Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

James L Hyde

Publications and source records attributed to James L Hyde.

7 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2023

Orion Artemis I as Flown MMOD Analysis

The Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. The comparison showed that Bumper analysis predictions were generally within one integer value of the damage found, which is considered high accuracy. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this effort extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗
NASA NTRS2023

Orion Artemis I as Flown MMOD Analysis

The Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. The comparison showed that Bumper analysis predictions were generally within one integer value of the damage found, which is considered high accuracy. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this effort extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

Kevin D Deighton↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon 1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

Introduction The SpaceX Dragon 1 spacecraft performed 20 resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team from the NASA John-son Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group inspected each Dragon 1 capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions. Scope A general description of the areas of the vehicle that were inspected are provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. The paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected as well as the results of analysis of intact samples collected for spectroscopic analysis to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest MMOD environments are also presented. Findings Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides de-tails of each of these variables. (1) Damage equations (2) Impact condition assumptions a. Projectile density b. Impact speed c. Impact angle (3) Analysis results a. pre-flight vs. on-orbit damage b. MMOD vs. non-MMOD Conclusions and Recommendations The ISS visiting vehicle impact database is an ongoing project. SpaceX provides crew rotations as well as resupply and cargo return with the Dragon 2 spacecraft. Sierra Space is manifested for resupply and cargo return services starting in 2023. Boeing is expected to provide crew rotations as well. All of these spacecraft will provide additional opportunities for post flight MMOD inspections of space exposed hardware. Acknowledgements Over the course of the inspection campaign various personnel at the SpaceX Texas Test Site in McGregor and at the SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne CA provided valuable support to this activity.

James L Hyde↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion Artemis I As Flown MMOD Analysis

Introduction The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, an engineer from the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris MMOD analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, a team from the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. Scope of Work The spacecraft geometry model was created by Lockheed Martin during construction of the Artemis I Orion vehicle based on Computer Aided Design (CAD) models of the vehicle. New hypervelocity impact testing was performed to verify Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) used in the analysis to link impactor size and damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS). The exact trajectory flown was recorded during the flight, including vehicle attitude. This data was used in conjunction with the ORDEM 3.2 and MEM 3 environment modeling tools to create models of particle flux impacting the spacecraft throughout the mission. Meteoroid shower forecast information was also included to account for additional particle flux associated with meteoroid showers. Inspection of the Orion capsule included the Backshell thermal tiles and the tape covering it, windows, fabric thermal materials, and small areas of other materials. Potential MMOD damage found was characterized using various techniques, including optical microscopy, computed tomography scanning, and X-ray spectroscopy. Findings The number of craters found in the Backshell tile, and their size distribution, matches well with the Bumper analysis prediction. Tape, window, and other material impacts recorded similarly align to Bumper analysis predictions. Conclusions and Recommendations This comparison of analysis with inspection of the hardware provides valuable insight into the MMOD environment and how accurately analysis tools assess the impact risk to spacecraft. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this analysis extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (XEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs). An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an MMOD risk assessment of the internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds.

Micrometeoroid↗