Can Cell-to-Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation in Li-ion Modules be Prevented?
No abstract available
Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Jeevarajan, Judith.
No abstract available
Increasing cell spacing decreased adjacent cell damage center dotElectrically connected adjacent cells drained more than physically adjacent cells center dotRadiant barrier prevents propagation when fully installed between BP cells center dotBP cells vent rapidly and expel contents at 100% SOC -Slower vent with flame/smoke at 50% -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 160 degC center dotLG cells vent but do not expel contents -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 200 degC center dotSKC LFP modules did not propagate; fuses on negative terminal of cell may provide a benefit in reducing cell to cell damage propagation. New requirement in NASA-Battery Safety Requirements document: JSC 20793 Rev C 5.1.5.1 Requirements - Thermal Runaway Propagation a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy cells (greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended application and environment. NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its battery deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols. This prevention-centered approach has included extensive screening for manufacturing defects, as well as robust battery management controls that prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of multiple system failures. This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of such an event highly improbable. b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the severity (consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment as well as to identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could appreciably reduce that severity. In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the severity of a possible thermal runaway event. Programs should assess whether there are reasonable design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of the outcome. Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled contaminates, and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard.
The li-ion pouch design cells exhibit similar behavior under off-nominal conditions as those in metal cans that do not have the internal safety devices. Safety should be well characterized before batteries are designed. Some of the li-ion pouch cell designs studied in this program reacted most violently to overcharge conditions at the medium rates but were tolerant to overcharge at very low rates. Some pouch cell designs have higher tolerance to vacuum exposures than some others. A comparison of the pouch material itself does not show a correlation between this tolerance and the number of layers or composition of the pouch indicating that this is a property of the electrode stack design inside the pouch. Reduced pressure (8 to 10 psi) test environments show that the extent of capacity degradation under reduced pressure environments is much less than that observed under vacuum conditions. Lithium-ion Pouch format cells are not necessarily true polymer cells.
With the need for long periods of extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the Moon or Mars or a near-asteroid, the need for long-performance batteries has increased significantly. The energy requirements for the EVA suit, as well as surface systems such as rovers, have increased significantly due to the number of applications they need to power at the same time. However, even with the best state-of-the-art Li-ion batteries, it is not possible to power the suit or the rovers for the extended period of performance. Carrying a charging system along with the batteries makes it cumbersome and requires a self-contained power source for the charging system that is usually not possible. An innovative method to charge and use the Li-ion batteries for long periods seems to be necessary and hence, with the advent of the Li-ion supercapacitors, a method has been developed to extend the performance period of the Li-ion power system for future exploration applications. The Li-ion supercapacitors have a working voltage range of 3.8 to 2.5 V, and are different from a traditional supercapacitor that typically has a working voltage of 1 V. The innovation is to use this Li-ion supercapacitor to charge Liion battery systems on an as-needed basis. The supercapacitors are charged using solar arrays and have battery systems of low capacity in parallel to be able to charge any one battery system while they provide power to the application. Supercapacitors can safely take up fast charge since the electrochemical process involved is still based on charge separation rather than the intercalation process seen in Li-ion batteries, thus preventing lithium metal deposition on the anodes. The lack of intercalation and eliminating wear of the supercapacitors allows for them to be charged and discharged safely for a few tens of thousands of cycles. The Li-ion supercapacitors can be charged from the solar cells during the day during an extended EVA. The Liion battery used can be half the capacity required for a nominal EVA. The small Li-ion battery can be divided into two parallel modules with independent charging ports that would allow the supercapacitors to charge one battery while the other is providing power to the rover or suit.
NASA's rigorous certification process is being followed for the R2 high voltage battery program for use of R2 on International Space Station (ISS). Rigorous development testing at appropriate levels to credible off-nominal conditions and review of test data led to design improvements for safety at the virtual cell, cartridge and battery levels. Tests were carried out at all levels to confirm that both hardware and software controls work. Stringent flight acceptance testing of the flight battery will be completed before launch for mission use on ISS.
NASA follows top level safety requirement of two-failure tolerance (t hree levels of controls or design for minimum risk) to all catastroph ic hazards in the design of safe li-ion batteries for space use. ? R igorous development testing at appropriate levels to credible offnominal conditions and review of test data. ? Implement robust design con trols based on test results and test again to confirm safety at the a ppropriate levels. ? Stringent testing of all (100%) flight batteries (from button cells to large batteries).
No abstract available
No abstract available
Lithium-ion batteries have the highest energy density of the batteries available in the commercial market today. Although most lithium-ion cell designs use a metal can design, this has changed significantly in recent years. Cell designs are offered in the pouch format as they offer better volumetric and gravimetric energy densities and in some cases, higher tolerance to abuse or off-nominal conditions. In the past decade, several state-of-the-art lithium-ion pouch cell designs have been tested. The pouch cell designs have become more robust in the past two years but there are still a few issues that need to be looked into for optimization. The pouch cells seem to have a tendency to swell when left in storage under ambient conditions. The cells also swell under overvoltage and undervoltage conditions. A significant issue that has been observed is the swelling of the cells under a vacuum condition which could lead to deformation of the cell pouch after this exposure. This last factor would be very critical in the use of these cell designs for space applications as vacuum exposure is used to check for cell and battery leaks before it is flown into space. In rare cases, corrosion of the aluminum layer of the pouches has been observed in stored cells. Pouch material analysis has been carried out in an effort to understand the strength of the pouches and determine if this is a factor in the corrosion as well as unsafe condition of the cells as deformation of the inner layers of the pouch could occur when the cells swell under the various conditions described above. Pouch materials are typically aluminized plastic, made up of a layer of Al sandwiched between one or more layers of polymeric material. Deformations or cell manufacturing processes could lead to a compromise of the inner polymeric layer/s of the pouch leading to the corrosion of the Al layer in the aluminized pouch material. The safety of the pouch cell designs has been determined for cells from various manufacturers. The results are varied and in some cases, unexpected. This paper presents a summary of the tests carried out on a few li-ion pouch cell designs from various cell manufacturers. The data will include performance under different conditions specifically cycling under vacuum conditions with and without restraints as well as safety test data. The presentation will also include detailed analysis of the pouch material for the cells studied.
Presentation covers: (1) Safety Certification Process at NASA (2) Safety Testing for Lithium-ion Batteries (3) Limitations Observed with Li-ion Batteries in High Voltage and High Capacity Configurations.
The purpose of this system is to simulate an internal short on battery cells by causing deformation (a crushing force) in a cell without penetration. This is performed by activating a hydraulic cylinder on one side of a blast wall with a hydraulic pump located on the other. The operator can control the rate of the crush by monitoring a local pressure gauge connected to the hydraulic cylinder or a load cell digital display located at the hydraulic pump control area. The internal short simulated would be considered a worst-case scenario of a manufacturer fs defect. This is a catastrophic failure of a cell and could be a very destructive event. Fully charged cells are to have an internal short simulated at the center of the length of the cell (away from terminals). The crush can be performed with a .- to 1-in. (.0.6- to 2.5-cm) rod placed crossways to the cell axis, causing deformation of the cell without penetration. The OCV (open-circuit voltage) and temperature of the cells, as well as the pressure and crushing force, are recorded during the operation. Occurrence of an internal short accompanied by any visible physical changes such as venting, fires, or explosions is reported. Typical analytical data examined after the test would be plots of voltage, temperature, and pressure or force versus time. The rate of crushing force can be increased or decreased based on how fast the operator pumps the hydraulic pump. The size of cylinder used to compress the battery cell can be easily changed by adding larger or smaller fittings onto the end of the hydraulic cylinder based on the battery/cell size being tested. The cell is crushed remotely and videotaped, allowing the operator to closely monitor the situation from a safe distance.
The purpose of this innovation is to use microstrain gauges to monitor minute changes in temperature along with material properties of the metal cans and pouches used in the construction of lithium-ion cells. The sensitivity of the microstrain gauges to extremely small changes in temperatures internal to the cells makes them a valuable asset in controlling the hazards in lithium-ion cells. The test program on lithium-ion cells included various cell configurations, including the pouch type configurations. The thermal properties of microstrain gauges have been found to contribute significantly as safety monitors in lithium-ion cells that are designed even with hard metal cases. Although the metal cans do not undergo changes in material property, even under worst-case unsafe conditions, the small changes in thermal properties observed during charge and discharge of the cell provide an observable change in resistance of the strain gauge. Under abusive or unsafe conditions, the change in the resistance is large. This large change is observed as a significant change in slope, and this can be used to prevent cells from going into a thermal runaway condition. For flexible metal cans or pouch-type lithium-ion cells, combinations of changes in material properties along with thermal changes can be used as an indication for the initiation of an unsafe condition. Lithium-ion cells have a very high energy density, no memory effect, and almost 100-percent efficiency of charge and discharge. However, due to the presence of a flammable electrolyte, along with the very high energy density and the capability of releasing oxygen from the cathode, these cells can go into a hazardous condition of venting, fire, and thermal runaway. Commercial lithium-ion cells have current and voltage monitoring devices that are used to control the charge and discharge of the batteries. Some lithium-ion cells have internal protective devices, but when used in multi-cell configurations, these protective devices either do not protect or are themselves a hazard to the cell due to their limitations. These devices do not help in cases where the cells develop high impedance that suddenly causes them to go into a thermal runaway condition. Temperature monitoring typically helps with tracking the performance of a battery. But normal thermistors or thermal sensors do not provide the accuracy needed for this and cannot track a change in internal cell temperatures until it is too late to stop a thermal runaway.
Lithium-ion cells in the cylindrical Commercial-off-the-shelf 18650 design format were used to study the hazards associated with overdischarge. The cells in series or in parallel configurations were subjected to different conditions of overdischarge. The cells in parallel configurations were all overdischarged to 2.0 V for 75 cycles with one cell removed at 25 cycles to study the health of the cell. The cells in series were designed to be in an unbalanced configuration by discharging one cell in each series configuration before the start of test. The discharge consisted of removing a pre-determined capacity from the cell. This ranged from 50 to 150 mAh removal. The cells were discharged down to a predetermined end-of-discharge voltage cutoff which allowed the cell with lower capacity to go into an overdischarge mode. The cell modules that survived the 75 cycles were subjected to one overvoltage test to 4.4 V/cell.
Matrix Packs display large variations in cell bank voltages at the charge and discharge current (C/2) used in this test program. The voltage difference is larger at the end of discharge than at the end of charge under the conditions studied. Disconnection of a cell from the pack leads to a larger voltage difference during discharge (greater than 2.0 V) between the bank that has one less cell and the other banks. Thermal profile does not show any significant changes or increase in temperature after one cell was disconnected from the bank in spite of falling to very low voltages at the end of discharge. All tests on the matrix pack with the HAM displayed lower max in general due to the placement of thermocouple on the outside of the HAM rather than on the cells. Disconnection of cells has almost no influence on the performance of the packs and does not show any abnormal thermal changes for the 100 cycles obtained in this test program. Longer cycle life may influence the performance especially if the low voltage cell goes into reversal. Overcharge leads to CID activation of cells. If the matrix configuration has a larger number of cells in series, (more than 5 S configuration), the limitations of protective devices may manifest itself irrespective of it being in a matrix configuration. External short circuit causes a fire with expulsion of content from some cells. The fire does not propagate itself laterally, but if there was cell module stacking, then the fire would cause the cells above it to also go into flames/thermal runaway. Limitations of protective devices are observed in this case as the PTCs in the cells did not protect under this abusive condition. Matrix configurations seem to provide protection against lateral propagation of fire and flame. Matrix pack configuration seems to provide good performance in spite of losing cell connections; at least for the configuration tested under this program.
Varta Cell Characteristics: Voltage : 3.7 V Capacity : 1.21 Ah Dimensions : 5mm X 37mm X 38.5 mm MOSFET switches for Overvoltage and Undervoltage. Initial Screening Results 29 Cells delivered: Statistics on Ph ysical Screening: Thickness (mm): Average- 5.08; Weight(g)- 22.8938; OCV (V)- 3.787; CCV (V)- 3.491.