medicine Operation Team meetings, records in the Shuttle Mission Data Archive, and data collected by research teams in the Human Research Program (HRP). Aggregated data was used in descriptive analysis of the trends in medical events and countermeasure use. The data was also used to identify high value targets for emphasis in on going surveillance efforts. RESULTS Completeness of reporting varied greatly over time and across missions dependent on information sources available for data extraction. Landing forms provided the most complete data but still missed or left unconfirmed, several, common symptoms, and countermeasures. Data aggregation did show to cover gaps within individual data sources. Commonly reported symptoms included nystagmus, vertigo, and nausea. Common protocols for fluid loading and meclizine are reflected within the data set. DISCUSSION The data set generated in this project provides a foundation that show how symptoms of astronauts as they return to Earth varies across the long duration ISS missions. While there is an abundance of information provided within the data set, there are still inconsistencies in reporting especially in the absence of the landing day form. Further data collection practices should be standardized to ease the burden on crew surgeons during R+0 exams and better collect high value variables.
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