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Jason Norcross

Publications and source records attributed to Jason Norcross.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2023

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗
NASA NTRS2022

Recommendations for Developing Space Suit Integrated Food Systems and Delivering Nutrition Before, During, and After Lunar EVA

The concept of providing hydration and nutrition during extravehicular activity (EVA) is nearly as old as the space program itself. Astronauts currently have access to 32 ounces of water through a disposable in-suit drink bag (DIDB) while they are confined to their space suit. During the Apollo program, methods for providing food/nutrition to crewmembers in space suits were included as contingency solutions (1) but were eventually abandoned. The main reasons that provision of in-suit nutrition beyond water was discontinued after Apollo were the complicated engineering requirements, the additional mass and volume that was required for the applicable food formulations, hardware needed for a suit-specialized food system, and because the perceived need for in-suit nutrition during EVAs was not sufficient during the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station (ISS) eras. A custom-made 165-kcal fruit bar was fitted into the EVA suit during the Space Shuttle program, but crewmembers rarely consumed it during the EVA and rather chose to consume it before or after suited activities (2). Since 2011, between 4 and 13 EVAs have been conducted from the ISS each year, with durations ranging from 1:32 to 8:17 hours (https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/spacewalks ). It has been acceptable for the crewmembers to schedule food intake around these relatively infrequent suited activities. Because upcoming Artemis missions will include nominal 8-hour lunar exploration EVAs that are expected to increase in frequency to several (4 to 5) sorties per week (3), the desire for an in-suit nutrition system has increased. In preparation for these missions, requirements to provide in-suit nutrition has been outlined in the most recent NASA Human Spaceflight Standards documents (4). Establishing general recommendations for in-suit nutrition systems precedes the selection of a lunar EVA pressure suit system. The current document is intended to define the rationale for nutrition to support EVA (whether in-suit or from the pantry in the habitat), document the requirements, constraints, and crewmember preferences, and recommend necessary next steps for developing an in-suit EVA nutrition system. Assessments presented in this report include a review of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) food products as potential in-suit formulations, a comparison of conceptual designs for delivering nutrition to a crewmember while confined to a space suit, an evaluation of space suit volume constraints for the placement of in-suit nutrition systems, and feedback from astronauts regarding preferences for nutrition support during EVA. Based on these assessments, recommendations were formulated that can be used to help develop a method to deliver nutrition safely and acceptably to a crewmember while they are confined to a space suit for an EVA duration of up to 8 hours, and a total time in the suit of up to 12 hours.

space suit↗
NASA NTRS2022

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new extravehicular (EVA) suit is being developed for National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) upcoming lunar missions that will be designed to operate in both the lunar surface and in microgravity. This suit will allow for increased range of motion compared to the current Extravehicular Mobility Unity (EMU) and Apollo era suits and have additional features (e.g. ability to increase pressure in the field) that will enhance the health and safety of exploration astronaut.

Teresa M Reiber↗
NASA NTRS2022

Evidence Report: Risk of Injury and Compromised Performance due to EVA Operations

During future missions to the Moon and Mars, each crewmember will most likely perform up to 24 hours a week of extravehicular activity (EVA) in support of exploration, science, construction, and maintenance tasks. Achieving mission objectives will require EVA systems and operations concepts that maximize human performance and efficiency while minimizing health and safety risks for crewmembers. Currently, over 450 EVAs have been performed in microgravity using the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The EMU space suit has enabled the successful assembly and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) for over 20 years, as well as deployment of payload experiments, solar arrays, satellite launches and repairs. This EVA work was accomplished at a slower cadence than is expected for Moon and Mars, with ISS crewmembers performing no more than 7 EVAs during a single mission and without any back-to-back EVAs. Despite their success, ISS EVAs have resulted in more injury to EVA crewmembers than may be acceptable for long-duration exploration missions. The Apollo astronauts completed EVA tasks in suits that were designed for their short-duration lunar missions, although suit mobility problems were evident. The more frequent EVAs and more varied EVA tasks that are anticipated during the future longer-duration exploration missions will require EVA suits and systems that are better oriented to human health and performance than those used during the Apollo Program. Many of the problems that were encountered with the Apollo EVA suits (e.g., limited mobility and dexterity, high and aft center of gravity, and other features requiring significant crew compensation) will need to be corrected or mitigated to optimize EVA objectives of exploration missions. It is critical that we understand how EVA system design variables such as suit pressure, weight/mass, center-of-gravity location, joint ranges of motion, and biomedical monitoring, affects the ability of astronauts to perform safe, efficient, and effective EVAs. To achieve this understanding, EVA researchers will need to develop and execute an integrated human testing program across multiple environments. The research will provide objective data that will enable informed design decisions and crewmember standards, thereby ensuring EVA systems that optimize crewmember health, safety, efficiency, and performance. This report describes the risks to crew health, safety, performance, and efficiency caused by EVA operations, and it provides the evidence base to substantiate the importance of the risk.

EVA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Validation of Decompression Sickness Risk Mitigation Protocols for Planetary Spaceflight Missions

BACKGROUND: Apollo missions used a 100% O2 cabin atmosphere which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activity (EVA) on the moon. NASA’s future missions to the moon and Mars are expected to use nitrox gas mixtures of up to 34% O2, 66% N2, which will reduce flammability risk compared with Apollo, but will necessitate Oxygen prebreathe prior to EVA to reduce DCS risk to acceptable levels. Prebreathe protocols used on the space shuttle and International Space Station are validated for microgravity EVAs, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary EVA. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA as a compromise that balances prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. However, this atmosphere may not be used for vehicles that do not support frequent EVA, and with commercial providers and international providers expected to provide landers, pressurized rovers, habitats, and spacesuits, different combinations of vehicle and spacesuit atmospheres are possible and will each require validated prebreathe protocols. OVERVIEW: Key components of a multi-year strategic roadmap include: 1) Establish hypobaric chamber facility capable of supporting 8-person EVA prebreathe validation tests at saturation atmospheres up to 36% O2; 2) validate an EVA physical workload simulation for use during prebreathe validation testing; 3) validate the recommended “exploration atmosphere” prebreathe protocol; 4) validate prebreathe protocols for additional atmospheric combinations that bound the most likely potential operating ranges of future vehicles and spacesuits; and 5) update DCS risk estimation models based on results of prebreathe validation studies. DISCUSSION: Details and data from completion of the first two steps of the strategic roadmap will be presented; the third step is currently underway, with pilot results provided in a companion presentation. Steps four and five will require a multi-year series of chamber tests; collaborations are being pursued.

Andrew F. J. Abercromby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Results of a 3-day Pilot Study to Validate Planetary Prebreathe Protocols Using a 56.5 kPa 34% O2, 66% N2 Saturation Cabin Atmosphere

INTRODUCTION: Apollo missions used 100% O2 cabin atmospheres which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activities (EVAs, ‘spacewalks’); however, this atmosphere presented a flammability risk that is no longer acceptable to NASA. Denitrogenation prebreathe protocols used to mitigate DCS risk for Space Shuttle and International Space Station EVAs are validated for the microgravity environment, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory surface EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary/Lunar missions. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA for future Moon and Mars missions as a compromise that balances subsequent pre-EVA prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. Prebreathe validation studies was initiated utilizing a three-story 6m diameter hypobaric chamber at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. Here, we report the results of a 3-day human-in-the-loop system checkout. METHODS: Six volunteers acclimated to the 56.6kPa/34% O2 66% N2 environment for 48hrs prior to conducting a 20-minute prebreathe and a 6-hour simulated EVA at 34kPa/85% O2 / 15% N2. The EVA simulation was designed to include tasks that are physically and ergonomically representative of future planetary EVAs. Decompression stress was evaluated by serial doppler and echocardiographs, as well as by clinical features of DCS signs/symptoms. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: Preliminary data analysis noted venous gas emboli (VGE) in 3 of 6 subjects, with peak Grade II VGE by Doppler and peak E-B score of 5 by cardiac ultrasonography. No volunteers were diagnosed with DCS during this initial test. No acute hypoxic symptoms were noted. Musculoskeletal and gastrointestinal complaints were noted, likely associated with the exercise load and the food system. Validation of exploration prebreathe protocols has since been initiated with an 11-day saturation test using the same facility and protocol.

Alejandro Garbino↗